

PART VI
SUPPORT AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 13

Supporting Arms

Marine Air Operations—Fixed-Wing Operations—Helicopter Operations—Artillery

Marine Air Operations

At the start of 1967, Major General Louis B. Robertshaw's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing consisted of three fixed-wing groups, MAGs-11, -12, and -13, and two helicopter groups, MAGs-16 and -36. One fixed-wing group, MAG-11, operated from Da Nang, while the other two were at Chu Lai. The two helicopter groups operated from different bases also; MAG-36 was at Ky Ha, and MAG-16 split between Marble Mountain and Phu Bai. Wing headquarters, services, command, and control functions came from units of Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1) at Da Nang.

General Robertshaw, as III MAF's air component commander, exercised operational control of these units through his staff and by means of the Marine

air command and control system. The key unit in this system, the tactical air direction center (TADC), was at wing headquarters in Da Nang.* This agency monitored the employment of all wing aircraft and allocated resources to specific missions. TADC exercised control through two subordinate organizations, the tactical air operations center (TAOC) and the direct air support centers (DASCs).

*The senior agency in the Marine air command and control system normally is the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). Since the Seventh Air Force had a TACC in Saigon, the 1st MAF center used "TADC" as provided for in doctrine. Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1971, p. 138.

Sunlight reflects from a .50 caliber machine gun sticking from the side of a CH-46A helicopter as it heads out on a late afternoon mission to a unit southwest of An Hoa.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421675



The TADC, manned by Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7), was the main control center for both anti-air warfare and air traffic control. Plotters wrote information from the unit's various radars on vertical display boards from which controllers maintained positive air traffic control, as well as target area air space control. In June, wing control capabilities significantly increased when MACS-4 arrived to replace MACS-7. The new unit brought with it a new semi-automated, computer-oriented TAOC which comprised part of the Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS). This TAOC permitted the wing to handle more than 200 aircraft tracks at the same time. When the complete MTDS became operational on Monkey Mountain on the Tiensha Peninsula northeast of Da Nang in July, it provided a link with the Navy Tactical Data System of the Seventh Fleet for instant exchange of air defense data with ships operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. Future plans for the MTDS included a connection with the Air Force Tactical Data System for passing air defense and air control data instantly from Thailand to Da Nang and naval units in the Tonkin Gulf.

While the TAOC, collocated with the MTDS and a Hawk missile battery on Monkey Mountain, served as the hub of wing control and air defense, the DASCs were the main centers of support for ground units. At the beginning of 1967, three DASCs were in operation; one at each of the division headquarters and one at the 3d Marine Division (Forward) Command Post at Dong Ha. Marine Air Support Squadrons (MASS) 2 and 3 provided the DASCs. Requests for air support, both attack and helicopter, passed through battalion and regimental air liaison officers to the DASC at division headquarters; requests from AOs and FACs went directly to DASC.

The support squadrons also contained the air support radar teams (ASRTs). During 1967, there were five ASRTs in operation. Located at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Dong Ha (two), each team used TPQ-10 radar to control aircraft in direct support missions during low visibility conditions. TPQ-10s had a 50-mile range, thus the Marine radar coverage included almost all of I Corps.

Although their mission was not tactical in nature, the Marine air traffic control units (MATCUs) were vital to the conduct of effective air operations. At all Marine airfields, the MATCUs provided terminal traffic control, including landing instructions and



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189984
Men from Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 62, a subordinate unit of MAG-12, operate at the Khe Sanh airstrip from expeditionary equipment they have sandbagged against NVA artillery and rockets.

ground-controlled approach data during periods of low visibility.

Until the activation of Marine Air Control Group 18 on 1 September 1967, the units operating the Marine air command and control system were part of Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1. With one headquarters squadron, two air support squadrons, two air control squadrons, and two anti-aircraft missile battalions on 1 July 1967, the group was one of the largest known to Marine aviation. Its personnel served throughout I Corps, including Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Marble Mountain, Monkey Mountain, and the Hai Van Pass.¹

Throughout 1967 the 1st MAW operated under the provisions of MACV Aviation Directive 95-4 of 25 June 1966. This directive gave the commander of the Seventh Air Force, in his capacity as Deputy Commander USMACV (Air), the "coordinating authority" for tactical air support in South Vietnam, but not actual operational control of Marine air. The system allowed 1st MAW to meet all of III MAF's air support requirements while making its excess sortie capability available to Seventh Air Force for supporting other U.S. and allied forces.

A Memorandum of Agreement between III MAF and Seventh Air Force guided 1st MAW's air defense operations during 1967. Both services recognized the

necessity of a unified air defense system in the event of a North Vietnamese air attack on South Vietnam. The agreement gave the Air Force overall air defense responsibility, including naming an air defense commander. The 1st MAW designated which of its forces would participate in air defense and granted the Air Force certain authority over those forces, including the scrambling of alert aircraft, designation of targets, declaration of Hawk missile control status, and firing orders.

Marine commanders were essentially satisfied with the adequacy of these documents. In actual practice, 1st MAW controlled all air operations in support of ground units in I Corps while making available 25 to 30 sorties per day to the Seventh Air Force.² This system remained in effect until the advent of "single management" in early 1968.

Fixed-Wing Operations

In the absence of enemy aircraft over South Vietnam, the day-to-day mission of the 1st MAW fighter and fighter attack squadrons became close air support (CAS).³ By long-established doctrinal definition, these air strikes were against targets so close to friendly forces that each mission required integration with the fire and maneuver plans of the ground combat element. For better coordination and to reduce the possibility of friendly casualties, a forward air controller (FAC) with the supported unit or an airborne forward air controller (FAC[A]) controlled these strikes.

There were two basic categories of CAS mission, preplanned and immediate. A preplanned strike was the culmination of a complex process. For example, a Marine battalion commander with the mission of taking a specified objective normally would submit a request for strike aircraft through his air liaison officer the day before the operation began. From the battalion this request passed through the DASC at division and eventually to the wing TADC at Da Nang. There, the TADC assimilated all requests and assigned missions to one of the three fixed-wing groups, depending on the nature of the target and aircraft type desired for the mission.

As soon as the TADC passed the mission to a MAG, the group operations officers compared the orders with aircraft availability within the group and assigned a schedule to each squadron for the following day. Each mission passed by TADC through group received a mission number, a time on target

(TOT), and a prescribed ordnance load;* the squadron scheduling officer merely assigned pilots and aircraft.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421815

A Marine forward air controller in a small O-1 observation aircraft checks a target after directing an air strike on the position by fixed-wing attack aircraft.

At the appropriate time, the aircraft took off and headed for the target. Once airborne, the flight leader contacted TADC to confirm that his flight was airborne and proceeding on schedule. Usually the TADC simply cleared the leader for his original mission, but if a target of higher priority developed, the TADC could divert the flight. In this case, before entering the new operating area, the leader contacted the responsible DASC, which cleared the flight to a local controller. Normally this was a division air liaison officer (ALO) or a Marine or Air Force FAC(A) flying over the area of the infantry unit to be supported.

FAC(A)s in either light observation planes or UH-1E helicopters controlled most CAS missions in I

*Colonel John M. Verdi pointed out that this system did not relieve the squadron commander of his responsibilities. The squadron commander had to carefully supervise the weight and balance of the prescribed load on the aircraft to avoid unnecessary danger to the crew and aircraft during takeoff and combat maneuvering. Col John M. Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Verdi Comments.

Corps. During these missions, the airborne controller monitored the ground unit's VHF radio net and directed the attacking aircraft over his UHF radio. When a flight arrived on station, the FAC informed the pilots* of the target description, elevation, attack heading, direction of pull-out, number of passes desired, and the number and type of bombs to be dropped on each pass. He also relayed the direction and distance to the nearest friendly units. The FAC then marked the target with a white phosphorous rocket or a smoke grenade. Once certain that the pilots had identified the correct target, the controller cleared the jet for an approach with the phrase "cleared hot." Thus instructed, the flight leader would make the first pass on the marked target, followed closely by his wingman. Throughout the strike, the ALO or FAC would relay corrections to the attack planes, often directing them to new targets as the Communist troops maneuvered or fled.

While preplanned missions required approximately 20 hours from time of request to time of delivery, the wing could respond much more quickly if necessary. This response was an "immediate mission." If an emergency developed, the TADC or DASCs diverted airborne flights to another target, and briefed them en route to the new target. The TADC also could launch aircraft from one of three "hot pads." Each of the three fixed-wing groups maintained four planes on an around-the-clock alert for this type of emergency. Two of the planes at each group were on primary alert, and the other two served as a backup in case of another emergency. The time lapse between notification to launch and until the on-call aircraft became airborne normally was just under 10 minutes. As soon as a flight of alert aircraft became airborne, another flight replaced it on the pad.

Another important aspect of Marine fixed-wing operations was deep air support. These strikes did not take place in the immediate vicinity of friendly forces and, therefore, did not require integration with the ground maneuver plan. Deep air support missions helped isolate the battlefield by destroying enemy reinforcements, support troops, and logistic

resources. If a FAC(A) was available in the objective area, he controlled the strikes, but his services were not mandatory because the distance from the target to friendly forces eliminated the chance of accidental bombing. However, pilots of strike aircraft often preferred to work with a FAC(A) on such missions because of the latter's greater familiarity with targets and enemy defenses in the area.⁴

The aircraft most frequently selected for close support missions was the Douglas A-4E Skyhawk. Colonel Jay W. Hubbard's MAG-12 included four A-4 squadrons. The A-4E was a small, highly maneuverable, attack jet capable of extremely accurate bombing. The Skyhawk could deliver a variety of ordnance including bombs, rockets, napalm, smoke, and 20mm cannon fire. The most significant performance limitation of the A-4 was the size of its payload, roughly 3,000 pounds.*


The McDonnell F-4B Phantom II was a more versatile aircraft. Four F-4 squadrons operated in Vietnam during 1967, one assigned to Colonel Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.'s MAG-11, at Da Nang and three with Colonel Douglas D. Petty, Jr.'s MAG-13. Designed to perform the primary air-to-air mission and modified to perform a secondary air-to-ground mission, the F-4 was one of the fastest interceptors in the world, yet it could carry as many as twenty-four 500-pound bombs for ground support.⁵

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Verdi commented, however, that this was a theoretical figure that did not reflect the realities of combat. He wrote recently:

... the F-4 *could* be loaded with as many as 24 Mk-82 bombs ... But (1) *not* an F-4B (unless one elected to go with 2,000 pounds less than full internal fuel so as to comply with max gross weight), and (2) *not* if the target was anywhere further away than the end of the runway. I daresay somebody might have hauled such a load in combat (to get his picture taken), but in the real tactical world the choices came down to TANK-3-6-3-TANK ([as did VMFA-] 122 and most USAF units) and 3-3-TANK-3-3 (most Navy units). Of course, Brand X [squadrons] did it 6-3-TANK-3-6, which (1) overloaded the airplane, (2) cracked the wing spars, and (3) gave the crew an unmanageable rolling moment in event of failure of one of those outboard MERs (multiple ejection racks) to release or jettison (something [the Air Force] found out when *they* tried it, which is why they went back to TANK-3-6-3-TANK.)⁶

*Colonel John M. Verdi noted that such in-the-clear radio transmissions also informed enemy monitors of the particulars of the mission. This was true of all radio transmissions, ground or air, without voice encryption devices, especially during this period when radio frequencies and call signs did not change on a daily basis. Verdi Comments.

*As is common with aircraft, the A-4's practical payload varied from as much as 5,000 pounds in the winter monsoon to as little as 2,000 pounds in the heat of summer, assuming a center-line external tank. Verdi comments.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A26453

A large ordnance load and multiple bomb racks made the A-4 Skyhawk, shown here in the A-4F version entering production in 1967, a mainstay for close air support missions.

Two other types of Marine aircraft available for ground support operations during 1967 were the Ling-Temco-Vought F-8E Crusader and the Grumman A6-A Intruder. One squadron of each type served under MAG-11 at Da Nang.

The Crusader carried internally mounted 20mm cannon and was the only Marine aircraft in Vietnam configured to carry more than one 2,000-pound bomb until the arrival of the A-6A. Because the F-8Es were originally designed as a high performance fighter, the Marines phased out these planes and replaced them with F-4s.⁷

The morning of 1 April, VMA(AW)-533, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Williams P. Brown, arrived at Chu Lai to become MAG-12's first A-6 squadron.* The A-6A was the only operational U.S. aircraft that had a self-contained all-weather bombing capability using a moving target indicator.⁸ It flew extensive interdiction missions during the monsoon season, not only in South Vietnam, but also in Laos and North Vietnam. The Intruder could carry a heavy bomb load to a target 400 miles away, drop its ordnance, and return to base, even during severe monsoon conditions.

The increase in heavy ground action in northern I Corps during the early months of 1967 brought demands for many more close and direct air support missions in that region. The heavy fighting at Khe Sanh in late April and early May provided a classic

example of integrated employment of modern, fixed-wing aviation in support of ground maneuver elements. In the two weeks of bitter fighting for Hills 881 North and South, the 1st MAW flew more than 1,000 sorties for Marine infantry units. The defeat of the enemy on this critical terrain was the product of skillful and closely coordinated air-ground action.

As the enemy continued to focus on northern Quang Tri Province, Marine aviation, from 2 June under the command of Major General Norman J. Anderson, increased the tempo of attack operations there. Primary targets were enemy artillery and rocket sites, a major threat to allied units and installations along the DMZ. By July, intelligence officers had identified approximately 130 sites, including weapons as large as 152mm gun-howitzers. The heaviest raids against these positions occurred during and after the battle for Con Thien, when Marine aircraft participated in joint operations called Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate. These operations received the acronym SLAM, for searching, locating, annihilating, and monitoring. This concept used the entire spectrum of supporting fire: B-52s, tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Elements of the Seventh Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Seventh Fleet, Vietnamese Air Force, Marine and Army artillery, and 1st MAW concentrated on destroying the enemy fire support positions. By the end of the year, the effort destroyed less than 40 of the NVA weapons.

While the majority of the 1st MAW's out-of-

*Lieutenant Colonel Howard Wolf's VMA(AW)-242, also flying the A-6A and part of MAG-11, had arrived in Vietnam on 1 November 1966.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422400-B

General purpose bombs hang from the wings of an A-6A Intruder from VMA(AW)-242 and an F-4B Phantom II from VMFA-542 enroute on a scheduled mission in Vietnam.

country missions were in the DMZ area, Marine pilots also participated in strikes against North Vietnam. These strikes involved the six areas of North Vietnam which planners called "route packages." Route Package I was immediately north of the DMZ; Route Package VI lay in the extreme north of the country. Bombing of the southern portion of Route Package I, codenamed "Tally Ho" and under the control of Seventh Air Force, began in July 1966. By the winter of 1967, Tally Ho missions ceased as a separate entity; strikes in the area thereafter fell within the overall interdiction campaign.⁹

The Seventh Air Force's retaliatory Rolling Thunder raids, initiated in March 1965, expanded to include high intensity interdiction missions during 1967. On 18 May 1967, VMA(AW)-242 participated in the first Rolling Thunder strike in Route Package VI (Hanoi/Haiphong).¹⁰ The other A-6A squadron, VMA(AW)-533, kept just as active. The sophisticated electronic equipment and superb all-weather capability of the Intruder made it an ideal aircraft for attacks against attractive, but heavily defended, North Vietnamese targets.

Because of the A-6's all-weather capability, 1st MAF reduced the enemy's antiaircraft effectiveness by flying most Marine Rolling Thunder missions at night and as single-aircraft missions.¹¹ During the strikes, the attack pilots relied upon assistance from their fellow Marines from VMCF-1. EF-10Bs and EA-6As of VMCF-1, the same basic aircraft as the A-6As, carried equipment for electronic countermeasure

missions; they carried no ordnance.¹² During the raids, the EF-10Bs or EA-6s orbited beyond North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile range and jammed the enemy's fire control radar while the attacking Intruders made their target runs. Because of their lighter equipment load, the EA-6As could remain on station longer than the attack aircraft, an ideal situation for superior electronic countermeasure raid protection. Prime targets for Rolling Thunder missions were bridges, fuel facilities, rolling stock, airfields, missile sites, and supply lines.*

In addition to close and deep air support missions, Marine fixed-wing squadrons conducted a variety of less dramatic, but equally important, tasks such as landing zone (LZ) preparation. These operations illustrated the then prevalent Marine Corps concept that the helicopter was a mode of transportation, not an attack aircraft. The 1st Wing provided fixed-wing support for helicopter assaults of contested landing zones. Prior to and during these landings, Marine attack aircraft would strike the objective area to clear obstacles and neutralize possible antiaircraft threats. As the troop-carrying helicopters entered the zone, the covering jet pilots would shift their attacks to terrain around the LZ from which the enemy could op-

*After the NVA's deployment of missiles in the DMZ area in April, electronic countermeasure EA-6As and older EF-10B Sky Knights remained airborne over the area to counter this threat. Their effectiveness limited Marine aircraft losses to only two missile kills during 1967.



3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967

Cargo parachutes stream from the rear of one of VMGR-152's KC-130s bringing supplies to the Khe Sanh combat base in September 1967 after enemy activity closed the only road leading to the base.

pose the landing. These strikes not only protected the helicopters, but also shielded the first infantry waves during the critical, early phase of the landing.

Other Marine fixed-wing pilots contributed immeasurably to the overall air effort, even though they never fired a shot or dropped a bomb. Some flew the C-117Ds assigned to the headquarters of the aircraft groups. These C-117D missions varied from routine logistics support to dropping flares over friendly forces at night. Another group of transport pilots came from VMGR-152. The squadron's Lockheed KC-130 Hercules provided extensive and varied support for both III MAF and 1st MAF. Though VMGR-152's home base remained at MCAS Futema, Okinawa, the squadron maintained a detachment of at least four planes on a rotational basis at Da Nang. The Marine transport's 30,000- to 35,000-pound cargo load, depending on mission range, served many varied logistic requirements. The 130s flew diversified missions such as in-flight refueling of jets, paradropping of bulk lots of ammunition and supplies, flare drops, and even service as airborne DASCs; as well as for daily, routine shipments of hundreds of passengers and tons of

cargo. Such varied missions required great flying skill, especially those into Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. Flying into Khe Sanh under visual flight rules and into Dong Ha with its dust and short runway were routine but far from dull missions for VMGR-152 pilots.¹³

VMCJ-1's version of the Phantom II, the RF-4B, equipped with cameras in the nose, performed a variety of photo-reconnaissance missions for 1st MAF. These aircraft also contributed directly to the defense of Da Nang, as described by one of the squadron's commanders, Major Edgar J. Love:

... after the second rocket attack on Da Nang, 14 July 1967, the RF-4B played a major role in helping to keep the VC from launching rockets within the 12,000 meter ring [around the base]. Through use of its sensors, the RF-4B was able to [monitor] a fairly large area on a daily basis from about 5 miles north of Da Nang to about 20 miles south and from the sea on the east to some 30 miles inland. When it was determined that the various [enemy] teams transporting rockets were converging into a central area, harassing fires or air strikes (including B-52s) were directed into these areas. It was a coordinated effort of reconnaissance patrols, artillery, air strikes, and airborne reconnaissance. As a side light, Major Richard W. Hawthorne and Captain Richard R. Kane, while flying one

The sun rises beneath the nose of a venerable C-117 at the Ky Ha airfield at the Chu Lai combat base in February. This particular aircraft had logged over 15,000 hours in the air and still performed reliably.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421604





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421998
Cpl William H. Mielke (top) and LCpl Phillip J. Orlando of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 36 repair the AD20-8 engine of their squadron's C-117D at Phu Bai on 30 December.

of these many reconnaissance flights, crashed in September 1967 and were declared missing.*¹⁴

Helicopter Operations

The Vietnam War was the first conflict in history to involve large-scale employment of helicopter forces. This "Cavalry of the Sky" provided the allies with the advantages of mobility and staying power which negated much of the advantage held by an already elusive enemy. To the infantryman the helicopter was more than a tactical expedient; it was a part of his life. Helicopters carried him into battle, provided him with life and fire support, and rushed him to the hospital if he were sick or wounded.

At the beginning of 1967, MAGs-16 and -36 and the SLF had a total of 11 helicopter squadrons operating in South Vietnamese air space. Of these, eight were transport squadrons flying either the Sikorsky UH-34D, a Vietnam veteran since early 1962, or the relatively new and larger Boeing-Vertol CH-46A. The other three squadrons were observation squadrons equipped with the highly

maneuverable, single-engined Bell UH-1E.*

The Marines used helicopters for five basic missions: tactical airlift of troops, insertion and extraction of reconnaissance teams, supply, downed aircraft recovery, and search and rescue. The helicopter groups frequently supported more than a dozen major ground operations during a given month. The 1st MAW maintained direct control of the helicopter groups, issuing orders to them on the basis of the ground units' daily needs. The air request and allotment chain of command was basically the same as for fixed-wing squadrons. While the daily schedule covered routine missions, many unforeseeable situations occurred, such as medical evacuations, emergency extractions, and downed aircraft. To deal with these contingencies, the squadrons kept a section of helicopters on strip alert, normally either one UH-34 or CH-46 transport and one armed UH-1E to fly "chase."

"Medevac" and emergency extractions were especially critical because lives depended on the quick and effective response of the helicopter crews. Most of these missions occurred when friendly forces were in close contact with the enemy; in such cases, ground fire in the landing zone was almost a certainty. Even with the jet and armed helicopter escort, rescue helicopters rarely departed the landing zone without sustaining hits from enemy fire. These flights usually took place over extremely rugged terrain, which gave the pilots problems in even finding the landing zone. MAG-16 and -36 squadrons flew these missions daily. The skill and courage of the helicopter crews were the major factors enabling nearly 99 percent of the wounded evacuees to survive.¹⁵

A major factor in the success of these missions was the presence of UH-1E "gunships." Assigned to the observation squadrons (VMOs), the UH-1Es functioned in a number of roles. The armed version, or gunship, carried four fuselage-mounted, electrically fired M-60 machine guns and two 19-round rocket packs. Gunships flew escort and close air support missions and also served as command and control

*The Marine Corps later administratively declared both officers legally dead. The determination occurred on 28 November 1978 for Hawthorne and 26 February 1980 for Kane.

*VMO squadrons each rated 12 light helicopters in 1965 and the Marine Corps had obtained UH-1Es based on this figure. The scarcity of suitable fixed-wing observation planes resulted in further procurement, so that by 1967 UH-1Es were the only aircraft assigned to the three VMOs in Vietnam. By December of that year, each squadron had between 21 and 27 UH-1Es available. This interim measure continued until the arrival of the long-awaited OV-10 in 1968.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421708

A Navy flight deck crewman on the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) signals the pilot of a Marine UH-1E that he is cleared for take off in support of Operation Beau Charger, Special Landing Force Alpha's assist to Operation Hickory against NVA forces below the DMZ.

"birds" for airborne forward air controllers as well as senior ground commanders. Each division commander had a permanently assigned helicopter; regimental and battalion commanders used others on an "as available" basis.

In the FAC(A) mode, one rocket pack carried white phosphorous marking rockets, the other contained high explosive missiles. In a clean, unarmed configuration, appropriately referred to as a "slick," the aircraft could carry seven to nine fully equipped troops. "Slicks" also performed administrative and transport missions such as VIP flights.

An incident occurred in southern Quang Ngai Province in late 1967 which demonstrated both the firepower of the armed UH-1E and the tenacity, skill, and courage of Marine gunship crews. On 19 August, Captain Stephen W. Pless, a VMO-6 gunship pilot, was flying chase for an emergency medevac mission when he heard over the radio net of another emergency situation. Pless learned that four U.S. Army soldiers were stranded on a beach north of Duc Pho and were about to be overwhelmed by a large Viet Cong force. Breaking off from his original mission, the Huey pilot flew to the scene. On arrival, Pless saw about 50 VC in the open; some were bayoneting and beating the Americans. He swept in

1stLt Jack H. McCracken, a helicopter pilot with HMM-165, escaped serious injury during a resupply mission in Quang Ngai province when the .30-caliber round he holds smashed into his cockpit and lodged in the hard rubber heel of his left boot.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A423001





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422068

The terror of a helicopter medevac flight under fire shows on the faces of a wounded Marine, Cpl Larry R. Miklos (center) and an unidentified Navy hospital corpsman as they watch an enemy machine gun shooting toward their helicopter on 1 September.

on the VC, killing and wounding many and driving the survivors back into a treeline. He made his rocket and machine gun attacks at such low levels that fragments from his own ordnance pelted the gunship. Though still under heavy small arms fire, Pless landed his gunship between the Communists in the treeline and the wounded soldiers. His two enlisted crewmen, Gunnery Sergeant Leroy N. Poulson and Lance Corporal John G. Phelps, leaped out of the helicopter and raced through enemy fire to help the wounded men.

Captain Rupert E. Fairfield, Jr., the co-pilot, killed three of the nearest VC with a burst from a M-60 machine gun, then ran to help Poulson and Phelps drag the soldiers to the aircraft. Captain Pless hovered his UH-1E and sent streams of machine gun fire into the Viet Cong positions in the treeline. Under cover of his fire, the three crewmen pulled the wounded soldiers into the helicopter. Pless headed the dangerously overloaded aircraft out to sea. Four times the helicopter settled into the water. Each time Captain Pless skipped it back into the air. While the crew threw out all unnecessary gear to lighten the craft, Pless jettisoned the rocket pods. Gradually, the UH-1E gained altitude and limped back to the 1st Hospital Company's landing pad at Chu Lai. In addition to rescuing the Americans, the crew received credit for killing a confirmed total of 20 VC and

probably killed another 38. Fairfield, Poulson, and Phelps each received the Navy Cross; Captain Pless

The Da Nang press center provides the location for this photograph taken during a news conference on 26 August following the dramatic flight that earned VMO-6's Capt Stephen W. Pless (second from left) his Medal of Honor. Others of the UH-1E crew, LCpl John G. Phelps, Capt Rupert E. Fairfield, Jr., and GySgt Leroy N. Poulson, received the Navy Cross.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189212





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370412

A smoke grenade marks the landing zone as a member of a helicopter support team brings in a CH-34D with supplies for the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines in Operation Shelby.

received the Medal of Honor, the first awarded to a member of the 1st MAW for action in Vietnam.*

While the armed helicopters participated in many dramatic exploits, the yeoman's share of the workload fell to the transport helicopters, the UH-34s and the CH-46s. In March of 1966, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing's tactical/logistical airlift capability significantly increased with the arrival of the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. It could carry a four-man crew and 17-20 combat-loaded troops, or 4,000 pounds of cargo, in contrast to the five to seven troops, or 1,500-pound lift capacity of the aging UH-34. The twin-engined, tandem-rotor transport had a retractable tail ramp, a 115-mile combat radius, and a top speed of about 145 knots. The Sea Knight was the only Marine helicopter in

Vietnam armed with two .50-caliber machine guns.*

The arrival of another aircraft in 1967 further improved Marine helicopter capabilities. On 8 January, a four-plane detachment of CH-53A Sea Stallions from HMH-463 joined MAG-16 at Marble Mountain. They were the first increment of a phased replacement of the obsolescent CH-37s. By the end of the year, 36 of the big CH-53s operated in I Corps. These twin-turbine, single-rotor assault transports could carry an impressive internal cargo of 8,000 pounds, but more significantly the "53A" had a six-ton external lift capability which permitted battlefield salvage of disabled UH-34Ds and CH-46s. By the end of 1967, Marine Sea Stallions had retrieved more than 120 damaged aircraft which avoided

*In addition to the Medal of Honor, Captain Pless, who flew over 700 combat missions in two tours in Vietnam, earned the Silver Star Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star Medal, 32 Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal, the Korean Order of Military Merit, and the Purple Heart. After returning to the U.S., this colorful Marine aviator died in a tragic motorcycle crash at Pensacola, Florida, in 1969. See Appendix D for Captain Pless' Medal of Honor citation.

*Major General Norman J. Anderson has cautioned that there was a greater complexity behind this simple statement about two .50-caliber machine guns on helicopters. "This became standard, replacing the .30-caliber," he wrote, "only after extensive experience proved the need for the range and impact of the heavier weapon. Issues such as this, and there were many in the ordnance and engineering areas, were important and should not be [overlooked] or you create the impression that aviation sailed through the war without problems." MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments on draft ms, 10Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370575

Infantrymen lean forward against the rotor wash and rush forward to unload supplies from a CH-46A Sea Knight helicopter in the 1st Marine Division's Operation Citrus.

destroying them in place. Troop lift and ambulance capabilities also increased with the Sea Stallions' arrival; normal loads were 37 combat troops or 24 litters. Fully loaded, the aircraft could accomplish missions at ranges up to 200 miles at a comfortable cruise speed of 120 knots.

The arrival of the "Super Bird," as the Marines quickly nicknamed the CH-53, was providential. In September III MAF grounded all CH-46s following several unexplained crashes. An on-site investigation, conducted by a joint Naval Air Systems Command/Boeing Vertol accident investigation team, revealed that structural failures were occurring in the area of the after pylon.* The team recommended structural and systems modifications to reinforce the rear rotor mount, as well as the installation of an indicator to detect excessive strain on critical parts of the aircraft.

*Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, a former assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Division, recently wrote his recollections of the grounding of the CH-46s: "Several CH-46s had gone down in flight before this. One was observed by an assistant air officer of the 3d Marine Division, a major [who was an] aviator. He had described seeing the tail fly off a CH-46 in flight. However, it is believed that [because of] a desire to accord the lost crew members the honor of dying in combat rather than in an accident, this observation was ignored. It wasn't until the accidents occurred as stated in the text, that the CH-46s were grounded. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

The entire modification program, requiring approximately 1,000 man-hours per aircraft, occurred in three phases: (1) disassembly of the aircraft, (2) incorporation of the modifications, and (3)

Aviation personnel at Dong Ha on 16 January look over one of the huge CH-53s from HMH-463 only eight days after the first detachment of four of the new helicopters arrived in South Vietnam for service with MAG-16 at the air facility at Marble Mountain.

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967





3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967

A CH-53, the Marine Corps' largest and most powerful helicopter, retrieves a UH-34 downed in a mission to the Con Thien combat base in December.

reassembly and flight tests. Marines performed phases one and three; Boeing Vertol personnel completed phase two. Okinawa served as the principal modification site because it was the nearest secure Marine base which could provide both adequate facilities and skilled civilian workers. The program modified 80 aircraft at MCAF Futema, Okinawa, while the remaining 25 aircraft, already undergoing normal overhaul in Japan, received their modifications there.

The Marines of HMM-262, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Corliss, detached from the SLF to perform the Marine portion of the work. On 11 October, the Marines unloaded 40 CH-46s at Futema, and disassembly began immediately. Five days later, 114 Boeing Vertol specialists began phase two. By the end of December, the program had modified 89 aircraft and began phasing them back to the squadrons. The remaining 16 aircraft completed the modification program in February 1968.

Until the 46s returned, III MAF lost approximately half its tactical/logistic airlift capability and had to find replacement helicopters. As soon as the Marine Corps learned the seriousness of the CH-46s' defect, it rushed 23 UH-34s from the United States by cargo planes. They arrived on 15 October and immediately entered battle, often flown by pilots from the downed CH-46 squadrons. Ten additional CH-53s

entered the wing's inventory to further augment the lift capability in Vietnam. Finally, 31 U.S. Army UH-1Ds of the 190th Aviation Company joined General Anderson's forces at Phu Bai until the Sea Knights returned to flight status.¹⁶

The shifting of additional ground forces into the northern two provinces of I Corps during the fall of 1967 increased the tempo of helicopter operations. During this period, the two main areas of enemy activity were the DMZ and the Que Son Basin south of Da Nang, but as combat to the north intensified, MAG-36 at Chu Lai found itself further and further from the scene of Marine ground operations. As a result, General Anderson ordered MAG-36 to Phu Bai where it could better support 3d Marine Division operations. The first squadron, VMO-6, relocated on 4 October and 11 days later Colonel Frank E. Wilson displaced his group headquarters from Ky Ha to Phu Bai. The next day, Colonel Wilson took over VMO-3, HMM-164, HMM-362, and MATCUs-62 and -68 from Colonel Edwin O. Reed's MAG-16. At the same time, HMM-265, a MAG-36 CH-46 squadron at Marble Mountain, passed to Colonel Reed's command. On 30 October, another UH-34

A CH-46A from HMM-164 lands on 2 March 1967 to pick up infantrymen from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines engaged in Operation Prairie II north of Cam Lo, while an escort helicopter circles overhead.

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189791

CH-34Ds, the mainstay of transport helicopter operations following grounding of the CH-46s for structural problems, land infantrymen in a dry paddy for Operation Essex.

squadron, HMM-163, joined MAG-36 from the USS *Okinawa* (LPH 3) and moved to the new airfield at Quang Tri.* By the end of the month, MAG-36 occupied its new home; only HMM-165 remained at Ky Ha, until space became available at Phu Bai in November. The relocation of MAG-36 proved to be

*Before joining the SLF, HMM-163 had been at Phu Bai as part of MAG-16. LtCol Horace A. Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

A CH-46A takes off after bringing supplies to an infantry unit on a hill top somewhere in Vietnam.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370584



a wise decision, as events of early 1968 demonstrated.

Operational statistics indicate the sharply increased scale of Marine helicopter squadrons' efforts in Vietnam during 1967. The sorties rate increased by more than 20 percent over that of 1966. In 1967, 1st MAW helicopters flew 510,595 sorties, carrying 628,486 personnel and 70,651 tons of cargo.

Artillery

In January of 1967, the Marines had the entire family of Marine Corps artillery—light, medium, and heavy—in I Corps. The method of employment of these weapons differed little from World War II and Korea: direct support of a specific unit or general support of divisional units.

Division-level light artillery, the 4.2-inch mortar or the 107mm M30 mortar and the 105mm M101A1 howitzer, provided direct support of infantry units. Division Medium artillery, the 155mm M114A1 howitzer (towed) and the 155mm M109 self-propelled (SP) howitzer, were the general support weapons.* Force artillery elements attached to the

*The Marine Corps replaced 155mm M114A1s in the Marine divisional artillery regiments with the 155mm M109/SP just before the the Vietnam conflict. As the need for more artillery developed, the Marine Corps shipped the old towed weapons to Vietnam and formed provisional batteries. Personnel and required equipment came from artillery battalions already there. Ironically, the older M114A1 enhanced the overall mobility of the divisional 155mm capability. The heavy tracked M109/SP was essentially roadbound and served in a "fortress artillery" role, while the lighter M114A1 could move both by helicopter and truck.

Marine Artillery Capabilities

Marine Artillery Capabilities											
WEAPONS	RANGE (meters)	WEIGHT (pounds)	SUSTAINED RATE OF FIRE PER MINUTE	PRIME MOVER	EFFECTIVE AREA OF BURST: METERS, ONE ROUND		AMMUNITION				FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE
					DEPTH	WIDTH	TYPES AVAILABLE	FUZES AVAILABLE	WEIGHT OF FUZED HE PROJO		
105mm How Towed M101A1	11,000	4,980	3	Helo 2 1/2-ton truck	20	30		Q,D Ti VT CP	(pounds) 33	200	
155mm How Towed M114A1	14,600	12,950	1	Helo 5-ton truck	30	50	HE L HE Illum WP Smoke RAP Gas Nuclear	Q,D Ti VT CP	95	300	
155mm How (SP) M109A1	14,600	53,060	1	SP							
8" How (SP) M110	16,800	58,500	0.5	SP	30	80	HE Spot Gas Nuclear	Q,D Ti VT CP	200	N/A	
155mm Gun (SP) M53	23,500	96,000	0.5	SP	30	50		Q,D VT	95	N/A	
107mm Mort M30	5,656	671	15-20	Helo 1/4-ton truck	30	30	Illum WP Gas	Q,D Ti VT	26	200	



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421672

A maintenance team from HMM-165 rigs a hoist sling to a CH-46A sitting in a mountain stream northwest of Chu Lai on 12 May. Enemy ground fire had set the aircraft on fire and the pilot, Capt James F. Pleva, force-landed in the stream, dousing the flames.

artillery regiments provided increased range and delivery capabilities.¹⁷ Force artillery included the 155mm M53 self-propelled gun and the 8-inch M55 self-propelled howitzer. The Marine Corps replaced the M55 during the year with the new M110 self-propelled model.


Although the basic techniques of artillery employment in Vietnam differed little from those used elsewhere, local circumstances required certain refinements. Probably the most difficult problem facing Marine artillerymen and the infantry they supported was the need to minimize civilian casualties and property destruction, while still furnishing adequate fire support. Strongly worded MACV directives, further amplified by instructions from III MAF and the divisions, enjoined restraint and careful fire planning. These required careful selection of helicopter landing zones and scheduling artillery and air strikes with the goal of keeping both Marine and civilian casualties at the lowest possible level, especially in heavily populated areas such as those around Da Nang. Firing into populated areas, using reconnaissance by fire, and planning harassment and interdiction fires presented significant problems. The Marine artillerymen continually balanced the possible tactical advantages against the danger to long-term pacification goals. When

Marine units planned operations in coordination with Vietnamese province and district chiefs, a liaison officer from the Marines or a Marine or Army advisor stayed at the district headquarters to coor-

An unidentified Marine helicopter crewman smokes a cigarette beside his M-60 machine gun mount during a quiet flight in a CH-53A in December 1967.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370848







Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370303

Bystanders cover their ears on 25 June as MajGen Donn J. Robertson, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, fires from a self-propelled 155mm howitzer the 30,000th artillery round shot by the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines in the Vietnam War.

dinate fire support, as well as other aspects of the operations. ARVN liaison officers performed a similar function at American headquarters.*

These operational considerations, formalized as rules of engagement, were necessary restrictions but did not deprive any American unit of the right to defend itself against hostile action. Though planning helped to avoid the problem of noncombatant casualties, sound judgment during operations by both field commanders and fire support centers remained the final determinant.

Another technique of fire coordination, the "sav-a-plane," appeared because of the crowded air space over Vietnam, particularly over Route 1 along the coast of I Corps. Any artillery unit operating near the road contended with innumerable aircraft flying through its zone of action. The competition for space to shoot and space to fly was a constant headache for both participants. The 1st MAF considered the established practice of restrictive fire planning too burdensome because of the episodic nature of artillery firing. As a result, III MAF introduced the sav-a-plane system as a technique for keeping friendly aircraft safe from allied artillery while, at the same time, permitting liberal use of both arms.

Sav-a-plane was simply a radio procedure which told a pilot where and when artillery or naval gunfire was shooting. From that point on, it was the individual pilot's responsibility to stay clear of the firing area. When a battalion or regimental fire support coordination center (FSCC) initiated a sav-a-plane, the message went to the division FSCC/DASC for broadcast to all pilots in the area. The elements of a sav-a-plane transmission included target area, location of the firing unit, time of firing, and maximum trajectory ordinate. Though the system was not foolproof, artillery and naval gunfire hit very few, if any, aircraft.*

Supplemental safeguards to the sav-a-plane system included air sentries at battery positions and, whenever possible, collocation of the artillery liaison officers with infantry battalion forward air controllers. The latter technique ensured that all

*"I don't know that any aircraft has ever been hit by artillery fire," commented Colonel Edwin S. Schick, a former commander of the 12th Marines. "There was some talk that an Army outfit did hit a plane. . . . So long as the proper fusing is maintained . . . [and the] coordination principle of the restrictive fire plan is adhered to, no harm will come to our air brethren." Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) Current doctrine does not include the sav-a-plane concept. Statistical studies support the "big sky-small bullet" principle by indicating very little probability of artillery hitting an aircraft in flight.

*Forty Marines augmented the U.S. Army advisory staff with the ARVN in I Corps during 1967.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189158

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, listens as Col William L. Dick, commander of the 4th Marines, points to explosions on a nearby hill demonstrating artillery support available to his regiment from the 12th Marines. The latter was one of the largest artillery regiments ever fielded under Marine command.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370317

The fire direction center of Battery G, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines receives and computes a fire mission.

elements kept abreast of artillery firing and also permitted immediate response for lifting or shifting of fires.

The employment of individual batteries in Vietnam differed from all previous American war experiences. A single battery often provided the support normally expected from an artillery battalion. The individual 105mm and the provisional 155mm towed batteries possessed the capability to deploy to widely separated positions, each with its own fire direction and communication capability. Each battery maintained its own 360-degree (6,400 mills to artillerymen) firing capability. Often the battery fire direction center coordinated its own reinforcing fires and those of nearby ARVN artillery as well. Marine artillery batteries also made increased use of helicopter displacement. This practice required battery personnel to break down the guns, section gear, and ammunition into helicopter-transportable loads on short notice. These procedures required greater versatility of artillerymen in Vietnam than in the Korean War and World War II.

Traditional unit descriptions provided misleading indicators of artillery capabilities in Vietnam. When



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800970

A Marine M-98 107mm "Howtar," a 4.2-inch heavy mortar mounted on a 75mm pack-howitzer chassis, awaits a fire mission in support of the Special Landing Force in Operation Deckhouse VI, a subsidiary of Task Force X-Ray's Operation Desoto near Duc Pho.

the tactical situation dictated, the 3d Marine Division, for example, formed provisional batteries using a mix of artillery calibers. At times these were closer to being "mini-battalions" than conventional batteries. Such practices in task organization also affected the artillery battalions; at times they assumed the size of "mini-regiments."¹⁸

Fast and accurate response traditionally provided the measure of good artillery support. If contact appeared imminent, the infantry battalion's forward observer notified the FDC, where chart operators prepared to plot the mission while the computer stood ready to provide gun data. The artillery liaison officer in the battalion FSCC then could arrange for a sav-a-plane to avoid losing time in getting clearance to fire. As the same time, word passed to the gun crews of the impending mission. To ensure accuracy of firing data, both the battery and battalion FDCs computed the fire missions, providing a double check on the information sent to the guns.

In July 1967, a new piece of equipment, the M18 Field Artillery Digital Computer (FADC), arrived at artillery battalion FDCs. Prior to its arrival, the Marines manually computed all firing data computations. FADC was supposed to accelerate the process of providing the batteries with accurate firing data and decrease the time between the initial request

and the impact of the first round on the target.

FADC did not favorably impress either Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., or Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V. Hendricks, who respectively commanded the 12th and 11th Marines. Colonel Schick noted that "a well-disciplined and trained fire direction team [would] out perform [FADC] with speed, reliability, and all-weather capability . . . and no material failures." Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks remembered that the 11th Marines continued to compute manually and used FADC only as a check on the results. However, those doing the manual calculations often had to wait on FADC. In addition, FADC depended upon electricity from undependable power generators.¹⁹

On-call fires provided another means used to reduce reaction time. When an infantry unit operated in enemy-controlled areas, preplotted on-call fires along the route of advance were common practice. To execute the mission, the artillerymen used previously prepared firing data. Last minute clearance was the only requirement before firing the mission. Marines often resolved such delays by employing a long-term umbrella or area type sav-a-plane which permitted the battalion FSCC to retain local firing control. In such cases, they did not need higher-level firing clearance. On-call preparations,

"almost instant artillery," were particularly effective as a counter to meeting engagements and ambushes.

Other uses of artillery involved flushing the enemy from concealed positions, denying his use of escape routes, and deceiving him as to the direction of attack. Night employment included illumination of avenues of approach, harassing and interdiction fires, and navigational orientation for friendly elements. The Marines also used jungle applications dating back to the island campaigns of World War II. A lost patrol could reorient itself by requesting a marking round on a nearby grid line intersection. Another common jungle technique was the use of artillery fire to guide units toward their objectives. Following the advancing fire by only a few hundred meters, the infantry worked their way forward while the artillery forward observer adjusted the firing to suit the situation.

The Sting Ray concept represented a novel innovation which blended maximum use of supporting arms and the talents of III MAF's reconnaissance personnel. As III MAF initiated large-unit operations beyond assigned TAORs, and as TAORs increased in size to accommodate the operational tempo, reconnaissance teams operated at ever increasing ranges from their battalion command posts. The lightly

armed and equipped teams usually landed by helicopter at points near their operational areas and then moved stealthily to a designated observation post. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence in areas of suspected heavy enemy movement, but the Marines was soon learned the teams could call in artillery fire and air strikes and remain undetected by the enemy. This led to the evolution of Sting Ray which caused substantial enemy casualties at the risk of a very few Marines. Enemy troops, away from the main battle areas, relaxed, and feeling relatively safe, moved with less caution and often concentrated in large numbers. Alert Sting Ray teams exacted a heavy toll on unwary Communist units by hitting them with accurate artillery fire and precision air strikes.

For the Sting Ray teams, artillery served both as a defensive and an offensive weapon. If the enemy detected the team, artillery provided a ring of fire around its position while helicopters moved in for the rescue. Though enemy units hotly contested many extractions a surprisingly large number of Sting Ray teams escaped with only minor casualties, while Communist losses multiplied greatly from the heavy concentration of fire. To overrun a Sting Ray position, the Communists had to concentrate their forces; as soon as helicopters extracted the team, the abandoned site became a killing zone.

When the North Vietnamese sent large units across the DMZ during the fall of 1966, more American artillery units moved into the region, including the U.S. Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery with its 175mm self-propelled guns. These heavy weapons, with a range of 32,700 meters, added a new dimension to III MAF artillery support. By March of 1967 the 11th and 12th Marines provided artillery coverage from the Gulf of Tonkin to Laos and substantially reduced enemy freedom of movement.

The U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery also arrived to reinforce Marine artillery during 1967. Its M108 self-propelled 105mm howitzers had a 360-degree traverse capability and could respond rapidly to calls for fire from any direction. In recognition of its quick response and rapid rate of fire, the 3d Division Marines called the 40th's Battery A "Automatic Alpha."

Artillery strength further increased in I Corps during 1967 following the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Company (105mm howitzers); the 5th 155mm Gun

The crew of a 105mm howitzer from Battery C, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, prepares to respond to a fire mission in support of infantrymen engaged in Operation Chinook about 12 miles north of Hue.

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189143

Battery A, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, one of several Army units sent north to provide needed artillery reinforcements to III MAF, fires a 175mm gun into the A Shau valley in Operation Cumberland in August. The operation closed at the start of the monsoon.

Battery; a platoon from the 5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery; and another battalion of Army 175mm guns, the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery. By the end of the year, 35 Marine artillery batteries from the 11th, 12th, and 13th Marines, as well as four separate Force Troops and 10 Army batteries supported Marine operations in I Corps.*


Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the war, from an artilleryman's point of view, was the massive supporting arms effort employed to counter enemy artillery and rockets in the DMZ region. In the spring of 1967, the NVA introduced rockets as well as medium and heavy artillery to support actions there. As the year progressed, the North Vietnamese employed more and larger-caliber weapons. According to intelligence on the enemy order of battle, the North Vietnamese had approximately 130 artillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River, including 152mm gun howitzers with a range in excess of 10 miles. Marine positions at Cua Viet, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, Con Thien, Cam Lo, and Camp Carroll suffered frequent attacks. These bombard-

ments threatened not only the Marine forward positions, but also lines of communication, command posts, airfields, and logistic installations.

There were many difficulties in countering the increased enemy artillery activity, but the biggest problem involved determining the precise location of the enemy weapons. The Marines had limited ground observation because of the political/military prohibition of operations in the DMZ, and NVA missile and antiaircraft fire challenged aerial observation. Intelligence and damage assessments remained, at best, skimpy. The available assessments came from diversified sources. The prolonged collecting and collating time, however, produced targeting results which often were too old to be worthwhile. Conversely, the Communists knew the exact locations of Marine forces and installations. The fact that the Marines occupied prominent terrain further simplified the enemy's observation task.

The Marines response to the expanded NVA artillery and rocket threat involved a pronounced increase in counterbattery fire, augmented by naval gunfire and aviation. III MAF increased Marine artillery along the DMZ to 84 of the 180 pieces available to the 3d Division. In August, USAF B-52s

*K Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines remained on Okinawa awaiting gun repairs and equipment.





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189466

Soldiers of Battery G, 65th Artillery, equipped with truck-mounted, quad-.50 machine guns, stand by to escort a Marine "Rough Rider" truck convoy in I Corps in October.

added their immense bomb loads to the battle against the Communist artillery. The 3d Marine Division staff initiated an intensive effort to improve the counterbattery program and installed new radar and sound-flash ranging equipment at key locations. An Army unit, the Target Acquisition Battery from the 2d Battalion, 26th Artillery worked to improve target information. The Dong Ha FSCC received more personnel and communications equipment. Because the Seventh Air Force controlled fire clearances north of the DMZ, it sent an Air Force liaison officer to the Marine FSCC to speed up fire mission clearances. On 28 September 1967, the Marines established a fire support information center (FSIC) that employed data processing equipment, to speed collection and collation of target information from all 3d Marine Division, III MAF, and Seventh Air Force sources. Additional observation aircraft were made available, nearly doubling the number of hours of aerial observation over the DMZ area.

The Marines initiated large-scale, joint counterbattery and interdiction operations such as Ropeyarn, Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate. Artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes blanketed all known and suspected firing and support positions north of the DMZ. For example, during Operation

Headshed, both artillery and naval gunfire hit enemy positions, and air strikes followed to catch the survivors of the earlier bombardment.

As a result of these measures, enemy fire declined steadily from a September peak, but the Communists retained their capability to disrupt military activity and cause significant allied casualties.

The DMZ experience highlighted the necessity of relying on supporting arms to offset the disadvantage of operating next to an enemy sanctuary. The problem of neutralizing enemy artillery remained one of the most frustrating dilemmas of the war. Though supporting arms eased the situation, political considerations ruled out the only satisfactory solution, seizure of the enemy guns.

For the Marines not involved in the war along the DMZ, base defense remained one of the most worrisome responsibilities. Beginning in February, the threat of rocket attack menaced all I Corps bases. At Da Nang the enemy could launch rockets from any point in a 200-square-mile belt surrounding the city. Five thousand Marines participated in the defence of this TAOR, but the high mobility of the enemy rocket enabled the Communists to maintain the threat. To combat the rockets, the 11th Marines




3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967

An artilleryman covers his ears and turns his back after dropping a round down the tube of a 4.2-inch mortar in a position at Dong Ha in December 1967.

repositioned firing batteries so that by July, at least two batteries covered each part of the Da Nang TAOR. Observation aircraft flew constant patrols over the rocket belt.²⁰ Additionally, artillerymen manned strategically located observation posts throughout the belt, but the threat persisted.

III MAF artillery, totaling 49 Marine and Army batteries at the end of the year, faced a vast array of tactical and technical problems. Counterbattery fire across the DMZ, neutralization of the Da Nang rocket threat; coverage of numerous, simultaneous ground operations; and countless harassment and interdiction missions provide samples of the complex gunnery problems confronting III MAF artillery during 1967. As an example of the quantity of artillery support needed, the Communists fired 42,190 rounds during the 1967 artillery duel, while the III MAF Marine and attached Army gunners replied with 281,110 rounds.



CHAPTER 14

Logistics

Upgrading the Logistics System – Problems with the M-16 Rifle Navy Support – Marine Corps Engineers

Upgrading the Logistics System

When 1967 began, the Marine logistics system in support of the Vietnam War was still undergoing growing pains. The means to fight were available; however, as Brigadier General Louis Metzger noted, there were many weaknesses, not excluding the provision of such necessities as socks and uniforms. "While CG, 9th MAB," he wrote, "I was appalled at the condition of the Marines and their equipment when they arrived on Okinawa [from Vietnam]. My observations in-country [as assistant commander of the 3d Marine Division] did nothing to dispel my opinion."¹

The Marines landed in March 1965 with logistic support tailored for their initial requirements; only 592 personnel provided motor transport, supply, and maintenance services. As III MAF's role in I Corps expanded, the logistic organization increased



FLC ComdC, December 1967

The headquarters of the Force Logistic Command (above) sits almost surrounded by water while (below) parts of the maintenance and storage area stretch toward Da Nang.

FLC ComdC, December 1967





FLC ComdC, July 1967

GySgt D. B. Durrell, assigned to the inventory section of Supply Battalion, checks some of the material stored by FLC at Camp Brooks in Da Nang in July.

both in scope and size and led to the creation of the Force Logistic Command. FLC realignment started with the transfer of the 1st Force Service Regiment from Camp Pendleton to Da Nang on 15 February 1967. Although only the 1st FSR headquarters colors arrived, involving no personnel or equipment movement from Camp Pendleton, this transfer permitted the FLC to restructure its elements to conform with a service regiment's table of organization and equipment provisions. The required personnel were already in Vietnam, but FLC needed a new structure to administer an inventory which had grown to more than 60,000 supply items. By 28 February the Marine logistic organization in I CTZ, which was to remain essentially unchanged until the end of the year, was:

Dong Ha: Force Logistic Support Unit 1

Phu Bai: Force Logistic Support Group Alpha, 3d Service Regiment

Da Nang: Force Logistic Command Headquarters, 1st Force Service Regiment

Chu Lai: Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, 1st Service Battalion

FLC strength totaled 5,500 men; its mission was:

To provide sustained logistical support to III MAF organizations; to provide staff augmentation and self-sustaining, balanced, mobile logistic support elements in support of III MAF units up to and including brigade size when deployed on independent missions; and to provide logistic support to other organizations as may be directed.²


By 31 December, FLC's authorized strength had grown to 9,551 men. Elsewhere, the Marine Corps adjusted existing tables of organization and force levels to accommodate the compelling needs in I Corps. The realignment provided a III MAF "tooth-to-tail" ratio of 6.5 to 1. This ratio measured the relative numbers between Marine combat and combat support troops to combat service support troops in Vietnam.

Providing supplies and services to the Vietnam Marine was a worldwide Marine Corps logistic network which spanned the United States from Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, across the Pacific to Hawaii, then Okinawa, and finally to I Corps. Most of the supplies flowed directly into the combat zone; the rest stopped at the Marines' supply base on Okinawa, thus providing a "surge tank" that could respond rapidly to demands from the units in RVN. The 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR) on Okinawa remained the nerve center of the Marine logistic system in the western Pacific. Continuously exchange-

The operator of one of the most important pieces of equipment in the Marine logistics system, a rough-terrain forklift, carefully removes cargo from the rear of a KC-130F at the air freight facility at Dong Ha.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A190069





FLC ComdC, October 1967

A Marine operates the keyboard in air-conditioned comfort surrounded by other components of the IBM-360 computer used by the Force Logistic Command to fill over 63,000 requisitions each month.

ing computerized information with III MAF, this activity processed 1,333,140 III MAF requisitions between January 1966 and September 1967, filling 82 percent of them from stores on hand. The remainder passed to the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, or in some cases to the Naval Supply Centers at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or Oakland, California. During this period, the Okinawa Marines shipped 19,521 short tons of material to Vietnam by air and 78,949 measurement tons by ship.

The focal point for all logistic support flowing into III MAF was the Force Logistic Command (FLC), commanded by Brigadier General James E. Herbold, Jr. FLC handled all supplies and equipment going to, or coming from, III MAF, as well as performing maintenance of equipment and facilities.

This logistic pipeline was a two-way system; as it moved new equipment into combat, damaged and worn items headed in the other direction for repair, salvage, or disposal. The 3d FSR acted as both a coordinating agency and a rebuilding center. Work repairs occurred either in Marine shops on Okinawa, at the Public Works Center, Yokosuka, Japan, or in the continental United States. Between January 1966

and September 1967, 3d Force Service Regiment repair facilities completed work orders on 77,286 items of combat equipment.

Frequent shifting of units to new locations, the rapid pace of the fighting, and bad weather all combined to aggravate supply problems. FLC introduced new supply management techniques to accelerate delivery of critical materials. The first of these was the Red Ball system introduced in September 1965. It sped the delivery of problem items through the normal distribution system by means of individual personal attention and continuing followup actions. When III MAF designated an item as Red Ball, FLC notified all supply agencies in Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Thereafter, designated action officers at each command level monitored the status of each Red Ball item and took every possible measure to speed delivery. By the end of September 1967, over 5,700 items had received the Red Ball treatment since the program's inception.

FLC introduced another special system in 1965 which it called the Critipac program. Under this program, each month the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow provided every major III MAF unit with one box of rapidly expended supplies which it required on a routine basis. Critipac eliminated the process of requisitioning and the inherent wait for the supply system to respond.

These two 5-ton trucks, one heavily damaged by an enemy mine and the other rebuilt to fully-usable condition, illustrate the heavy maintenance capabilities of FLC's motor transport repair shops.

FLC ComdC, August 1967





3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967

A Rough Rider convoy of 150 vehicles enroute to Phu Bai moves through the Hai Van Pass, the only land route across the mountains that reached the sea north of Da Nang.

Repair parts and similar expendable items, usually in the Class II supply category, continued to be a headache during 1967. No matter how many of these items flowed into Vietnam through the supply system, the demand seemed insatiable. The explanation rests with the wide variety of items required, 86,000 during 1967, as well as the high usage rate. The increased tempo of combat operations and harsh weather conditions played a significant role in the rapid expenditure of supplies and equipment. This increased the number of requisitions submitted each month within III MAF. The number rose from only 2,500 in April 1965 to 70,959 in October 1967.

Enemy action also influenced supply levels and created sudden shortages. One of the most dramatic incidents of this nature occurred on 3 September when enemy artillery hit Dong Ha combat base, touching off one of the most spectacular series of explosions in the war. The initial blasts damaged seventeen helicopters. Force Logistic Support Unit 1's bulk fuel storage farm went up in flames. The enemy fire destroyed the main ammunition storage area; 15,000 short tons of vitally needed ammunition vanished. The explosions continued for more than four hours and people as far south as Phu Bai, more than 40 miles away, could see the enormous column of smoke.

Replacing the destroyed ammunition and the bulk fuel system while continuing normal supply operations plus providing building materials for construction of the "McNamara Line" represented monumental tasks.³ As an interim measure, the men of Force Logistic Support Unit 1 established a drum refueling point immediately after the attack. This

functioned until engineers completed another bulk fuel farm at Dong Ha a week later. The ammunition situation was better. Fortunately, two small, alternate supply points in the immediate Dong Ha area survived the attack. Quantities of artillery and other ammunition remained limited, however, until emergency sea and airlifts replenished the dangerously low stocks. Bad weather, heavy seas, and flooding of the Dong Ha LCU ramp during the period of 17-23 September complicated the resupply effort. The Marines circumvented this untimely development by offloading munitions at Hue and then moving them by truck to Dong Ha. Concur-

A forklift, mired to the axles in mud created by monsoon rains in January, sits in the Force Logistic Support Group Alpha open storage lot at Da Nang.

FLC ComdC, January 1967



rently, they started construction of new dumps at Quang Tri City, well beyond enemy weapons' range. Luckily, the Communists did not capitalize on the disaster.

Enemy artillery fire in October almost caused another serious setback to these resupply efforts. Fortunately, the immediate efforts of three Seabees and four Marines, one of whom was a general officer, prevented another disaster. "On 29 October our second and smaller ammunition dump in Dong Ha was hit by enemy fire," recalled General Metzger. "Knowing we simply could not lose it, three Marines, three Seabees, and I put out the fire."^{4*}

Another of FLC's inherited missions involved personnel management. By 1967, the task of processing personnel to and from the western Pacific had grown to prodigious proportions. Over 191,000 Marines required processing during 1967. Approximately 97,000 went by aircraft to Vietnam and 7,872 arrived in surface shipping; 82,000 flew back to the United States and another 4,276 traveled home by ship. This complex evolution required the writing of orders, rosters, and schedules; and administering physical examinations, baggage inspections, troop handling, and billeting at transient facilities and processing centers reaching from South Vietnam

*Each of the seven received the Bronze Star Medal for their efforts in saving the ammunition dump.

back through Okinawa to El Toro and Camp Pendleton in California. In addition, all Marine posts and stations faced the tasks of filling outbound quotas and absorbing returnees.

At first, the main control center for the stream of Marines flowing through the western Pacific remained at Camp McTureous, Okinawa. In mid-1966 this activity moved to Camp Hansen, Okinawa to accommodate the increasing two-way personnel flow. By early 1967, the Transient Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Cliff, processed as many as 25,000 troops in a single month. This complicated operation included accounting for all hospitalized casualties and expediting emergency leave personnel movement by arranging for these Marines' transportation, clothing, and pay, as well as many other services. Computerization sped such involved operations as the modification of orders of personnel still in transit. By 1967, the Transient Battalion reduced the average holding time for transients at Camp Hansen to about 40 hours. The transient program also involved the classification and storage of excess baggage and clothing in 3d FSR's climate-controlled warehouse. The hard-working troop handlers and administrators of the Transient Battalion received little praise, but their long hours of demanding work were as vital to the support of the Marines in I Corps as food and ammunition.

The Air Delivery Platoon of FLC was one of the

Newly arrived Marine replacements await processing in front of a long line of tropical huts at the Force Logistic Command's transient facility in July at the Da Nang airfield.

FLC ComdC, July 1967





FLC ComdC, April 1967



FLC ComdC, July 1967

Feeding the thousands of Marines assigned to III MAF required facilities as large and efficient as many stateside commercial establishments. Some of the average of 2,592 loaves of bread provided each day by the bakery sit on cooling racks at Phu Bai. A Vietnamese civilian (right), one of 53 employed in FLC's milk plant, analyzes a sample of the more than 40,000 pints of reconstituted milk produced each day in April 1967.

more unusual Marine logistic units. The members of this specially trained 33-man platoon were graduates of the parachute school at Fort Benning, Georgia, as well as the parachute rigger school at Fort Lee, Virginia. The platoon supported requests for aerial delivery of supplies throughout I Corps. During September and October, the platoon rendered especially valuable service during the aerial resupply of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh. Because of subsurface water damage, landing on Khe Sanh airstrip had become extremely hazardous for transport planes. Beginning in late August, the Air Delivery Platoon helped airdrop large quantities of supplies to the Marines at Khe Sanh during repairs to the runway. During the more than two months the strip remained closed, the Air Delivery Platoon made airdrops on 40 days, handling an average of 51 short tons per day, more than double its normal, rated capacity.

At the end of 1967, to improve logistic support and keep pace with the northward movement of III MAF combat elements, FLC emphasis shifted to northern I Corps. Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

moved from Chu Lai to Dong Ha, leaving Supply Company (-)(Reinforced) as the agency responsible for logistic support of Marine elements in the Chu Lai area.

Problems with the M-16 Rifle

Problems with the M-16 rifle posed a logistics burden of staggering proportions for III MAF. After the heavy fighting at Khe Sanh in April and May a furor developed over reported deficiencies in the newly issued M-16. Many Marines lost confidence in the weapon, creating a situation which had a definite impact on combat operations and morale.⁵

The issue generated considerable reaction in the American press and Congress. Some Marines contributed to the furor by spreading exaggerated accounts of problems with the M-16, as described by General Metzger:

... a congressional investigating team of two congressmen . . . arrived on the scene. It was my unhappy duty to escort them to units along the DMZ. If it weren't so serious it would have been laughable. They insisted on questioning individual Marines with no officers and NCOs present, I suppose to ensure they got the truth, without command influence. The result was that they were fed the



FLC ComdC, July 1967

Off-duty Marines watch a 20-lap race organized by the Force Logistic Command on 4 July as part of efforts to provide diversified recreation to III MAF.



FLC ComdC, July 1967

Marines enroute to the United States in July 1967 on government transportation line up at the airline ticket office at the FLC transit facility in Da Nang to buy tickets from the west coast to their homes.

Security forces' aerial flares, photographed by a time exposure as they drift over Camp Brooks, serve as a blunt reminder of the nearness of FLC's Marines to the dangers of war.

FLC ComdC, August 1967



most awful line of "hog wash" imaginable. Tall tales of heroic actions, patrols wiped out, etc., all due to the M-16 rifle, but which according to the sergeant major of one unit involved, had never taken place. The young Marines had a field day.⁶

The main criticism was that the rifle jammed; it would not extract spent cartridges. III MAF conducted numerous field tests and studies to determine if the weapon was faulty and, if so, what could be done about it. Much of the evidence pointed to the absolute necessity of keeping the weapon immaculately clean, mainly because of the extremely fine tolerances of its moving parts and the tendency of rounds to bend in the chamber. The studies cited dirty ammunition and poor cleaning methods as the major reasons for malfunctions. Commanders at every level hammered away at the traditional Marine theme of frequent weapon cleaning, which had been less important when armed with the M-14 rifle with its chrome-plated chamber and bore.

Even this was not always adequate. "The earlier [M-16] weapons—even when cleaned to usual stan-

RAdm Thomas R. Weschler, commander of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang discusses his command and its capabilities with Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on board a small craft in Da Nang harbor in January.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188112



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189370
Two large cargo ships unload at the Naval Support Activity's deepwater piers at the Da Nang harbor.

dards (not always possible in any sustained combat) still developed microscopic 'pits' in the chamber," recalled Colonel James C. Short. "The [rifles] would then fail to extract, usually at an awkward time."⁷

When further investigation revealed that the problem could be alleviated by changing the chambers, the FLC faced the urgent task of modifying all Marine M-16s. It set up an assembly line and replaced all of the original chamber assemblies with new ones having a chrome coating. This modification reduced chamber friction, making extraction more reliable. At the same time, FLC installed a modified buffer group to reduce the cyclic rate of fire. The M-16's teething problems plagued FLC for the rest of the year, and a final solution waited until 1968.

The controversy over the new rifle had other long-term side effects that affected III MAF's combat effectiveness and logistic posture. These effects originated from the policy that each Marine would test fire his rifle before departing on a patrol. "So, obeying orders, each Marine dutifully fired his weapon regularly before each patrol," recalled General Metzger, "which depleted our ammunition supply and conditioned the Marines to shooting without aiming, so that the standard of marksmanship in combat dropped sharply."⁸

Navy Support

Throughout 1967, the Naval Support Activity



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A193811

A Navy medium landing craft (LCM-8), with folding cots on top of its improvised pilot house cover, moves a tank from the 3d Tank Battalion up the Dong Ha River on 6 July.

(NSA), Da Nang, served as the focal point for Navy activities supporting the Marines in I Corps. The Navy established NSA in July 1965 to relieve the Marines of the administrative and logistic tasks associated with an advanced naval base. During 1966 the command's responsibilities grew to the point that a flag officer, Rear Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, became the unit's commander. By the end of 1967, NSA developed into the largest U.S. Navy overseas shore command with more than 10,000 officers and men.* It provided III MAF with an average of 39,661 measurement tons of supplies per month in 1967.

Besides operating the Da Nang port facilities, sailors of NSA served throughout I Corps in several separate detachments to accomplish some rather diverse missions. Personnel of the command operated small craft on the dangerous waters of the Cua Viet to supply the fighting forces along the DMZ. Detachments at Hue/Tan My performed similar duties. At Chu Lai another detachment shared the burden of supplying all allied forces in

lower I Corps, aided by the southernmost NSA detachment at Sa Huynh. NSA built the Sa Huynh

A sailor on the Navy's Swift Boat 80, operating in the South China Sea in September, prepares to fire an 81mm mortar at enemy coastal positions two miles south of the Demilitarized Zone. The dual mount also includes a .50-caliber machine gun installed above the mortar and recoil mechanism.

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967



*For a fuller treatment of Navy logistics in Vietnam, see Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret), *Mobility, Support and Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968* (Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1972).



3d MarDiv ComdC, June 1967

Navy hospital corpsmen remove a wounded man from a medevac helicopter at Dong Ha for the short ride to the 3d Medical Battalion's field hospital.

facilities shortly after the arrival of Task Force Oregon in the summer of 1967.

In addition to transshipping material from Da Nang to the smaller ports, NSA performed a variety of other tasks. It provided loading and unloading services, and transient and terminal storage at these ports; operated base supply depots for supply of material common to all U.S. forces in I Corps; supplied port and harbor security; coordinated activities with RVN agencies and the U.S. Agency for International Development in support of military operations; supervised industrial relations; provided all petroleum requirements; provided public works support in secure areas; maintained airfields in coordination with III MAF; and operated in-country R&R facilities.

Another vital NSA service involved providing hospital facilities for combat troops in I Corps. The NSA station hospital opened at Da Nang in January 1966. It expanded from a 60-bed capacity to 460 by year's end. The staff included more than 500 doctors, nurses, corpsmen, and technicians. This modern hospital boasted the only frozen blood bank in Vietnam, and had competent departments such as X-ray; eye, ear, nose, and throat; neurosurgery; urology; orthopedic; research; and preventive medicine facilities. Served by a convenient helicopter pad, the NSA hospital, working with the

facilities of the 1st and 3d Medical Battalions and the 1st Hospital Company, provided III MAF with the most modern medical technology available.

In addition to the fixed medical facilities, hospital ships cruised the waters off Vietnam to receive casualties evacuated directly from the battlefield by helicopter. The USS *Sanctuary* arrived on 10 April 1967 to join her sister ship, the USS *Repose*, a veteran of almost a year's Vietnam service. In her first 50 days of action, *Sanctuary* admitted 1,200 patients. Operating from Da Nang, the *Sanctuary*, with 560 hospital beds and 27 doctors embarked, could move to Chu Lai in less than two hours and to the seaward approaches to the DMZ in less than five hours. The presence of a fully-equipped hospital ship only minutes away provided solace for many Marines as they contemplated their chances of survival.

No account of naval support would be complete without mention of the Marines' long-term friends, the Seabees. By midsummer of 1967, nine Navy mobile construction battalions (NMCBs) were in Vietnam: two at Dong Ha, one at Phu Bai, five at Da Nang, and one at Chu Lai. These formed the 3d Naval Construction Brigade, commanded by Rear

HMC Marvin L. Cunningham, Navy medical corpsman, removes mosquitoes from a trap with a portable vacuum cleaner before sending them to the Navy Support Activity at Da Nang for examination.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189498





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A369856

General purpose tents of the type commonly called "GP Medium" house a small field hospital run by the 1st Medical Battalion in support of Operation Desoto near Duc Pho.

Admiral Robert R. Wooding, CEC. His force included 7,000 officers and men.

The Seabees in Vietnam demonstrated their amazing capability and traditional versatility. One of the best examples of their ability to respond with speed and determination took place during the fall of 1967 when they built an airfield and quarters for 500 men at Quang Tri. The field served as a backup installation for the strip at Dong Ha, by then vulnerable to NVA rocket and artillery fire. Seabees and equipment converged on the site within a day of General Westmoreland's order to complete the field before the monsoon season. NMCB-10, the Pacific Fleet's Alert Construction Battalion on Okinawa, deployed immediately to take charge of the urgent project and relieve the composite force already at work. The specifications called for a 4,100-foot strip of sand cement covered with metal matting, plus 15,000 square yards of parking aprons and taxiways.

Heavy rains hit the region in late September, adding to the problem of stabilizing shifting sand in the construction area. The Seabees also faced the delicate task of negotiating and supervising the removal of approximately 11,000 Vietnamese graves located in the middle of the proposed site. The latter problem occurred frequently in Vietnam and its solution required subtle and skillful diplomacy. In

spite of these obstacles, the first KC-130 landed at Quang Tri on 23 October, nine days ahead of the scheduled completion date and only 38 days after the project started.

Concentration shows on the faces of Cdr Ronald L. Bouterie and his assistants during surgery on the hip of a wounded Marine on board the USS Tripoli.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A704398





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189992

Seabees of Mobile Construction Battalion 301 battle the mud on 29 November as they set and seal runway mats into place during the rebuilding of the runway at Khe Sanh.

Navy Seabees use special mobile equipment in September to crush rock for repairing the damage caused by heavy monsoon rains to the runway at the Khe Sanh combat base.

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967





Photo courtesy of Maj Henry Wayne Gardner
A Navy chaplain assigned to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines conducts a non-denominational service in February using three C-ration boxes for an altar.

Seabees also made a major contribution by their continual struggle to maintain "Liberty Road," the route connecting Da Nang with the An Hoa industrial complex, 23 air miles to the southwest. Elements of the 3d, 7th, and 9th Marine Engineer Battalions worked with the Seabees to keep the road open as heavy two-way traffic strained its many culverts and bridges. The constant threat of enemy mines and sapper attacks added to the Seabees' and Marines' worries on "Liberty Road." Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Harris III's 7th Engineer Battalion replaced one bridge blown up by enemy demolitions on 4 February 1967, with a 96-foot, 60-ton-limit, timber bridge in the remarkable time of only 16 days.

The Seabees, however, claimed credit for the largest single bridge building feat on "Liberty Road." NMCB-4, commanded by Commander Richard M. Fluss, CEC, built the 2,040-foot-long "Liberty Bridge" across the Thu Bon River. The bridge rested on more than 800 80-foot-long piles, each one driven approximately 40 feet into the river bed. The battalion used more than five tons of 10-inch nails and 5,000 24-inch bolts in its construction. It completed the job in less than five



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A369963
HM Andre A. Bougie, a 19-year old Navy medical corpsman in the 1st Marine Division, tries to keep a wounded Viet Cong alive in Operation New Castle.

The visiting Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., pins a Navy Unit Commendation streamer on the colors of the 3d Medical Battalion in a ceremony at Phu Bai on 7 January 1967.

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967





3d MarDiv ComdC, April 1967

Two Marines from Company D, 11th Engineer Battalion perform a ritual common in the Vietnam War. PFC T. Outlaw, having located a suspected enemy mine with a mine detector during a road sweep on 12 April, watches as Pvt R. P. Dotson cautiously probes the ground with his bayonet tip.




3d MarDiv ComdC, July 1967

A bulldozer pushes trees aside as the 11th Engineer Battalion completes construction on Route 561 near the strategic combat base at Con Thien in July 1967.

A pontoon ferry constructed by Company C, 11th Engineer Battalion carries several Marine vehicles across the Perfume River 15 miles west of the city of Hue on 16 May.

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967





3d MarDiv ComdC, April 1967

Smoke pours from the 11th Engineer Battalion's new asphalt plant constructed at Dong Ha for improving the highway network necessary to the defense of the DMZ region.

months, from 3 April to 2 September. Enemy sappers attacked the bridge during the early morning hours of 6 September and knocked out two spans. A scant 32 hours later, the Seabees had completed repairs and traffic moved once more on "Liberty Road."

For the majority of Marines in Vietnam, the most frequently encountered evidence of Navy support were the naval personnel assigned to his unit. Each battalion, aircraft group, and higher headquarters had its own Navy chaplain. Each battalion and squadron, as well as higher headquarters, had its own complement of Navy medical personnel, headed by a physician. The enlisted Navy medical corpsmen provided immediate medical care at all levels, down to the individual rifle platoon. In addition, each Marine division included a medical battalion and a dental company commanded by a Medical Corps or Dental Corps officer.

Captain John T. Vincent, MC, USN, who commanded the 3d Medical Battalion, described his unit's disposition in support of the 3d Marine Division:

During 1967 there were two essentially complete hospitals, one at Phu Bai and the other at Dong Ha which we staffed and equipped for definitive surgical treatment. In addition, two clearing platoons (essentially the equivalent of an Army MASH [Mobile Army Surgical Hospital] unit) were in the field: one at Khe Sanh and the other at a fire support base between Phu Bai and Quang

Tri. The deployment of a clearing platoon of "C" Company, 3d Medical Battalion to Khe Sanh during the fight for Hills 861 and 881 was an extremely expeditious and efficient operation and provided excellent combat support.⁹

Dental Corps personnel could be found operating with Marines under similar conditions. For example, to provide primary dental care to Marines at Duc Pho, the 1st Dental Company rigged a dental chair and other equipment in a 3/4-ton trailer. A helicopter flew the trailer from Quang Ngai to Duc Pho. When dug in and sandbagged, it allowed the provision of excellent dental care throughout the Marine stay at the base, despite such occurrences as a near miss from a mortar during the enemy attack on 24 March.¹⁰

Marine Corps Engineers

No Marines in Vietnam faced more frustrations in the accomplishment of their mission than the engineers. Organized and equipped to accomplish engineer support for short duration amphibious operation, five Marine engineer battalions, the 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, and 11th, found themselves committed to a protracted land war in an underdeveloped country. The wide spectrum of urgent tasks, hard equipment use, torrential rains, mud, heat, abrasive dust, replacement shortages, lack of spares, and a long supply pipeline were some of the more com-

mon hindrances. Only forceful leadership, grueling work schedules, and considerable ingenuity kept the battalions abreast of mounting demands for engineering support. They met their military commitments while still managing to build dams, schools, dispensaries, bridges, and other facilities for the people of South Vietnam.¹¹

One of the most challenging tasks facing the engineers in 1967 involved maintaining and upgrading more than 2,000 miles of I Corps roads. The opening of Route 9 connecting Dong Ha with Khe Sanh in March provided a prime example of Marine engineering accomplishment. Flooding and enemy damage closed the road to vehicular traffic west of Cam Lo in 1964. This 42-mile road included 49 bridges, 27 of which occupied the 15-mile stretch between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh. Once open, the road required continuous maintenance to repair the constant ravages of flooding and enemy action. Additionally, the engineers reinforced all bridges to support 60-ton loads. The Route 9 project tied up almost a full engineer battalion for all of 1967.

Another project which tested the resolve of the battalions was the construction of the DMZ barrier system in northern Quang Tri Province. The 11th Engineer Battalion, under the successive command of Lieutenant Colonels Ross L. Mulford and Willard N. Christopher, comprised the initial project force, but by the end of the summer, the mammoth effort in-

volved 30 percent of all III MAF engineer forces.¹² U.S. Army motor transport and helicopter units were deployed from other Corps areas to help; Seabees provided additional support, especially in the construction of observation towers and bunkers; and ARVN engineers contributed their share. By the end of the year, the barrier construction effort and associated security tasks had absorbed 757,520 man days. Casualties among the engineers mounted as the enemy employed snipers, mines, mortars, and artillery to discourage them.

The generator shortage caused headaches for Marines throughout 1967. The engineers owned and operated the major share of III MAF's power-generating equipment, but they were purely expeditionary-type generators. The Marine Corps possessed only a limited quantity of garrison equipment, including power generators. The rapid construction of many new installations in I Corps, all of which required electricity, quickly depleted existing generator stocks. The engineers had the task of servicing and exchanging generators to keep up with seemingly insatiable power demands. Clubs, messes, air conditioners all demanded electricity, and the requirements often exceeded the means.

The generator situation in 1967 would have been even more acute save for actions taken in 1966 by Colonel George C. Axtell, then the commander of

Marines from the 3d Engineer Battalion use ropes and muscle power as they manhandle a dud 250-pound bomb in the mud of a farmer's paddy near Camp Evans in October.

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 1967





Photo courtesy of Col Frank W. Harris III

The 7th Engineer Battalion, in an assignment common to all engineer units in Vietnam, goes beyond its combat duties and aids the pacification program by building an irrigation dam to allow local Vietnamese farmers to grow a second rice crop each year.

the Force Logistic Command. Colonel Richard D. Taber, Sr., recently recalled:

When the shortage of generators began to be realized, Colonel Axtell personally called higher headquarters in the Pacific and United States to get all available expeditionary generators made available to III MAF. Then, following a discussion with Captain [Albert R.] Marshall (CEC) USN

[of the Third Naval Construction Brigade], joint action was taken to obtain some larger (60 kilowatts and up) Navy generators for all complexes where power grids could be built and to release the smaller expeditionary generators to more remote locations. Care and maintenance of the expeditionary generators was primarily by their "owners" (i.e., the engineers) with backup from FLC. Care and maintenance of the larger Navy generators was first by selected engineer personnel from FLC and backed up/augmented by Navy Seabees.¹³

While the Marine engineers spent much time engaged in construction and maintenance, they also devoted many hours to road clearing sweeps. Each day, prior to the departure of the first truck convoy, engineers teams, with infantry support, ensured the roads were clear of mines, booby traps, and ambushes.¹⁴ When the engineers found enemy explosives they either disarmed or blew them in place, depending upon their size and type. The slow, tedious, and dangerous sweeps were a necessary part of keeping supplies moving throughout I Corps.

The Marine engineers in Vietnam demonstrated true versatility. Not only challenged by new and demanding tasks, but they also faced vastly different physical properties of soil and rock, as well as a clever and determined opponent. Every engineering project involved constant exposure to sabotage, mining, ambush, or some other nagging threat. The dramatic aspect of combat eclipses most supporting efforts, but this was not the case of the Marine engineers in Vietnam. If nothing else, the mere physical size of their accomplishments bears witness to their contribution.

Father Nguyen Thanh Hoan, LtCol Ross L. Mulford of the 11th Engineer Battalion, and others stand in front of the school in Dong Ha partially supported by the battalion.

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967



CHAPTER 15

Other Marine Activities

*Marines with MACV—The Embassy Guard—The Advisors—I Corps Advisors—The Rung Sat Special Zone
The Marine Advisory Unit—Action In Binh Dinh Province—Action in the South*

Marines with MACV

The Marine Corps provided the MACV staff 72 officers and 67 enlisted men at the beginning of 1967. The assigned Marines comprised slightly less than five percent of the total MACV staff personnel. Another 25 officers and 24 enlisted Marines served with the MACV field components. The senior Marine officer on the staff was the director of the combat operations center (COC), Brigadier General John R. Chaisson. General Chaisson remained in this vital position through 1967 and up until mid-1968. Other Marine billets covered a broad spectrum of assignments which ranged from

membership in the Studies and Observation Group to duty with the radio and television staff.

Marine participation in MACV functions had a dual importance. Not only did they make Marine views readily available to the staff in Saigon, but MACV Marines clarified Saigon's decisions with their fellow Marines in I Corps. General Chaisson was himself a former member of the III MAF staff and the only Marine general out of 20 flag officers at MACV Headquarters. He had direct, personal contact with General Westmoreland and his senior staff members, as well as other senior American and

Marine BGen John R. Chaisson, the director of the MACV combat operations center in Saigon, listens as Gen Creighton W. Abrams, the deputy MACV commander, confers with III MAF's LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., and the 3d Marine Division's MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth during Gen Abrams' visit to the division at Phu Bai on 13 July.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188880



foreign representatives. From these associations, he gained considerable insight into the way the other services viewed Marines. None ever criticized Marines' fighting characteristics, except for the belief that Marines did not know how to dig in when occupying a defensive position, such as Con Thien in 1967. Not all the remarks were so charitable, as he recounted some years later at the Basic School:

Sometimes they made disparaging remarks about our rather casual approach to logistics and communications and these rather ancillary supporting activities. They weren't quite sure that we were up to speed in these regards. . . . I don't think they gave us credit for having too many smarts. They had a feeling that we liked to put our head down and go up the middle rather than get the least bit fancy. I can remember one day a senior officer of the Army came back [after] he'd visited a Marine battalion. He said to me, "John, you know, I met a real intelligent battalion commander up there. Real unusual guy." Now, I wasn't sure that . . . [of the Marine's] two characteristics—intelligent and unusual—whether the one followed the other.¹

Some of the other 1967 Marine MACV Staff members were: Colonel James C. Stanfield, chief of the Plans and Requirements Division (J-4); Colonel William L. Traynor, the COC air operations officer; and Colonel Joseph C. Fegan, Jr., who served as General Chaisson's deputy director of the COC. Colonel Kirby B. Vick was the deputy director of the Doctrine and Analysis Branch (J-34) until March, when his relief, Colonel David D. Rickabaugh, arrived.

Many controversial issues confronted the Marines assigned to MACV. These involved doctrinal and policy matters of direct interest to other commands, such as FMFPac, Seventh Fleet, and III MAF and its subordinate units. Marine participation in MACV functions helped in arriving at palatable solutions for many of the problems which developed during the year.

The MACV viewpoint, of necessity, covered a broader range than that of the respective corps commands. MACV maintained a fine balance between the attitudes of the U.S. participants, as well as those of Vietnamese and allied staffs. Typical of the issues which confronted MACV in 1967 was the structuring of U.S. Army participation in I Corps. The provision of Task Force Oregon represented only the beginning of the northward move of Army troops. The fact that the displacement of each unit to I Corps meant that another corps area faced a force reduction, or a postponement of force buildup, remained


a constant staff annoyance throughout the year. General Westmoreland's continuing concern about Communist use of the A Shau valley and the protection of the remote cities of Kontum and Pleiku was another worrisome matter. The enemy rocket attacks against Da Nang posed still another dilemma. If enemy rockets could hit Da Nang, they also could hit Bien Hoa and, for that matter, Saigon. Another issue was the "barrier," or the "McNamara Line" along the DMZ. Even with the accelerated troop buildup in I Corps, the number of troops required to man, much less build, the unpopular barrier served as a continuing source of irritation. Added to this, the question arose of what to do with the left flank of the proposed barrier, an area comprising all of western Quang Tri Province. In III Corps a new threat developed. Even though Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City had badly mauled Communist formations in the "Iron Triangle" northwest of Saigon, at least three enemy divisions threatened Long Binh and Bien Hoa. To the south in IV Corps, U.S. riverine operations were expanding, but again the I Corps troop drain reduced the effectiveness of this tactical innovation.

An entirely different and equally perplexing conflict was the dispute between Marine and Air Force fire restrictions in the DMZ. The Air Force contended that it should be responsible for all territory north of the Ben Hai River, but Marine staffs demanded to be allowed to fire to the maximum range of their attached 175mm guns in order to silence North Vietnamese artillery. An interim decision limiting Marine fires to the northern boundary of the DMZ and placing Air Force control north of the same boundary, satisfied neither service, and the issue remained in contention for the rest of the year.

The year 1967 was filled with innumerable perplexing situations for the MACV staff. American troop strength increased from 385,000 to 486,000, but Communist activity also intensified. In August, the MACV Headquarters moved from downtown Saigon to a new complex at Tan Son Nhut Airbase on the outskirts of the city. The improved facilities did not diminish the number of problems, but they did improve the staffs' working conditions. The coming year proved that the move occurred none too soon.

The Embassy Guard

The year 1967 brought on expansion of the Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD) at the



American Embassy in Saigon. The detachment of Marines, one officer and 67 enlisted men at the beginning of the year, came under the administrative control of Company C, Marine Security Guard Battalion, headquartered at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The parent battalion, established in February 1967, was the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) located at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The Saigon detachment's chain of command consisted of one of the longest small unit command links in the world, more than 650 miles from Saigon to Manila and over 9,000 miles to battalion headquarters in Washington. At the beginning of the year, First Lieutenant Philip E. Tucker commanded the Saigon detachment; his deputy, and the only staff noncommissioned officer, was Staff Sergeant Gary G. Stoces.

The Marines assigned to the Embassy protected American lives and property within the Embassy and its associated U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Information Service (USIS) buildings. The guard consisted of an administrative section and a watch section. The watch section broke down into three separate units: a Guard Section, charged with protection of the Embassy, USAID, and USIS compounds; an Ambassador's Residency Guard; and the Ambassador's Personal Security Unit, the bodyguard of the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge and his wife. The Embassy Security Officer, Mr. Robert A. England, exercised operational control of the detachment through First Lieutenant Tucker. The Embassy Marines had no connection with Marines elsewhere in Vietnam.

Weapons and radio equipment for the Marines came from the U.S. Department of State. The detachment's highly sophisticated radio net consisted of extremely reliable fixed and portable units which linked guard posts, vehicles, the detachment office, and the security offices. The standard weapon for the embassy guard was the Smith and Wesson .38-caliber, 4-inch barrel revolver. However, the Residency Guard carried the 2-inch barrel Smith and Wesson .38, while the Personal Security Unit used the Colt "Python," a .357-caliber, magnum revolver. Both the Residency and the Personal Security Units had 9mm Beretta sub-machine guns, which they carried in unobtrusive attache cases. A 1966 test of some of the world's available sub-machine guns resulted in the selection of the Beretta because of its

accuracy, reliability, and light weight.* Backing up the arsenal of hand guns, each internal post possessed 12-gauge Remington Shotguns, loaded with 00 buckshot shells.

One major problem encountered by the officer in charge during 1967 was that his command expanded so rapidly that he and his one staff NCO were hard put to exercise adequate control. As a result, sergeants supervised watch sections of as many as 30 Marines, located at different posts in a potentially insecure city. This situation ceased only after Captain Robert J. O'Brien became OIC of the detachment in April and Gunnery Sergeant Alexander Morrison arrived in February.

The security guard faced an additional difficulty during the construction of a new embassy facility. During the construction period, the Marines guarded the site on a 24-hour basis and, because of security considerations, monitored the workers on the job. The Marine guard requirements constantly changed at the new building site and the contractors did not finish the new complex until the fall.

The year 1967 passed without any significant test of the Saigon MSG's mission capability. The events of February 1968 justified the long and tedious hours devoted to drills, alerts, passive defense measures, and tests of the security system.

The Advisors

Major operations such as Cedar Falls and Junction City in III Corps, the Prairie series, the Hickory sweeps, and the protracted defenses of Con Thien and Khe Sanh in I Corps served as focal points for the year 1967. Because of the tactful and often delicate nature of their missions, American advisors often found their activities in Vietnam overshadowed by these more dramatic events. The advisors' role in Vietnam, however, included every aspect of the conflict.

Following the signature of the Geneva Accords on 20 July 1954, the South Vietnamese Government requested U.S. military aid. The United States granted the request and established the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam. In February 1955, MAAG Vietnam's mission expanded to include the organization and training of the Viet-

*The weapons tested included the Thompson SMG (.45 caliber), the Swedish K, the Israeli Uzi, and the Beretta. LtCol Philip E. Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

namese forces. Continued growth of the MAAG led to the formation of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) in February 1962 to direct the expanding effort. By the end of 1962, MACV personnel strength reached 11,000. As the level of combat increased, MACV grew accordingly, and during 1967 General Westmoreland, recognizing the value of the advisory program, requested the addition of 3,100 advisory personnel. By 31 December 1967, 7,038 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine advisors served in the field with their Vietnamese counterparts; 76 were Marines.

Marine advisors fell into two categories. The largest contingent, 40 officers and enlisted men, served as members of the 845-man USMACV I Corps Field Advisory Element. The Naval Advisory Group (NAG) carried the other Marine advisors on its rolls. NAG Marines operated with two separate advisory components: The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU). The Rung Sat Special Zone was a small, joint Navy-Marine advisory unit, while the Marine Advisory Unit was directed to the growing Vietnamese Marine Corps.

I Corps Advisors

Marine advisors assigned to I Corps came under the control of the Army Advisory I Corps Headquarters, located at Da Nang, and commanded by Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA. Colonel Hamblen reported to the senior advisor; I Corps, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, who, in addition to commanding III MAF, wore the advisory "hat" in the Corps area.

The Marine advisors in I Corps, 20 officers and 20 enlisted men, spread throughout the entire I CTZ, but most of them concentrated in the 1st ARVN Division while the rest served with the 2d ARVN Division and the 51st ARVN Regiment. The I Corps advisory teams contained U.S. Marine and Army and Australian personnel.³

One of the major accomplishments of the Army-Marine advisory teams with the 1st ARVN Division involved the improvement of the division's firepower. During September 1967, the 1st ARVN Division took over a sector of the DMZ defenses, and to strengthen its defensive capabilities, the division received 106mm recoilless rifles and M-60 machine guns. Its mortar allocations increased, and late in the year the entire division was reequipped with M-16 rifles.



Photo courtesy of LtCol James R. Davis

Marine Capt James R. Davis (second from right), the senior advisor to a battalion of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, and his assistants, pose with the battalion's commander (center). Comprising the team are a Marine lieutenant, an Australian warrant officer, Capt Davis, and an Army sergeant first class.

Five major ARVN actions during 1967 in I Corps demonstrated increased South Vietnamese unit combat effectiveness, the goal of the advisory effort. In February, 2d ARVN Division battalions engaged elements of the 1st VC and NVA Regiments in Quang Ngai Province, killing 813 enemy. To the north, 1st ARVN Division regulars accounted for 392 NVA killed during May as they worked with the 3d Marine Division during Operation Lam Son 54/Hickory.

Lam Son 54 provided an excellent example of the rigors experienced by advisors assigned to I Corps. On the night of 20 May 1967, Marine First Lieutenant William M. Grammar, senior advisor to the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, was with the battalion command group. Suddenly a large North Vietnamese force lunged out of the darkness, completely overrunning the group. During the confused action which followed, enemy fire hit one of Grammar's assistants. Grammar tried to carry him to safety, but the wounded American refused, saying that he would stay behind and pro-



3d MarDiv ComdC, April 1967

Marine Capt Roger E. Knapper, an advisor to the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, inspects a well-constructed bunker at one of the division's bases in April 1967.

vide covering fire. Lieutenant Grammar, with the rest of his team, fought his way through the encircling enemy to the relative safety of a nearby village. There, an enemy search party discovered them. Grammar, trying to draw the Communists away from his group of survivors, broke into the open and ran into an open field. His efforts failed and the enemy force captured him.

Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the 1st ARVN Regiment received orders to go to the assistance of the survivors of the 3d Battalion. By 0600 the 4th made contact with the same enemy unit that had overrun the 3d Battalion. The battle raged all morning; close air support and artillery helped the 4th Battalion to drive the North Vietnamese from their original positions. Senior battalion advisor, Marine Captain James R. Davis, directed the supporting arms effort. At 1100, the 4th Battalion located the main enemy force near a church. The South Vietnamese launched a determined assault against the enemy position at 1300 and, despite heavy NVA automatic weapons fire and B-40 rockets, the battalion carried the Communist position. The NVA

unit broke off the engagement. The 4th Battalion consolidated the church position, where they found the body of First Lieutenant Grammar. His captors had killed him before they fled.*

Later in the year, during July, the 1st ARVN Division conducted a sweep operation, Lam Son 87, north of Hue. During the operation, the division shattered the *802d VC Battalion*. The final enemy body count reached 252. The next month, in Quang Nam Province, units from the independent 51st ARVN Regiment tracked down a battalion of the *21st NVA Regiment*, and killed 197. Later in the fall, during Lam Son 138 east of Quang Tri City, a 1st ARVN Division battalion smashed another NVA battalion. At the end of the day-long battle, a total of 107 North Vietnamese bodies covered the field. Marine advisors participated in all of these actions. In I Corps during 1967, South Vietnamese large-unit actions killed more than 8,000 enemy troops, as compared to 5,271 in 1966. The advisors were accomplishing their mission.

The Rung Sat Special Zone

Since the beginning of Vietnamese history, the *Rung Sat*, literally "forest of assassins," represented a source of vexation to the rulers of Cochinchina. The Rung Sat is a dense mangrove swamp covering the 400 square miles separating Saigon from the sea. Saigon's main waterway to the South China Sea, the Long Tau River, meanders through the tangle of the Rung Sat. The area served as the hideout of countless pirates and other fugitives in the past and remained ideally suited for the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong. The only way to move in the Rung Sat is by small, shallow draft boat, and its tidal waterways challenged navigation. Only long term residents of the Rung Sat knew its secrets, and the Viet Cong were long term residents. The primary VC threat from the Rung Sat was the possibility of sinking large shipping in the Long Tau, thereby blocking the Saigon port. The VC attempted this many times and forced the South Vietnamese into an extended "cat and mouse" game of finding and expelling the Communists from their sanctuary.

As one solution to the threat posed by the Viet Cong presence in the Rung Sat, the South Vietnamese Government designated the region as a

*Lieutenant Grammar received a posthumous Silver Star Medal for this action. LtCol James R. Davis, Comments on draft ms, 14May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

special tactical operational area, thus the designation Rung Sat Special Zone. As in all other arenas of conflict in Vietnam, American advisors served there. By 1967 the RSSZ Advisory Team consisted of two Marine officers, one Navy officer, three enlisted Marines, and two sailors. The team had its headquarters at Nha Be, seven miles south of Saigon, on the west bank of the Long Tau River. The base provided an ideal operational site since it lay at the junction of the Long Tau and the Soi Rap River, the latter forming the southern boundary of the RSSZ. Boats from Nha Be could reach the entire perimeter of the swamp.

The RSSZ advisors faced multiple duties. As the resident experts, they coordinated all efforts to force the Communists out of the swamp. Initially, they worked with a meager Vietnamese force consisting only of local RF and PF units. As the year progressed the unit's advisory responsibilities increased as the South Vietnamese directed larger formations and more sophisticated equipment against the enemy in the zone. During the year, the United States improved the Nha Be base to support U.S. Navy river patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, and the invaluable Navy Sea Wolf helicopter fire teams. On 28 February 1967, the U.S. Navy established the Riverine Assault Force (TF 117), which represented the Navy element of a new tactical organization, the Mekong Delta Mobile Assault Force. This force made its combat debut in a joint operation with the 9th U.S. Division in the Rung Sat during March. Following this penetration, operations in the Rung Sat increased in tempo and scale through the summer and fall.

The Communists responded to the increased allied efforts. They shelled Nha Be twice during August, and during the first attack on 3 August, the Communists wounded 24 men. Enemy attacks against shipping continued. On 16 March the Communists hit the SS *Conqueror* with six 75mm recoilless rifle rounds as it sailed up the Long Tau. On 18 November they hit the SS *Buchanan* 19 times. On 22 December, a mine exploded under the SS *Seatrain Texas* while it lay at anchor near Nha Be.

The *Buchanan* shelling touched off a reaction which is an excellent illustration of advisory activity in the Rung Sat. At the time of the incident, Marine Captain Clifford R. Dunning served as the RSSZ advisor to a specially formed Vietnamese commando/intelligence unit. The unit quickly planned an operation that sent a reaction force in three

helicopters after the VC gunners. The helicopters could not land, which forced Dunning and his unit to jump into the swamp from the hovering helicopters from a height of about 12 feet. About 200 meters from the insert point, the reaction force caught up with the Viet Cong. After a sharp firefight, the enemy broke and ran, leaving behind two 75mm recoilless rifles. An air strike intercepted the fleeing VC. One enemy charged out of the swamp toward Captain Dunning. Dunning shot him. Shortly thereafter, the air strike ended and the surviving VC regrouped and counterattacked the Vietnamese commando party. Dunning's unit stopped the VC charge. Another heavy firefight developed, and once more the South Vietnamese attacked. While the South Vietnamese drove the VC back, a smoke grenade dropped from a friendly helicopter injured Dunning. Once more the Viet Cong withdrew and Dunning and his men established a night position. They counted 16 VC bodies on the battlefield. In addition, the capture of the two recoilless rifles deprived the VC of their best antishipping weapons.*

Once inside the dank, smelly confines of the swamp, the rest of Viet Nam seemed as remote as another world. The Rung Sat Advisors fought a very personal, almost private, war in the slime and heat of the Forest of Assassins.

The Marine Advisory Unit

The Marine Advisory Unit adapted its size according to the needs of the expanding Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). Starting as a single battalion in 1955, by the spring of 1967 the Vietnamese Marine Corps had grown to a strength of six infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and supporting elements. The advisory unit expanded from one officer in 1955 to 25 Marine officers, one Navy officer, and five enlisted Marines by January 1967.

At the beginning of the year, Colonel Nels E. Anderson served as the senior Marine advisor. He assigned teams of two officers, usually a major and a captain, to each battalion, while other members of the group served as technical advisors or performed the diverse administrative functions of the MAG. When the Vietnamese Marines deployed in brigade or task force formations, normally two infantry bat-

*For his actions on 18 November 1967, Captain Dunning received the Silver Star Medal.

talions and an artillery battery, an additional pair of advisors went with the force headquarters.

Both the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade operated as the national strategic reserve. This designation was, however, a misnomer; the so-called strategic reserve seldom sat uncommitted. The units engaged in combat operations more than 80 percent of the year. The role of the Marines resembled that of a theater reserve, but the emphasis was on rotational commitment, rather than retention as a static reserve element.

All but one of the VNMC battalions had their home base on the outskirts of Saigon. The one exception was the 4th, which operated from Vung Tau, located on the sea 60 kilometers southeast of Saigon. For this reason, when a Marine battalion began a scheduled rehabilitation, it usually returned to Saigon and assumed duties in either the Capital Military District, the geographic area including and surrounding Saigon, or the Rung Sat Special Zone, (RSSZ), which also lay near the battalions' base camps.

The strategic role and high commitment rate caused the officers and men of the Marine Advisory Group to see as much, if not more, of Vietnam during their respective 12-month tours than any other group of Americans. The familiar Vietnamese verb, "Di!" (Go!), assumed a special meaning to the advisors. Not only did it raise the immediate question of where, but experience soon taught the unwary that "Di!" could mean "We're going!" for weeks—or possibly months. For example, during 1967, the 1st Battalion remained in the field in Binh Dinh Province for 117 days, from 14 July until 8 November.

Vietnamese Marine operations during 1967 fell into three general categories: security operations in both the Capital Military District and the Rung Sat Special Zone, a year-long campaign against the well-entrenched Viet Cong in Binh Dinh Province in II CTZ, and search and destroy sweeps in III and IV Corps.

One exception occurred with Operation Song Than/Deckhouse V, a joint U.S. Marine-Vietnamese Marine effort. The first large-scale USMC/VNMC amphibious operation, Song Than/Deckhouse V went after VC elements reported active in the coastal regions of Kien Hoa Province. Intelligence officers reported the Communist units there included elements of the *516th*, *518th*, and *261st VC Battalions*.

The landing force of Vietnamese Marines came from VNMC Brigade Force Bravo, consisting of the 3d, 4th, and part of the 6th Battalion, reinforced by Battery C of the VNMC Artillery Battalion. The American force came from the Special Landing Force (SLF), then consisting of BLT 1/9 and HMM-362.

Colonel Anderson recalled the problems he encountered in coordinating the command relationships of this operation:

When I learned that Deckhouse V was to be conducted in Kien Hoa Province, I seized upon the opportunity to get the Vietnamese Marines involved at last in an amphibious operation, which, after all, was supposed to be their primary mission. I knew this would involve certain risks because none of the Vietnamese Marines had had any training whatsoever in this, the most complex of all military operations. One plus factor, however, was that the field-rank officers that were to participate were graduates of Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, and several junior officers and senior N.C.O.s had attended school at Landing Force Training Command, Pacific.

The first thing I did was to discuss the operation with the Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, at his headquarters at Bien Hoa. (Bien Hoa was the headquarters of the III Corps of which General Khang was commander at this time.) Khang, also a graduate of AWS was very enthusiastic when told about the operation. Among other things discussed were the command relations in amphibious operations as established by existing doctrine. He said he understood perfectly and that he would place the Vietnamese Marine units to be in Deckhouse V under the *command* of the Amphibious Task Force Commander. This of course would be a departure from command relationships then existing between U.S. and South Vietnamese Forces.

After embarkation, I learned that the Vietnamese Joint General Staff had disapproved of the command relationships agreed to by General Khang and that the old "cooperation and coordination" system would be in effect. I never could see the logic for such arrangement, and in my opinion the lack of unity of command between the U.S. and Vietnamese forces was a glaring weakness in the entire war.⁴

Song Than/Deckhouse V got off to a bad start. A compromise of the operation occurred even before the Vietnamese Marines embarked. Hurried planning, unclear command structures, faulty radio nets, and poor liaison compounded operational problems. Even the elements turned against the Marines. Rough seas postponed the landing for one day, and after returning to Vung Tau for ship-to-ship transfers, the Marines devised a new landing plan. The new plan called for helilifting most of the assault force. By this time, as many as 40 percent of the Vietnamese Marines had succumbed to seasickness. The landing on 7 January did not

brighten their spirits. Major Donald E. Wood, the operations and training advisor, reported:

Following the assault across Red Beach . . . Brigade Force Bravo was informed by local inhabitants in the area that VC elements had been alerted regarding the scheduled date and location of the operation three weeks prior to 1 January. The result was that very light contact was gained with VC by assault units.⁵

Song Than/Deckhouse V ended on 15-16 January as Brigade Force Bravo went through the tedious process of reloading from the shallow beaches of Kien Hoa and unloading again at Vung Tau. The week in the recently harvested rice fields and vexing mangrove swamps of the Mekong Delta resulted in five dead VC and the capture of 25 suspects, 10 of whom proved to be Viet Cong. These were lackluster results for an operation conducted by 1,750 Vietnamese Marines. One 4th Battalion Marine drowned and seven other troops suffered accidental wounds. The "lessons learned" were manifold; however Song Than/Deckhouse V represented the last operation of its type. MACV restricted the SLF to I CTZ and the Vietnamese Marines reverted to their previous landlocked role.*

During the year four Vietnamese Marine battalions participated in forays into the foreboding swamps of the Rung Sat:

1st Battalion	2-8 February
4th Battalion	11 March-12 April
1st Battalion	11 April-12 May
6th Battalion	12 May-21 July
3d Battalion	12 August-15 September

The 6th Battalion senior advisor's report of the 12 May-21 July occupation provides an insight into the conditions in the Rung Sat. Major Robert L. Fischer reported:

The tidal range in the TAOR is 12 feet At low tide many small streams are dry and larger rivers and streams present high, steep banks. The rapid currents during filling and receding tides make small streams dangerous for troop crossing and difficult for maneuverability of small boats. At high tide it is virtually impossible to move rapidly by foot Ambushers placed along streams often found themselves waist deep in water for at least half of the ambush period.⁶

Another frustration of Rung Sat duty stemmed from the Viet Cong's ability to recognize Marine intentions, which made decisive engagements virtually impossible. Major Fischer's report revealed some of the simple but effective VC measures:

The Viet Cong utilize a simple system of early warning and signal towers. Near each active camp located in the TAOR was a tree platform or tower. On ten occasions VC were observed either in the tower or dropping from it and running into the nearest dense area. These towers are located across the Rung Sat and undoubtedly serve to signal elements crossing the Rung Sat between adjacent

*See Chapter 11 for the SLF account of Deckhouse V.

A unit of Vietnamese wades ashore from a landing craft in a flooded part of the Mekong Delta during the joint Operation Deckhouse V in the Delta region in January.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A190966



provinces, as well as providing early warning and unit massing capability.⁷

Simply stated, Rung Sat duty remained hot, wet, filthy, frustrating, and dangerous. Myriad bugs, gnats, mosquitoes, and ants added to the grim atmosphere of the swamp. In spite of these obstacles, the five VNMC Rung Sat battalion-size operations in 1967 cost the Viet Cong 30 killed at a price of four Marines killed and 21 wounded.

Action In Binh Dinh Province

An area of major VNMC action in 1967 was Binh Dinh Province in northern II CTZ. After operating there since mid-1964, all Vietnamese Marines became familiar with the beautiful Bong Son plain and the seemingly endless ridge lines that extend westward to Laos. In 1965, the first U.S. ground forces moved into II Corps. The 1st U. S. Cavalry Division (Airmobile) went to An Khe with the mission of keeping Route 19 open between Pleiku and Qui Nhon. Joint U.S./RVN operations started shortly after the arrival of the "1st Cav."

For the Vietnamese Marines, operations in Binh Dinh proved different from those in III and IV CTZs to the south. The dense forest of the uncultivated areas, the concentration of the population in a narrow coastal strip, cooler weather, long periods of morning fog, and much more solid land forms, all contributed to tactical variations. Generally, the Viet Cong in Binh Dinh represented a different breed. Dominated by the Viet Minh in the Fifties, the province remained notorious for its solid Communist base. The Binh Dinh Cong were "hard core" in every sense of the term.

The terrain in Binh Dinh supports cultivation only in the coastal regions, hence the population centers there. The rest of the province, all forested, served as an enormous VC sanctuary. Only woodcutters and scattered Montagnards roamed the hinterlands; the Communists moved at will under the vast forest canopy. Operating from the spacious inland sanctuary, the VC had the enviable position of operating on interior lines against the densely populated coastal region.

The GVN forces, on the other hand, sought to protect vulnerable Routes 1 and 19, as well as the railroad and the Bong Son Airfield, all in lowland regions, except for the western end of Route 19. Similarly, most of the population requiring protection concentrated in these same lowlands. The con-

centrated population made government control somewhat easier, but the local citizens remained apathetic; the Communists long dominance made their influence strong.

Operationally, the terrain proved suitable for a different type of guerrilla warfare, unlike that experienced in the swamps and delta region in southern South Vietnam. In Binh Dinh Province the ground is hard, even during the rainy season. Cover and concealment is excellent. Seasonal, dense morning fog neutralizes the effect of air superiority. These factors provided the Communists with excellent mobility and they moved without fear of detection. Consequently, their vast natural hiding place, the inland forests, allowed the Viet Cong to operate more audaciously than elsewhere in the country.

One commodity, food, remained in short supply in Binh Dinh Province. The main cultivated areas lay along Route 1. In 1967, the government still controlled the food producing areas and the Communists wanted them. That brought the Vietnamese Marines and 1st U.S. Cavalry Division to northern II Corps.

The first major VNMC action in II CTZ during 1967 was Operation Pershing/Song Than 9, a joint operation with the 1st Cavalry Division near Bong Son. Song Than 9 was a satisfactory operation. During the period 14-22 February Brigade Force Bravo, the 2d and 3d Battalions, killed 54 Viet Cong. In return, the enemy killed three Marines and wounded 27. Remaining in the Bong Son area, the brigade force spent the rest of February, all of March, and the first part of April conducting sweep operations. They coordinated these operations with the 1st Cavalry Division's operations in adjacent areas, but the Marine sweeps remained separate operations.

On 18-19 April, Brigade Force Alpha flew to English Airfield at Bong Son where it relieved Brigade Force Bravo. On the 22nd, Force Alpha began search and destroy/pacification of a TAOR including Tam Quan on the north, Bong Son to the south, the portion of Route 1 connecting the two towns, with the South China Sea serving as the eastern boundary. Elsewhere in II CTZ, Brigade Force Bravo, under the direction of the 22d ARVN Division, conducted two major operations from 18 March through 18 April. Again, these actions paralleled but remained separate from 1st Cavalry Division operations. Brigade Force Alpha stayed in the Bong Son region until July. At the conclusion of Operation Bac Thien 817 on 12 July, Brigade Force

Alpha resumed patrolling of its TAOR until relieved by Brigade Force Bravo on the 26th. The latter unit started Operation Song Than 14 the next day. Brigade Force Alpha left II Corps in late July; Force Bravo remained until 6 November. The two units again switched places and Force Alpha remained there until well into 1968.

Vietnamese Marine operations in II CTZ during 1967 showed impressive results. Communist losses totaled 202 killed and 282 captured. Marine losses for the year's II CTZ campaign numbered 49 killed and 215 wounded.

Action in the South

Other than periodic assignments to the Rung Sat, security operations around Saigon in the Capital Military District, and rotations to II CTZ, the rest of the Vietnamese Marines' 1967 operations took place in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones; six occurred in the former and five in the latter.

From 22 February through 11 March, Brigade Force Alpha, consisting of the reinforced 1st and 5th Battalions took part in Operation Junction City, a search and destroy operation with the 25th U.S. Infantry Division. Force Alpha became the only Vietnamese unit to participate in the largest allied operation since the beginning of the war. Marine contact was very light, but the net results of the joint operation included the seizure of more than 364 tons of rice and significant damage to enemy installations in the Communists' War Zone C. This zone lay in a triangular territory formed by Route 13, the Cambodian border, and a line connecting Ben Cat with Tay Ninh. Vietnamese Marine-U. S. relations improved further when the brigade force commander, Colonel Bui The Lan, requested that his force be granted a more aggressive role in the 25th Division's scheme of operations. The Americans granted the request and Brigade Force Alpha avoided acting as a blocking force.

In May, Brigade Force Bravo, then consisting of the reinforced 1st and 5th Battalions moved from Saigon to Vi Tanh, 45 kilometers southwest of Can Tho in IV CTZ. There, under 21st ARVN Division control, the Marine force participated in the uneventful Operation Dan Chi 287/C. On 28 May, Force Bravo left its attached artillery behind and undertook a riverine assault. This operation, Long Phi 999/N, proved unproductive and the Marine elements became the 9th ARVN Division reserve at Vinh Long.

On 7 June, Brigade Force Bravo moved to Tan

Uyen village, 13 kilometers north of Bien Hoa in III CTZ where it came under the direct control of III Corps Headquarters. On 20 June the 1st Marine Battalion left to participate with the 1st U.S. Infantry Division in Operation Billings, north of Tan Uyen. The net result of these actions for the Marines included the loss of nine killed, 34 wounded. Among the wounded was the 1st Battalion's assistant advisor, Captain Manfred E. Schwarz. Communist losses were 14 killed and one captured. Vietnamese Marine operations in III and IV Corps got off to a slow start in 1967.

When Operation Billings ended on 9 July, Brigade Force Bravo moved from Tan Uyen to neighboring Phuoc Tuy Province. There, with the 9th U.S. Infantry Division, the 1st Australian Task Force, and the 43d ARVN Regiment, Force Bravo, now consisting of the 2d and 3d Marine Battalions, joined Operation Paddington. The mission involved locating and destroying the *274th VC Regiment*. The Marines opened their phase of the operation at 0900 on 10 July with a helicopter landing in their respective zones of action. Contact continued light throughout the 10th and 11th, but at 0900 on 12 July, elements of the 3d Battalion made contact with what appeared to be an enemy battalion. Heavy fighting continued until 1600 when the VC broke off the engagement. For the next three days the Marines conducted search operations but made no contact. Finally, on the 15th, Brigade Force Bravo regrouped at Xuan Loc and motored back to its base camp at Thu Duc outside Saigon. Brigade Force Bravo reported 43 Communists dead as the result of Paddington; 11 Marines died and 31 suffered wounds during the operation.

One of the most serious problems faced by advisors in the field revolved around establishing the precise status of the advisor vis-a-vis his counterpart. Often the Americans gave advice which their Vietnamese counterparts ignored. Third parties often compounded this situation. Major Charles E. Parker, senior advisor with Brigade Force Bravo during Operation Paddington, summed up the problem when he stated:

On two occasions coordination with U.S. units consisted of the [American] unit commanding officer simply stating his intentions to the nearest USMC advisor, then leaving without waiting for a discussion with the Task Force Commander. This abruptness, however, was probably more a result of late receipt of orders rather than any obstinacy on the part of the U.S. command. As it turned out,

liaison/coordination problems were solved before dangerous situations developed.

Major Parker continued:

The U.S. Army commanders and their staffs are not aware of the organization and functions of U.S. Marine advisors. They work on the assumption that we operate with teams similar to U.S. Army advisory teams (which were larger). They also seem to forget that USMC advisors are just what the term implies, advisors, not commanders.⁸

During the last week in July, the 3d Battalion participated in Operation Concordia VII with the 2d Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division. The operation produced no contacts or casualties, but the riverine landing in Long An Province proved that the Vietnamese Marines were prepared for this type of maneuver.

Intelligence sources reported a concentration of elements of at least four VC battalions in Dinh Tuong Province during late July. Accordingly, a quickly planned operation, Coronado II/Song Than 63/67 began under the control of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division. Other units assigned to Coronado II included 1st Brigade, 25th U.S. Infantry Division; 11th Army Armored Cavalry Regiment; and the ARVN 44th and 52d Ranger Battalions. Marine participation consisted of Task Force Alpha made up of the 3d and 4th Marine Battalions and Battery B from the Marine Artillery Battalion.

The first phase of Coronado II started on 30 July. Helicopters put the 3d Battalion into a landing zone north of the Mekong River. It was a bad zone. Immediately upon landing the battalion found itself in trouble. The Viet Cong occupied the heavily fortified area north of the LZ in force. The 3d Battalion could not move. To help, the 4th Battalion went by helicopters into a second LZ north of the 3d Battalion's position. The 4th Battalion moved to put pressure on the Viet Cong positions which now lay between the two Marine battalions. A prisoner revealed that elements of the veteran *263d* and *514th VC Battalions* faced the Marines. The battle raged all day in the jungle-canopied terrain as gunships, air strikes, and artillery pounded the well-entrenched Communists. At dusk the VC tried to break out, but the 3d and 4th Battalions held. Fire fights continued all night.

Captain Jerry I. Simpson, senior advisor to the 3d Battalion, spent the entire day and most of the night directing supporting arms against the tough enemy position. Enemy mortar rounds, rockets, and small

arms fire continued to hold back the Marines' advance. Suddenly, at 0500 on the 31st, a VC force of about two companies attempted a mass break-out. Their path led them directly to the 3d Battalion command post located partly in a small hut. In the confused fighting which followed, the VC overran the CP, but Captain Simpson and surviving Marines drove the VC back through the CP toward the VC's original positions. After that, the fighting stopped abruptly. The remaining Viet Cong managed to slip away in the jungle. At 1300, helicopters extracted the 3d Battalion and returned it to Dong Tam. The 4th Battalion continued sweep operations until 1500 the next day when it too withdrew to Dong Tam. On 1 August the 5th Battalion relieved the 3d and the latter moved by transport aircraft to Thu Duc.

Phase II proved uneventful and Vietnamese participation in Coronado II ended on 4-5 August. The 4th and 5th Battalions returned to their Thu Duc bases. The sharp action of 30-31 July hurt the VC in Dinh Tuong Province. The Marines killed 108 and captured six. Total South Vietnamese losses for the operation numbered 44 killed and 115 wounded. Of these, one of the dead and seven of the wounded were the result of friendly fires, an accident which provided a bitter lesson in coordination.

Task force Alpha went to the field again on 11 August. Operation Song Than 701-67, a three-phase operation in Bien Hoa Province, dragged on until 21 October. Various battalion combinations under Task Force Alpha permitted the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions to participate, but the results proved disappointing. They killed one VC. Coordination problems plagued the multibattalion, joint U.S./Vietnamese sweep. The most tragic error happened on 16 September. A 155mm round, fired from an improperly laid howitzer scored a direct hit on the 6th Battalion's command post and killed three Marines and wounded 11.

Credit for the most successful operational series in 1967 belongs to the 5th Battalion. During the period 9 November through 22 December, the 5th served as one of three maneuver battalions of the U.S. Mobile Riverine Force. Their operations concentrated in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien Phong Provinces. The 5th Battalion took part in nine separate actions during this period. The 44 days of riverine operation netted the battalion the impressive total of 186 dead Communists and 32 prisoners, including one VC province chief.

While assigned to the Mobile Riverine Force, the battalion normally stayed in the field for three days of operations, followed by a stand down period of the same duration. Missions generally started with the battalion moving in boats of the River Assault Division to an area of operations. Once in the assigned area, the battalion moved frequently, either by boat or helicopter, depending on the tactical situation.

A classic riverine operation, executed by Major Huong Van Nam's 5th Marine Battalion, started at midnight on 3 December as the Marines embarked on assault ships at Sa Dec. Their mission: destruction of the *267th Main Force* and *502d Local Force VC Battalions*, then located in eastern Kien Phong and western Dinh Tuong Provinces. The force moved down the northern bank of the Mekong and entered the Rach Ruong Canal to make a landing on the west bank of the canal at 0800. The plan called for the Marines to land, move west, and then sweep south back toward the Mekong. Two U.S. Army battalions, one embarked, supported the operation.

The sun came up as the river craft entered the canal. All remained quiet until 0740 when the rear of the boat column came under light small arms fire from the west bank. As the column moved up the canal, heavier fire, including recoilless rifles and B-40 rockets, opened up from positions further north on the west bank. All of the boats returned fire and the South Vietnamese called in the supporting gunships. A Communist B-40 rocket hit one of the ATCs (an armored troop carrying boat), and wounded 18 Marines. The 5th Battalion continued on toward its original landing beaches. Only the end of the column came under enemy attack. The boat formation carrying the 3d Battalion, 47th U.S. Infantry, which followed the 5th Battalion, heard the enemy fire and took advantage of their warning. The 3d Battalion promptly landed on the west bank, south of the first VC firing position.

At 0800 the Communists opened fire on the 5th Battalion again, this time from another west bank position about 2,500 meters north of the last firing site. Obviously, a large VC force occupied the west bank of the Rach Ruong. Enemy B-40 rounds hit six ATCs. Major Nam ordered his battalion to land on the west bank immediately. The 2d and 3d Companies landed near Objective 18, while the 1st, 4th, and Headquarters Companies landed at Blue Beach 1.

The 1st Company became heavily engaged as soon

as it landed, while Headquarters Company and the 4th Company met much lighter opposition. Neither the 2d and 3d Companies, to the north, had any contact. The 4th Company moved 250 meters inland, stopped, and called in air and artillery. Major Nam realized that his left flank units, the 1st and 4th Companies, were engaging the northern portion of the VC formation, by then identified as the *502d Local Force Battalion*. Major Nam ordered the 2d and 3d Companies to retract and land again at Blue Beach 2, move inland, seize objectives 114 and 213, and encircle the Communists. Both companies accomplished the mission; the VC found themselves surrounded. The riverine force boats blocked escape to the east across the canal.

By this time the 4th Company had lost contact, so, on Major Nam's orders, it withdrew to the beach, reembarked, and landed again just south of Blue Beach 1. The VC greeted the company's landing with intense rocket and automatic weapons fire. The guns of the assault craft established fire superiority as the 4th Company Marines scrambled ashore and gained a foothold. The 1st Company closed the ring, moving in from the northwest. Coordinated attacks by both the 1st and 4th Companies slowly rolled up the VC position, as the other companies blocked the rest of the perimeter. Contact was too close to use supporting arms. The Marines destroyed the enemy bunkers systematically, but their progress continued slow because their 57mm recoilless rifle had little effect on the well-constructed Communist bunkers.

The senior battalion advisor, Major Paul L. Carlson, reported final stages of the fight:

By 1600 one major Viet Cong complex remained 600 meters inland and withstood all assaults. Rocket gunships peppered the bunker system. The assaulting units then stormed the bunkers using grenades to destroy the opposition and physically tore the bunkers apart with entrenching tools.⁹

The battle ended by 1630. Throughout the night and the next morning, Viet Cong survivors continued to emerge from hiding places. Some had reverted to the classic VC trick of hiding under water, breathing through hollow reeds. The Marines knew the trick, also.

Enemy casualties during the "Battle of Rach Ruong" totaled 175 Viet Cong killed by the 5th Marine Battalion. They found the bodies of the chief of staff of the *502d Battalion*, one company commander, two platoon commanders, one doctor, and

two newsmen among the dead. The Marines captured 12 more confirmed VC, including a province chief, and picked up an additional 12 suspects before the 5th Battalion withdrew at 1400 on 5 December. Battalion losses amounted to 40 killed and 103 wounded, 34 of whom did not require evacuation.

Elsewhere in the AO, other units accounted for another 91 enemy killed, at the cost of nine American soldiers killed and 89 wounded. While the 5th Marine Battalion was scoring its resounding victory, the 3d Battalion, 47th U.S. Infantry assaulted the VC positions which had fired the opening rounds. The Army assault prevented the Communists from going to the aid of their besieged comrades to the north. The Army action provided a valuable assist, but the Rach Ruong battle remains as one of the finer moments in the brief history of the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

While the 5th Battalion participated in Coronado IX, the 2d Marine Battalion, the major component of Task Force Bravo, engaged in Operation Song Than 808/Buena Vista. Operating with the 199th U.S. Infantry Brigade, TF Bravo joined Buena Vista on 7 December. The search and destroy operation covered portions of Binh Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces. During the 11-day sweep, the Marines discovered the base camp of the *VC Dong Nai Regiment* and the *Binh Duong Provincial Forces*. The Marines suffered light casualties.

The last Vietnamese Marine Operation of 1967 was Task Force Bravo's Operation Song Than 809. Lasting only three days, 29-31 December, Song Than 809 resulted in a 20-hour battle with the *261st* and *263d VC Main Force Battalions* in Dinh Tuong Province in IV CTZ. At this time TF Bravo consisted of the 1st and 2d Marine Battalions, reinforced by Battery B of the Marine Artillery Battalion; control of the operation rested with the 7th ARVN Division.

Helicopters landed both battalions in separate zones during the morning of 29 December. There was no contact. On the 31st the 2d Battalion executed a second helicopter assault. This time the battalion made contact immediately after landing.

Complications came from an unexpected quarter. At 1700 the 7th ARVN Division forward command

post, controlling Song Than 809, shut down operations in anticipation of the New Year's truce. This left TF Bravo in the field and in contact. To make matters worse, the 2d Battalion almost ran out of ammunition and enemy fire drove off a pre-dark helicopter ammunition resupply. As a last recourse, the helicopter crewmen dropped the ammunition during a low pass. Unfortunately, it fell in an open, fire-swept area between the 2d Battalion and the Viet Cong. Senior battalion advisor, Major Jon A. Rindfleisch, and a volunteer squad of Marines raced out into the drop zone, gathered up the scattered containers, and rushed them back to the battalion's lines. The supply kept the 2d Battalion going through the night.*

Meanwhile, to add to the uncertainty of the situation, the 7th ARVN Division released all of its aviation at 1800, again, in anticipation of the New Year's truce. In spite of these disquieting developments, contact continued throughout the night, finally ending at 0530, 1 January when the VC withdrew. First light disclosed 85 VC bodies. The Marines took eight prisoners during the fight and picked up 71 enemy weapons. Task Force Bravo's losses included 28 Marines killed and 83 wounded. This ended the last Vietnamese Marine action of 1967.

During the year 1967, the Vietnamese Marines participated in 24 major combat operations, 15 of which were brigade- or task-force-scale maneuvers. Total VNMC casualties included 201 killed and 707 wounded. The Communists suffered 693 killed and 342 captured from Vietnamese Marine actions. The kill ratio of 3.45:1, though not as impressive as the U.S. Marine 1967 kill ratio of 5.18:1, was a tribute to the courage of the Vietnamese Marines, as well as the dedication of their advisors. The Marine advisors were fortunate during 1967; three suffered wounds but none died. From the advisory viewpoint, 1967 represented a year of investment. The dividends included positive results; the immediate future would affirm the advisors' faith in the abilities of their Vietnamese contemporaries.

*For this and other actions during Song Than 809, Major Rindfleisch received the Silver Star Medal.

CHAPTER 16

The Situation at the End of the Year

*Operational Aspects—Personnel and Logistics—The Outlook for Victory
Enemy Dispositions—The Changed Situation*

Operational Aspects

During 1967, III MAF's concerns increasingly focused north as it shifted the bulk of its Marine units toward the DMZ to counter the continuing threat of a North Vietnamese invasion. This threat forced III MAF to change its top priorities from pacification and counter-guerrilla warfare to fighting a conventional war against regular North Vietnamese infantry units. Enemy intentions followed a similar pattern. Beginning in 1966, Hanoi referred to the conflict as a "regular-force war," with the insurgency playing a secondary role.¹

The MACV commander also recognized the DMZ threat and, in April, reinforced III MAF with the Ar-

my's Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai. General Westmoreland also planned to send the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to I Corps where it could employ its high mobility around Khe Sanh as it had in the Central Highlands. He saw the latter move as a preparatory step should Washington authorize a drive into Laos or an amphibious landing just north of the DMZ.²

Construction of the Dye Marker project continued during December, with emphasis on completing Strongpoint A-3. The North Vietnamese responded with mortar and artillery fire. Marine units conducted continuous search and destroy operations around and north of A-3 in an effort to control the high ground and avenues of approach to the construction site.

An Air Force C-123 "Provider" lands on the air strip at Khe Sanh with supplies after Navy Seabees completed resurfacing the monsoon-damaged strip on 1 November 1967.

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967





3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967

A Marine, identified only as PFC Bola, shows the damage done to his helmet by a near miss from small-arms fire while at the Con Thien combat base.

Enemy units engaged in two types of activity during the final month of the year. In the early weeks of December, the North Vietnamese initiated a series

of limited ground attacks along the DMZ using units as large as companies. Enemy forces also overran and destroyed the Binh Son District Headquarters on 5 December. During the final two weeks of 1967, however, the enemy assumed a more defensive posture, only to sustain heavier casualties because of having to fight at a time and place not of their choosing.

The statistics from III MAF in December provided ample evidence that the enemy was not yet defeated. III MAF conducted 11 large-unit operations during the month. The Marines killed a confirmed total of 1,237 enemy soldiers and listed another 701 as probably killed. Marines also captured 77 prisoners and 362 weapons; however, 96 Marines died in December.

During 1967, U.S. forces under III MAF control killed 25,452 enemy soldiers and listed another 23,363 as probably killed. These enemy losses totaled 14,728 more than in 1966, a reflection of the increased scale of large-unit battles in northern I Corps. These forced the North Vietnamese to feed over 24,000 replacements into their units in I Corps during the year. By comparison, over 3,600 Americans died in I Corps during the same period.

There were bright spots in the picture for III MAF at the end of 1967. During the year, the North Vietnamese had attempted to conquer the northern provinces of South Vietnam only to suffer defeat each time they took the offensive. Meanwhile, the South

Men of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines stand in a loose formation beside the air strip at Khe Sanh just after arriving in transport aircraft to reinforce the base in December 1967.

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967



Vietnamese Army, as a whole, grew by 130,000 during the year. Its units in I Corps were at 101.7 percent strength, despite considerable losses due to desertions by former peasants unhappy with assignments far from their home villages and provinces. The arrival of U.S. Army units in I Corps for service under III MAF also eased the Marines' troop density problem.

III MAF had 79 Combined Action Platoons in operation; these killed 259 of the enemy and captured 56 during the second half of the year. Pacification appeared to be regaining the momentum it lost in 1966, which accounted for the increase in ARVN strength and the increasing difficulty faced by the Viet Cong in recruiting new members. Finally, Highway 1, the main north-south artery, was open from the DMZ to the border of Binh Dinh Province.³

Personnel and Logistics

The average strength for III MAF during December was 103,591, which was 4,203 higher than the previous month. Most of these personnel were Marines (72,782), but 27,565 were in U.S. Army units. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force contributed 3,161 and 83, respectively.

There were some changes underway in III MAF's force structure as the year ended. III MAF had orders to deactivate its antitank battalions and to activate another company, Company E, for the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, a unit of the 3d Marine Division.

III MAF faced several significant logistics problems in the final month of 1967, primarily from the effects of the northeast monsoon. Channel silting brought on by bad weather and high seas forced the closing of the LST facility at Tan My on 10 December. Cua Viet's LST facility also closed from 7-29 December for the same reason. Further, the rough seas prevented transshipment of materials at Da Nang for seven days. The weather also affected airlift capabilities; for example, high winds limited or curtailed C-123 flight operations for 23 days during December. However, the air strip at Duc Pho opened for C-130 use on 4 December 1967.

The M16A1 rifles continued to provide problems for Marines in Vietnam. A random inspection of rifles issued in the first increment of weapons revealed that a large number had pitted and eroded chambers. III MAF then terminated the issue of the second increment. As of 17 December, a FLC con-



3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967

Men from the 3d Engineer Battalion use a bulldozer at Con Thien in December to push aside some of the monsoon-created mud in an attempt to make it easier for Marines to walk inside the combat base.

tract team had inspected 9,844 rifles and found that 6,603 (67 percent) required replacement. At III MAF's request, Headquarters, Marine Corps initiated action to obtain chromed chambers for installation by June 1968.

Finally, III MAF logisticians were not pleased with a MACV study, published late in the year. The theme of the study was a desire for a downward revision of authorized stock levels with the expectation of reducing construction costs and achieving operating economies. In essence, the study called for fighting a war under peacetime management principles under which stock levels reflected previous usage data. Both III MAF and FMFPac took the position that any reduction in authorized stock levels would impair III MAF's operational capabilities and lower the Marines' readiness for emergencies.

The Outlook for Victory

As the year entered its last quarter, the war appeared to be going well. General Westmoreland, in his often-quoted speech on 21 September at the National Press Club in Washington expressed optimism about the future course of the war. He expressed his belief that the defeats inflicted on the enemy in the



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422006

South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky meets with LtGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps commander; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., the III MAF commander; and Army MajGen Samuel W. Koster of the Americal Division at Chu Lai on 28 December.

past year, plus the continued growth of the ARVN would permit phasing out U.S. units within about two years. "I am absolutely certain," he said, "that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing."⁴

Westmoreland's speech coincided with the Johnson Administration's highly publicized "progress" campaign in the fall of 1967. That campaign sought to show that the allies were winning the war in South Vietnam. General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was, however, one of the few officials who did speak out on the problems still remaining. His statements, which received little media attention, reflected the concerns of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and III MAF over inadequate manpower, particularly in the I Corps area. At a speech in Chicago in September, General Greene said:

In the Marines' area of South Vietnam alone, we have 1,282,000 people inside our security screen. We must double that number. This will take time—and fighting men on the ground.

We have over 2,000 square miles of territory inside the same screen of security. But we need a total of 3,000 square miles.

Again, it will take time—and fighting men on the ground to do this.

I cite these figures just to give you some idea of the problems—in the Marines' area alone.⁵

Enemy Dispositions

The number of regular NVA soldiers in I Corps numbered just over 21,000 at the end of the year. Their distribution was follows:

Quang Tri Province. The major units were the 812th and 90th Regiments of the 324B NVA Division, the 29th and 95th Regiments of the 325C NVA Division, and the 2d Battalion and regimental headquarters of the 9th NVA Regiment. Other forces in the province included the 5th NVA Regiment, the 27th NVA Independent Battalion, and four independent companies. Total: 10,805.

Thua Thien Province. The Northern Front Headquarters, the 5th NVA Regiment, four independent NVA battalions, and four independent companies operated in the province. Total: 3,645.

Quang Nam Province. This area contained the 368B NVA Artillery Regiment, four independent NVA battalions, and four independent NVA companies. Total: 2,940.

Quang Tin Province. Operating in this province were the headquarters and other support units of the 2d NVA Division, the 1st Vietcong Main Force Regi-

ment, the 21st NVA Regiment, the 3d NVA Regiment, three independent NVA battalions, and seven NVA independent companies. Total: 6,075.

Quang Ngai Province. The major units were the headquarters of *Military Region 5*, the 97th Battalion of the 2d Vietcong Main Force Regiment, six independent NVA battalions, and nine independent NVA companies. Total: 3,645.

The Changed Situation

The bright element of the tactical situation picture quickly faded at year's end in the face of mounting evidence of an impending major enemy offensive. General Westmoreland's optimistic speech at the National Press Club in September had been based upon an analysis that indicated the allies were winning the war. Hanoi read the same signs and changed its strategy.

Previously, Hanoi followed a strategy of protracted war; however, late in 1967 captured documents began containing exhortations for enemy units to make a maximum effort politically and militarily to win the war quickly. During the same period, the number of enemy defectors decreased and captured prisoners began speaking of the coming "final victory." Intelligence sources in I Corps indicated the 2d NVA Division was shifting its area of

operations in preparation for an offensive. Other sources reported the 325C NVA Division had moved back to positions near Hill 881 North, while the 304th NVA Division, which listed Dien Bien Phu among its battle honors, had moved from Laos to positions southwest of Khe Sanh.

General Westmoreland analyzed these and similar reports and detected an alteration in enemy strategy. On 20 December, he explained the changed situation in a message to his superiors in Washington. He emphasized the enemy might seek to gain a major military victory somewhere in South Vietnam, or perhaps even seek to gain an apparent position of strength before assenting to negotiations. "In short," wrote Westmoreland, "I believe the enemy has already made a crucial decision to make a maximum effort."⁶

General Westmoreland considered the base at Khe Sanh an obvious target for an enemy offensive and ordered III MAF to conduct a buildup in preparation for a fight for the base.⁷ In the last few days of 1967 he repeatedly advised reporters to expect "an intensified campaign in the coming months." The President echoed these expectations when he told the Australian cabinet about the enemy buildup. "We must try very hard to be ready," said President Johnson. "We face dark days ahead."⁸

Amid the mud, barbed wire, sand-bagged positions, and welter of supplies at the Con Thien combat base, a young Marine stands radio watch as the year 1967 draws to a close.

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967



Notes

PART I The DMZ in Early 1967

CHAPTER 1

THE SITUATION AT THE START OF THE YEAR

Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and General Westmoreland, USA, *Report on the War In Vietnam*, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; FMFPac, U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume I: Narrative; FMFPac monthly summaries, Operation of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Jan-Jun67; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 3d Marine Division ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 3d Marine Division AAR, Operation Prairie I, 28 Apr67; Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operation in Vietnam, 1967," *USNI, Naval Review* 1969, hereafter Simmons "USMC Ops in RVN, 1967." Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.

1. Colonel John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms, 14May81. (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report On The War*, p. 132.
3. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

CHAPTER 2

SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from FMFPac monthly summaries, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Jan-Jun67, hereafter FMFPac, MarOpsV (month, year); III MAF ComdC Jan-Jun67; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun67; 1st MAF ComdC, Jan-Jun67; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," *USNI, Naval Review* 1969, hereafter Simmons, "USMC Ops, RVN." Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located at the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.)

Operation Prairie I Continues

Additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie I, 28Apr67; 3d Mar ComdC, Jan67; 12th Mar ComdC, Jan67; 3/4 ComdC, Jan67. All documentary material cited is in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operation Prairie II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie II, 19May67; 3d Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 4th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 9th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 12th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 2/3 ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 3/3 ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 3/4 ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 1/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar67; 2/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar67. All documentary material cited is in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. LtCol Robert F. Sheridan, comments on draft MS, 11Jun81 (Vietnam Comment File).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Operation Prairie III

Additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie III, 13Jun67; 3d Mar ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 3/3 ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 1/4 ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 3/4 ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 1/9 ComdC, Mar-Apr67; 3/9 ComdC, Mar-Apr67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER 3

COMBINED US/ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie IV, 13Jul67; 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Hickory, 3Aug67; SLF Alpha (TG 79.4) AAR, Opn Beau Charger/Hickory, 10Jun67; 1/3 AAR, Opn Beau Charger, 12Jun67; HMM 263 AAR, Opn Beau Charger, 10Jun67; SLF Bravo (TG 79.5) AAR, Opn Belt Tight/Hickory, 22Jun67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operation Prairie IV Begins

Additional material in this section is derived from 9th Mar ComdC, May67; 3/3 ComdC, May67; 1/4 ComdC, May67; 1/9 ComdC, May67; 3/9 ComdC, May67; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, May67.

Attack on Con Thien

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from 1/4 ComdC, May67; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, May67; 1st Amtrac Bn ComdC, May67.

1. LtCol Rheafoord C. Bell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Into the DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from III MAF ComdC, May67; 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67; 1st MAW ComdC, May67, 3d Mar ComdC, May67; 9th Mar ComdC, May67; 1/4 ComdC, May67; 3/4 ComdC, May67; 1/9 ComdC, May67; 2/9 ComdC, May67; 3/9 ComdC, May67; 2/26 ComdC, May67; HMM-164 ComdC, May67; HMM-363 ComdC, May67.

2. BGen Harvey E. Spielman, Comments on draft ms, 27May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Operation Beau Charger

Additional material in this section was derived from 1/3 ComdC, May67; HMM-263 ComdC, May67.

Operation Hickory

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section was derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67; 3d Mar ComdC, May67; 2/3 ComdC, May67; 3/4 ComdC, May67; 2/9 ComdC, May67; 3/9 ComdC, May67; HMM-164 ComdC, May67.

3. Col Duncan D. Chaplin, III, Comments on draft ms, 31May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Chaplin comments, May81.
4. Ibid.

5. Col James R. Stockman, Comment on draft ms, 27Jun81; Chaplin comments, May81.

Operation Prairie IV Ends

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67; 3/4 ComdC, May67.

6. Maj Walter E. Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Deese comments, Jul81.

7. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67; Deese comments, Jul81.

CHAPTER 4

THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Jun67; 1st MAW ComdC, Apr-May67; 3d Mar AAR, Khe Sanh, dtd 9Jun67; 1/3 AAR, Opn Prairie I, 7Feb67; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Capt Moyers S. Shore, II, *The Battle for Khe Sanh* (Washington: HisBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, *Khe Sanh*; Maj Michael W. Sayers, Comments on draft ms, 18May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Sayers Comments, May81. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

The Early Days

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from 3d Mar ComdC, Apr67; 1/3 ComdC, Sep66-Feb67; 1/9 ComdC, Feb-Apr67; 2/9 ComdC, Mar67; 2/12 ComdC, Feb-Apr67. Unless otherwise noted all documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. Sayers comments, May81; 2dLt John M. Kramer, intvw by 3d MarDiv dtd 28Feb67, (No. 567, OralHist Coll, MCHC).
2. III MAF ComdC, Mar67, p. 3; LtGen Louis Robertshaw, comments on draft ms, 29May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC).
3. Capt William B. Terrill, et.al., intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 24Mar67, (No. 1017, OralHistColl, MCHC).
4. Sayers Comments, May81.

Opening Moves of the Battle

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67; MAG-11 ComdC, Apr-May67; MAG-12 ComdC, Apr-May67; MAG-16 ComdC, Apr-May67; 1/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67; 2/12 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/13 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3d AT Bn ComdC, Apr-May67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

5. SSgt Leon R. Burns intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 8May67, (No. 993, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC); 2dLt Thomas G. King, intvw by 3d MarDiv dtd 8May67, (No. 994, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC), hereafter King Intvw.

6. Sayers Comments, May81.

7. King Intvw.

Hill 861

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67.

8. Sayers comments, May81.

9. Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 13May67, (No. 950, OralHistColl, MCHC) hereafter Spivey Intvw; LtCol Bayliss L. Spivey, Comments on draft ms, 28May81 and 18Jun81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC).

10. Sayers Comments, May81.

11. Spivey Intvw, May67.

12. Sayers Comments, May81.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

Reinforcing the Hill 861 Attack

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from 1st MAW ComdC, Apr-May67; 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 1/12 ComdC, Apr-May67; 2/12 ComdC, Apr-May67.

16. LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick, Comments on draft ms, 15Jun81, (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC), hereafter, McKittrick Comments.

Attacking Hill 881S

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 2/9 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67.

17. SSgt Ruben Santos, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67, (No. 949, OralHistColl, MCHC).

The Final Objective: Hill 881N

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67; 1/26 ComdC, May67.

18. 1stLt Frank M. Izenour, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67, (No. 2105, OralHistColl, MCHC).

19. McKittrick Comments, Jun81.

20. 2dLt Terry M. Weber, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67, (No. 996, OralHistColl, MCHC).

21. *Sea Tiger*, 19May67, p. 3. PFC Lopez received the Navy Cross for this action.

22. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," USNI, *Naval Review* 1969, p. 136, records a favorable comment on the M-16. For a negative view, see Col Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81, (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC).

End of the Battle

Additional material in this section is derived from: 26th Mar ComdC, Apr-Jul67; 1/26 ComdC, May-Jul67; 3/26 ComdC, May-Jul67.

PART II

Spring Fighting in Southern I Corps

CHAPTER 5

THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, "U.S. Marine Corps Force in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," v.I: Narrative, FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Jun67; III MAF ComdCs Jan-Jun67; 1st Mar Div ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 1st MAW ComdCs Jan-Jun67; Task Force X-RAY ComdCs, Jan-Apr67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operation Desoto

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan-

7Apr67; Task Force X-RAY, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27Jan-7Apr67; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1Jun67; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; HMM 463 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; Col Francis V. White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov82. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. LtCol Edward J. Bronars intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 3Apr67, (No. 808, Oral HistCollection, H&MDiv, HQMC).

2. Captain Kenneth W. Johnson, intvw by Combat Information Bureau during Operation Desoto, (No. 0619, Oral HistCollection, HMDiv, HQMC).

3. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Deckhouse/Desoto

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: SLF (TG 79.5) AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 14Mar67; 1/4 AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 9Mar67; HMM 363 AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67. 1/5 AAR Operation Deckhouse VI/Desoto, 10Mar67, hereafter 1/5 AAR, Deckhouse/Desoto. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

4. HMM-363 AAR, Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67.

4A. 1/5 AAR; Desoto/Deckhouse, p. 14.

Desoto Continued

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan-7Apr67; Task Force X-Ray, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27Jan-7Apr67; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1Jun67; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; HMM 463 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 3/12 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 1st Engr Bn. ComdCs, Jan-Jun67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

5. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

6. Captain Patrick J. Morgan intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67, (No. 811, OralHistColl, HMDiv, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

7. LtCol Joseph T. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81, (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

8. Ibid.

Operation Union

Unless otherwise noted additional material in this section is derived from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Apr67; 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 5th Mar AAR Operation Union, 20Jun67; 1/5 AAR Operation Union, 29May67; 3/5 AAR Operation Union I, Jun67; 3/1 ComdC, Apr67; 1/1 ComdC, Apr-May67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

9. Col Emil J. Radics, Comments on draft ms, 19May81, (Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

10. Ibid.

11. LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67, (No. 1233, Oral HistCollHist MusDiv, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

12. Col Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81, (Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hilgartner comments, 2Jun81.

13. 5th Mar AAR, Operation Union, p.7.

Union II

Unless otherwise noted additional material in this section is derived from: 5th Mar AAR Operation Union II, 17Jul67; 1/5 AAR Operation Union II, 16Jun67; 2/5 AAR Operation Union II, 8Jun67; 3/5 AAR Operation Union II, 11Jun67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

14. Col Mallett C. Jackson, Comments on draft ms, 24May81, (Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

15. Ibid.

16. Hilgartner Comments, 2Jun81

17. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

TASK FORCE OREGON

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: "U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," v.I: Narrative, hereafter, *FMFPac HistSum*: FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67, hereafter *FMFPac USMC Ops in RVN*; III MAF ComdCs Jan-Dec67: Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67*, 12 Bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers*. Additional sources for this section are: CMC Trip Reports, Jan and Aug 67, hereafter CMC Trip Report; HQMC Cmd Center Operation Oregon File; III MAF Journal File, Operation Oregon, pts I and II; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; Task Force X-Ray CmdC, Apr67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. MACV msg No. 41191 to CinCPac, 13Sep66, as cited in *Pentagon Papers*, bk5, v.II, p.64.

2. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981), (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

3. CMC debriefing at FMFPac Headquarters, 11 January 1967, CMC file (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

4. MACV msg 09101 to CinCPac, 18Mar67, as cited in *Pentagon Papers*, bk5, v.II, p.64.

5. COMUSMACV 10248 to CinCPac, 28 Mar67, subject: Program 4 Force Requirements, as cited in *Pentagon Papers*, bk5, v.II, p.71.

PART III

Continuing Action Along the DMZ

CHAPTER 7

THE BARRIER—ANOTHER APPROACH

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: "U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," V. I: Narrative, hereafter *FMFPac HistSum*; FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67, hereafter *FMFPac USMC Ops in RVN*; III MAF ComdCs Jan-Dec67; Department of Defense, *United States-*

Vietnam Relations, 1945-67, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers*. MACV Cmd History, 1967. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Evolution of the Concept

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section was derived from: III MAF Dye Marker msg file; III MAF Op-Admin Plans 11-67; III MAF Op-Admin Plans 12-67; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar67; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," *USNI, Naval Review* 1969, hereafter Simmons "USMC Ops in RVN 1967." All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. Dr. Robert J. Watson, Comments on draft ms, 26May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

2. *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, v.I, p.66

3. Copies of MACV working papers on barrier concept, Encl 2, to 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct 66.

4. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of 26Jan67, Encl 6, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.

5. LtGen John R. Chaisson, intvw by Historical Division, HQMC, dtd 3Apr72, (Oral HistColl MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

6. Memo, Dir JTF 728 to SecDef, dtd 22Dec66, Subj: Plan for Increased Anti-infiltration Capability for SEA in Box 8 Barrier Starbird Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702); also FMFPac Journal File.

7. Practice Nine briefing paper, Encl 6 to 3d MarDiv ComC, 6Jan67.

8. Practice Nine briefing paper for Under SecNav Baldwin, Encl 3 to 3d MarDiv ComC, Jan67.

9. CinCPAC 060820Z February 1967 to JCS, Subj: "Barrier Plan." as cited in *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, v. II, p. 43.

Building the Barrier

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: III MAF Op-Admin Plans 12-67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Dec67; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Dec67; 3d Bn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Aug-Sep67; 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar-Dec67; and Simmons "USMC Operations in Vietnam, 1967." All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

10. ComUSMACV msg to CG III MAF, 261038Z Mar 67, Subj: Strong Point Obstacle System. Also SecState msg to AMEmb Saigon, 161730Z Mar67, Subj: SVN Strong Point-Obstacle System, III MAF, Dye Marker msg file.

11. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 191125Z Apr67, III MAF, Dye Marker msg file.

12. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 261046Z Apr67, III MAF, Dye Marker msg file.

13. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 30Jul67.

14. Col George E. Jerue, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

15. LtCol Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

16. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 16Aug67.

17. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 5Sep67. The 3 September artillery attack on Dong Ha is covered in Chapter 14.

18. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 13Sep67.

19. III MAF Operation Plan 12-67, dtd 12Sep67.
20. MajGen Louis Metzger, ltr to CG, FMFPac, Subj: Debrief, 22Jan68 (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); LtCol Willard N. Christopher, Comments on draft ms, 31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
21. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 22Oct67.
22. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 24Oct67.
23. *FMFPac, USMC Ops in RVN, Dec67*.
24. Quoted in Simmons, "USMC Ops in RVN 1967," p. 134.

CHAPTER 8

CON THIEN AND THE SUMMER BATTLES ALONG THE DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: "U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," v. I; FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jul-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jul-Oct67; 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec67; LtCol Ralph F. Moody et al, "*Marines in Vietnam*," Ms. (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D.C.); Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967" USNI, *Naval Review* 1969." All documentary material cited is located in MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Why Con Thien?

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Aug67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Aug67; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Aug67. All documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operation Buffalo

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: 1/9 AAR Operation Buffalo; 3/9 AAR Operation Buffalo; 1/3 AAR Operation Buffalo; 2/3 AAR Operation Buffalo; 9th Mar AAR Operation Buffalo; 3d Mar AAR Operation Buffalo. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the Historical Branch, History and Museums Division, HQMC.

1. Col Richard B. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 83, No. 8 (Aug 69), p. 35.
2. Col George E. Jerue, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
3. 1stLt William F. Delany intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No. 1269, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
4. Maj Darrell C. Daniels on intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67, (No. 1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
5. SSgt Leon R. Burns intvw by 3dMarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No. 1265, Oral HistCollection MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Burns intvw.
6. Col Richard J. Schening, Comments on draft ms, 26May81, (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
7. Burns intvw.

8. Maj Henry J. M. Radcliffe intvw by MCHC, dtd 14Dec73.
9. Maj Darrell C. Danielson, intvw by 3d MarDiv, 7Jul67, (No. 1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
10. LtCol Albert C. Slater, Comments on draft ms, 21May81, (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Slater comments.
11. Capt Burrell H. Landes, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd (No. 1519, Oral HistCollection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
12. Slater comments.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Navy Cross Citation, Cpl James L. Stuckey, Dec&Med Br, HQMC, Washington, D.C.
15. Col George E. Jerue, Comments on draft MS of "*U.S. Marines in Vietnam*," pt V, 12Jan70.

PART IV

Fall Combat, North and South

CHAPTER 9

CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," v. I: Narrative; FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jun-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; 1st Mars ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; 7th Mars ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; 2/5 ComdCs Jun-Dec67; 3/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67; F.J. West, Jr., *The Enclave: Some U.S. Military Efforts in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province 1966-1968*, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1969), hereafter West, *The Enclave*. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC Washington, D.C.

Raids and Rockets in Quang Nam

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from III MAF ComdC, Jul67; 5th Mar ComdC, Jul67; 2/5 ComdC, Jul67; and 2/11 ComdC, Jul67. All documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. 2/5 ComdC, Jul67, p. 3.
2. West, *The Enclave*, pp. 42-45.
3. Col Joseph T. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Operation Cochise

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Task Force X-Ray Operations Order 1-67 (Operation Cochise), dtd 9Aug67; 5th Mar AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 20Sep67; 1/5 AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 3Sep67; 3/5 AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 1Sep67; 1/3 AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 3Sep67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

4. MAG-36, ComdC, Sep67, Encl 1, p. 1.

Operation Swift

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Task Force X-Ray AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 20Oct67; 5th Mars AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 11Oct67; 1/5 AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 27Sep67; 3/5 AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 22Sep67; 2/11 AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 29Sep67; LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bowers comments. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

5. Col Philip M. Crosswait, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. Col Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
7. Ibid.
8. Cpl Joseph E. Fuller, et. al. intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 19Sep67 (No. 1612, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. Sgt James E. Dougherty, et al., intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 23Sep67. LCpl Henshaw account in reel 3, side 2 and reel 4, side 1. (No. 1630, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
10. 1stLt Donald R. Dunagan, intvw by 1stMarDiv dtd 20Sep67 (No. 1294, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. Bowers comments.
12. Ibid.
13. Col William R. Earney, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
14. Ibid.

A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 7th Mar AAR, Operation Foster, dtd 14Jan68; 2/3 AAR, Operation Badger Hunt/Foster, dtd 7Dec67; 2/5 AAR, Operation Essex, dtd 29Nov67; and LtCol Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Bowers Comments.. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

15. LtGen Donn J. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
16. 2/5 AAR, Operation Essex, p. 16-17.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. Bowers comments.

CHAPTER 10

FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH

Unless otherwise noted, the material for this chapter was derived from: III MAF ComdC, Jul-Dec67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67; 2/9 ComdC, Jul67; 2/4 ComdCs, Aug-Oct67; and 3/26 ComdC, Sept67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operation Kingfisher

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from: 9th Mar AAR Operation Hickory II; 9th Mar AAR Operation Kingfisher; 3d Mar AAR Operation Kingfisher; 1/9 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/9 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/3 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 3/3 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/4 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 3/4 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 3/26 AAR Operation Kingfisher; and 9th MT Bn ComdC, Jul-Aug67.

1. Major Walter E. Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. Col Robert C. Needham, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Needham comments.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Needham comments and Col James Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
6. 9th MT Bn ComdCs, Jul-Aug67.
7. Col Julian G. Bass, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 28May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
8. LtCol Horace A. Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
9. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Wasington, D.C.), hereafter Metzger comments.
10. Col Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
11. Ibid.
12. 3/26 ComdC, Sep67.
13. Col James W. Hammond, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 18May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hammond comments.
14. Col Richard B. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith comments.
15. Hammond comments.
16. Metzger comments.
17. Hammond comments.
18. Ibid.
19. LtCol James E. Murphy, Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Murphy comments.
20. Ibid.
21. 9th Mar AA, Operation Kingfisher (2/4)
22. Hammond comments.
23. Needham comments.
24. Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Studt comments.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Murphy comments.
29. Studt comments.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. 2/4 AAR, Operation Kingfisher.

36. Hammond comments.

Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 138

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Mar AAR Operation Medina; 1/1 AAR Operation Medina; 2/1 AAR Operation Medina; 1/3 AAR Operation Medina/Bastion Hill.

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Division

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 3d Mar AAR Operation Lancaster; 9th Mar AAR Operation Kentucky; 26th Mar Operation Scotland; 1st Am-TracBn AAR Operation Napoleon.

37. Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

38. Col William L. Dick, Comments on draft ms, 14May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

39. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

PART V Special Efforts

CHAPTER 11

THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: COMUSMACV Comd Hist, 1967; COMUSMACV Monthly Evaluation Report, Jan-Dec67; FMFPac "U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam," monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Mr. Benis M. Frank, "The Special Landing Force" (ms, MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1972). Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Expedient or Doctrine

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: III MAF ComdCs, Aug66-Feb67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

1. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

2. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Metzger comments.

Operation Deckhouse V

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1stBn, 9th Marines ComdC, Jan67; HMM-362 ComdC, Jan67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

3. Capt John D. Westervelt, USN, Comments on draft ms, 9Jun81 (Vietnam Comments file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Westervelt comments.

4. Ibid.

5. LtGen John R. Chaisson, intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, 3Apr72 (Oral Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Deckhouse VI/Desoto

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Feb-Mar67; HMM-363 ComdCs, Feb-Mar67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

6. Westervelt comments.

7. Metzger comments.

8. Westervelt comments.

Beacon Hill I

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1stBn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr67; HMM-363 ComdCs, Mar-Apr67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

9. VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Comments on draft ms, 24May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Beacon Star

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67; HMM-164 ComdCs, Apr-May67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Beaver Cage/Union I

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67; HMM-263 ComdCs, Apr-May67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory/Prairie IV/Cimarron

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67; HMM-164 ComdCs, May-Jun67; HMM-263 ComdCs, May-Jun67. Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

10. LtCol Edward K. Kirby, Comments on draft ms of Moody, *et al*, "Marines in Vietnam," 18Jan70 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Day On, Stay On

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67; HMM-263 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Maryland

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67; HMM-263 ComdC, Jun67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

11. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67.

Beacon Torch/Calhoun

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun-Jul67; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jun-Jul67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul67; HMM-263 ComdC, Jul67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

12. Col John A. Conway, Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul67; HMM-164 ComdC, Jul67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Bear Chain/Fremont

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul67; HMM-164, ComdC, Jul67; HMM-265 ComdC, Jul67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Beacon Guide

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul67; HMM-263 ComdC, Jul67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Kangaroo Kick/Fremont

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67; HMM-265 ComdC, Aug67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

13. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67.

Beacon Gate/Cochise

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67; HMM-263 ComdC, Aug67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Belt Drive/Liberty

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug-Sep67; HMM-262 ComdC, Aug-Sep67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

14. 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Sep67.

A Change In Scenario—The 46s are Grounded

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: III MAF ComdC, Aug67; 1st MAW ComdC, Aug67; MAG-16 ComdC, Aug67; HMM-262 ComdC, Aug-Dec67; HMM-163 ComdC, Aug67; HMM-463 ComdC, Aug67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyville

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Sep67; HMM-362 ComdC, Sep67; 4th Mar ComdC, Sep67; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep67, 2d Bn, 1st Mar ComdC, Sep67; 3d Bn, 5th Mar ComdC, Sep67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Fortress Sentry/Kingfisher

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Sep-Oct67; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Sep-Oct67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremont

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st Mar ComdC, Oct67; 4th Mar ComdC, Oct67; 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Oct67. Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Formation Leader/Liberty II/Knox

Unless otherwise noted additional material for this section is derived from: 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Nov67; 7th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67; 2d Bn, 26th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Granite/Kentucky II and III

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67; 9th Mar ComdC, Oct-Nov67; 1st Bn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67; HMM-361 ComdCs, Oct-Nov67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

15. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67.

Badger Hunt/Foster

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 5th Mar ComdC, Nov67; 7th Mar ComdC, Nov67; 3d Bn, 7th Mar ComdC, Nov67; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67; HMM-262 ComdC, Nov67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Fortress Ridge

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov-Dec67; 3d Bn, 1st Mar ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68; HMM-262 ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

16. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter McQuown comments.

17. Ibid.

Badger Tooth

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 3d Bn, 1st Mar ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68; HMM-262 ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68.

18. McQuown comments.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V/Osceola

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68; 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68; 2d Bn, 4th Mar, ComdC, Dec67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

21. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67.

CHAPTER 12

PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary," vols. I and II; FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

The Problem Defined

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; and 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. LtCol D. L. Evans, "USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam: A Philosophical History," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 52, no. 3 (Mar 1968, p. 22.

2. Col James L. Black, Comments on draft ms, 23May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Black Comments.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

County Fair

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Captain Russel H. Stolfi, USMCR, *U.S. Marine*

Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965 - March 1966, (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1968); Captain William D. Parker, USMCR, *U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1970). Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Captain William D. Parker, USMCR, *U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

5. III MAF ComdC, February 1967.

6. V. Keith Fleming, Jr., personal recollection, 9Nov82.

7. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter McQuown Comments.

8. 1stLt Robert E. Mattingly, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 23Oct67 (No. 1602, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.

9. AO3E-cem, "Personal Response Project," June 1968.

10. Col Donald L. Evans intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 15Feb72, (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

11. McQuown comments.

Reporting and Evaluation

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Captain William D. Parker, USMCR, *U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). Documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

12. FMFPac, *Hist Sum*, p. 5-36.

13. Black comments.

PART VI

Support and Conclusion

CHAPTER 13

SUPPORTING ARMS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary, vols. I and II; FMFPac Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; LtCol Ralph F. Moody *et al.*, Ms, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam," Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, Part VII. Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Marine Air Operations

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May71, p. 122-155, hereafter McCutcheon "Marine Aviation in Vietnam," and Gen William W. Momyer *Air Power in Three Wars* (GPO, Washington, D.C.: 1978), hereafter Momyer, *Air Power*. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. Col Kenneth T. Dykes, Comments on draft ms, 23Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
2. BGen Edward J. Doyle, Comments on draft ms, 14Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Fixed-Wing Operations

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; MAG-13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam." Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

3. Colonel John M. Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Verdi comments.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Verdi comments and Col Edgar J. Love, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Love Comments.
9. Momyer, *Air Power*, p. 199 and LtCol Earl E. Jacobson, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Jacobson comments.
10. Jacobson comments.
11. Ibid.
12. Love comments.
13. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft ms, 22May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
14. Love comments.

Helicopter Operations

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC. "Air Support for III MAF," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v.51, no.8 (Aug 1967), pp. 19-23. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

15. Cdr F.O. McClendon, Jr., MSC, USN. "Doctors and Dentists, Nurses and Corpsmen in Vietnam," *Naval Review* 1970, Annapolis; U.S. Naval Institute, 1970, p.283.
16. LtCol William R. Fails, Ms, "Development of Marine Corps Helicopters, 1962-1972," Chapter 6.

Artillery

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from: 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

17. Col Ernest W. Payne, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Payne comments.
18. Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) hereafter Schick comments.
19. Schick comments and Col Clayton V. Hendricks, Comments on draft ms, 31May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
20. Payne Comments.

CHAPTER 14

LOGISTICS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, Historical Summary, Vols I and II; FMFPac, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Upgrading the Logistics System

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is derived from: FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec67; Col G. C. Axtell, intvw by FMFPac, 5Oct66 (No. 219, Oral History Coll, MCHC); Col W. H. Cowper, intvw by FLC, 29Jan67 (No. 377, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC). Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. LtGen Louis M. Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981), (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C., hereafter Metzger comments.
2. FMFPac Hist Summ, pp. 6-8.
3. Metzger comments.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Col James C. Short, Comments on draft ms, 29May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
8. Metzger comments.

Navy Support

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: Cdr W. D. Middleton, "Seabees in Vietnam," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Aug67, v. 93, No. 8, pp. 54-64; US NavSupAct Da Nang, *Naval Support in I Corps* 1968. Unless other noted, all material cited is located in MCHC, Washington, D.C.

9. Capt John T. Vincent, (MC), USN, Comments on draft ms, 7Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
10. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Marine Corps Engineers

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, 11th Eng Bns ComdCs, Jan-Dec67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

11. Col James L. Black, Comments on draft ms, 23May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
12. Col Ross L. Mulford, Comments on draft ms, 1Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
13. Col Richard D. Taber, Comments on draft ms, 7Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
14. LtCol Willard N. Christopher, Comments on draft ms, 31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

CHAPTER 15

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derived from: HQMC Comd Status of Forces rept, Jan-Dec67; Adm U. S. Grant Sharp, USN, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (Washington, GPO, 1968). All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Marines with MACV

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from MACV Strength Reports, 1967; BGen John R. Chaisson debrief, HQMC, 1Aug67 (No. 6172, Oral Hist Coll HQMC). All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. LtGen John R. Chaisson, Transcript of Remarks at a Basic School Mess Night, 17Nov70 (Oral Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

The Embassy Guard

Material in this section is derived from: HQMC Comd Center Status of Forces rept, Jan-Dec67; MSG Bn Comd ComdCs, Feb-Dec67; MACV Strength Reports, 1967; Maj Philip E. Tucker intvw by HistBr, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 6Jun75 (No. 6019, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). Unless noted otherwise all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C..

2. LtCol Philip E. Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

I Corps Advisors

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is derived from: HQMC Comd Cntr Status of Forces rept, Jan-Dec67; SMA, AA rpts, Jan-Dec67; MajGen W. B. Fulton, USA, *Vietnam Studies, Riverine Operations, 1966-1969* (Washington, GPO, 1973); VAdm E. B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, (Washington, GPO, 1972). Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

3. LtCol James R. Davis, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
4. Col Nels E. Anderson, Comments on draft ms, 17May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

5. SMA AA Rept, Song Thanh/Deckhouse V, dtd 1Mar67, Encl (10).
6. SMA AA Rept, RSSZ Ops (unnamed), dtd 28Jul67.
7. Ibid.
8. SMA AA Rept, Operation Paddington, dtd 28Nov67.
9. SMA AA Rept, Operation Coronado IX, dtd 12Feb68.

CHAPTER 16

THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67; III MAF ComdC, Dec67; Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976), hereafter Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; and Peter Braestrup, *Big Story*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), hereafter Braestrup, *Big Story*. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Operational Aspects

Additional material in this section is derived from 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; 1st MAW ComdC, Dec67; and FLC ComdC, Dec67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

1. Douglas Pike, conference remarks, quoted in *A Conference Report: Some Lessons and Non-Lessons of Vietnam Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords*. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1983).
2. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 204; Gen William C. Westmoreland, Oral History Interview, 4Apr83 (Oral History Collection, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
3. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," *Naval Review*, 1969; FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67; and III MAF ComdC, Dec67.

Personnel and Logistics

Additional material for this section is derived from III MAF ComdC, Dec67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

The Outlook for Victory

Additional material for this section is derived from III MAF ComdC, Dec67; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; and 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

5. Quoted in Braestrup, *Big Story*, p. 53 and 59.

Enemy Dispositions

Additional material for this section is derived from III MAF ComdC, Dec67; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67; and 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67. All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

6. Gen William C. Westmoreland, quoted in Braestrup, *Big Story*, Vol. 1, p. 61.
7. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *Naval Review*, 1969.
8. Quoted in Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 239.

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List January-December 1967

MARINE COMMAND AND STAFF LIST, for III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 1 January - 31 December 1967*

**Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period when a unit was in Vietnam. Only permanent Marine organization of battalion/squadron-size or larger are listed; exceptions are 3d Marine Division (Fwd), Task Force X-Ray, and the Force Logistic Command and its components. The following listing reflects administrative rather than operational organization. (For a complete listing of locations and strength of Marine units in the western Pacific, see Appendix F.)*

III MAF Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec67

CG LtGen Lewis W. Walt	1Jan-31May67
LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1Jun-31Dec67
DepCG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Jan-31Mar67
MajGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1Apr-31May67
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Jun-17Oct67
MajGen Raymond L. Murray	18Oct-31Dec67
C/S BGen Hugh M. Elwood	1Jan-31Mar67
BGen Robert C. Owens, Jr.	1Apr-20Dec67
BGen Earl E. Anderson	21Dec-31Dec67
G-1 Col John L. Mahon	1Jan-3Jun67
Col James H. Berge, Jr.	4Jun-15Jul67
Col Poul F. Pedersen	16Jul-31Dec67
G-2 Col Roy H. Thompson	1Jan-13Feb67
Col Benjamin S. Read	14Feb-9Jul67
Col Kenneth J. Houghton	10Jul-31Dec67
G-3 Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr.	1Jan-2Jul67
Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	3Jul-13Nov67
Col Thomas L. Randall	14Nov-31Dec67
G-4 Col Joseph F. Quilty, Jr.	1Jan-2Jun67
Col Rex O. Dillow	3Jun-31Dec67
G-5 Col Eric S. Holmgren	1Jan-31Jan67
Col John T. Hill	1Feb-26Apr67
Col George O. Ross	27Apr-17May67
Col Robert F. Warren	18-31May67
Col George O. Ross	1Jun-1Jul67
Col James A. Gallo, Jr.	2Jul-5Sep67
LtCol James L. Black, Jr.	6-14Sep67

Col Joseph F. Holzbauer	15-17Sep67
Col John E. Hays	18Sep-31Oct67
LtCol James L. Black, Jr.	1Nov-31Dec67

1st Marine Division Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec67

CG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Jan-31May67
MajGen Donn J. Robertson*	1Jun-31Dec67
ADC BGen William A. Stiles	1Jan-23Mar67
BGen Foster C. LaHue*	24Mar-31Dec67

**BGen LaHue was Acting 1st Marine Division Commander during the period 27Oct-28Nov67.*

C/S Col Sidney J. Altman	1Jan-31May67
Col Edward L. Bale, Jr.	1-12Jun67
Col Henry J. Woessner, II	13Jun-31Dec67
G-1 Col Charles C. Crossfield, II	1-18Jan67
Col Arnold L. Emils	19Jan-10May67
Col William R. Earney	11May-31Dec67
G-2 Col John J. O'Donnell	1-14Jan67
Col Stanley Davis	15Jan-30Jun67
LtCol Emmett B. Sigmon, Jr.	1-7Jul67
Col James C. Short	8-11Jul67
LtCol Emmett B. Sigmon, Jr.	12Jul-30Sep67
Col Russell E. Corey	1Oct-31Dec67
G-3 Col Herman Poggemeyer, Jr.	1Jan-31May67
Col Herbert E. Ing, Jr.	1Jun-8Jul67
Col Robert D. Bohn	9-11Jul67
Col James C. Short	12Jul-31Dec67
G-4 Col Edward L. Bale, Jr.	1Jan-27Jun67
LtCol Earl K. Vickers, Jr.	28Jun-31Dec67
G-5 Col Walter Moore	1Jan-2Feb67
Col Donald L. Mallory	3Feb-31May67
LtCol Richard F. Peterson	1Jun-11Jul67
Col Emil J. Radics	12Jul-30Sep67
LtCol Richard F. Peterson	1-4Oct67
Col Herbert L. Beckington	5Oct-31Dec67

Headquarters Battalion

CO Col Warren A. Leitner	1Jan-31Jul67
Col Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr.	1Aug-31Dec67

Task Force X-Ray 1Jan-26Apr67*

**TF X-Ray activated at Chu Lai on 10 October 1966 and*

operated from there until 26 April 1967, at which time it deactivated when Task Force Oregon assumed its mission.

CO BGen William A. Stiles	1Jan-24Mar67
BGen Foster C. LaHue	25Mar-26Apr67
C/S Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	1Jan-26Apr67
G-1 LtCol Roland L. McDaniel	1Jan-3Mar67
Maj John C. Hergert, Jr.	4Mar-26Apr67
G-2 Maj Glenn K. Maxwell	1-4Jan67
Maj Daniel Z. Boyd	5Jan-26Apr67
G-3 LtCol Edward J. Bronars	1Jan-2Feb67
LtCol Robert E. Hunter, Jr.	3Feb-26Apr67
G-4 LtCol Louis A. Bonin	1Jan-3Mar67
LtCol Basile Lubka	4Mar-26Apr67
G-5 Maj Joseph T. Smith	1Jan-26Apr67

1st Marines

CO Col Donald L. Mallory	1Jan-28Jan67
Col Emil J. Radics	29Jan-11Jul67
Col Herbert E. Ing, Jr.	12Jul-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol Van D. Bell, Jr.	1Jan-4Jun67
LtCol George E. Petro	5Jun-27Aug67
LtCol Albert F. Belbusti	28Aug-16Nov67
LtCol Marcus J. Gravel	17Nov-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol Haig Donabedian	1-31Jan67
LtCol Marvin M. Hewlett	1Feb-5Aug67
LtCol Archie Van Winkle	6Aug-14Nov67
LtCol Evan L. Parker, Jr.	15Nov-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 1st Marines*

**The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines became part of SLF BRAVO on 1Dec67.*

CO LtCol Hillmer E. DeAtley	1Jan-26Apr67
LtCol Robert C. Rice	27Apr-28Aug67
LtCol Max McQuown	29Aug-30Nov67

5th Marines

CO Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	1Jan-27Feb67
Col Kenneth J. Houghton	28Feb-30Jun67
Col Stanley Davis	1Jul-16Oct67
Col Robert D. Bohn	17Oct-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner	1Jan-19Sep67
LtCol Oliver W. Vandenberg	20Sep-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol William C. Airheart	1-31Jan67
LtCol Mallett C. Jackson, Jr.	1Feb-18Jul67
LtCol George C. McNaughton	19Jul-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Dean E. Esslinger	1Jan-27May67
Col Charles B. Webster	28May-6Sep67
Col William K. Rockey	7Sep-31Dec67

7th Marines

CO Col Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.*	1-20Jan67
<i>*Surname changed to Snowden 19Apr72</i>	
Col Charles C. Crossfield, II	21Jan-14Aug67
LtCol Russell E. Johnson	15-21Aug67
Col Ross R. Miner	22Aug-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Basile Lubka	1Jan-27Feb67
LtCol Jack D. Rowley	28Feb-14Sep67
LtCol William J. Davis	15Sep-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Warren P. Kitterman	1Jan-16Aug67
LtCol John R. Love	17Aug-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary	1Jan-1Feb67
LtCol Edward J. Bronars	2Feb-4Apr67
LtCol John D. Counselman	5Apr-18Oct67
LtCol Roger H. Barnard	19Oct-31Dec67

11th Marines

CO Col Glenn E. Norris	1Jan-28Jun67
LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks	29Jun-18Jul67
Col Ernest W. Payne	19Jul-27Dec67
LtCol Clayton V. Hendricks	28-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Mark P. Fennessy	1Jan-18May67
Maj Joseph J. Marron	19May-31Jul67
LtCol David A. Rapp	1Aug-6Oct67
LtCol Robert C. V. Hughes	7Oct-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO Maj Ivil L. Carver	1Jan-21Feb67
Maj Joseph H. Marron	22Feb-11May67
LtCol Robert E. Hunter, Jr.	12May-28Sep67
LtCol David A. Clark	29Sep-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Alexander S. Ruggiero	1Jan-28Jun67
LtCol George T. Balzer	29Jun-31Dec67

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol George R. Lamb	1Jan-1Feb67
LtCol Joseph M. Laney, Jr.	2Feb-18Apr67
LtCol Gordon M. B. Livingston	19Apr-31Jul67
Maj John S. Hollingshead	1Aug-31Dec67

1st Reconnaissance Battalion

CO LtCol Donald N. McKeon	1Jan-20May67
Maj Bill G. Lowrey	21May-10Jul67
LtCol Browman C. Stinemetz	11Jul-31Dec67

1st Antitank Battalion ***The 1st Antitank Battalion deactivated on 21Dec67.*

CO Maj John J. Keefe	1Jan-4Jun67
Maj Pat S. Galligan	5Jun-20Jul67
LtCol Pierre D. Reissner	21Jul-21Dec67

1st Tank Battalion

CO Maj John W. Clayborne	1Jan-1Feb67
LtCol Richard M. Taylor	2Feb-10Nov67
LtCol Vincent J. Gentile	11Nov-31Dec67

1st Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Jim T. Elkins	1Jan-31Mar67
Maj Kenneth H. Reagan	1Apr-18Jun67
LtCol Kenneth M. Buss	19Jun-7Nov67
Maj Charles F. Cresswell	8Nov-31Dec67

1st Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Charles O. Newton	1Jan-24May67
Maj James M. Mackenzie	25May-1Oct67
LtCol Logan Cassedy	2Oct-31Dec67

1st Shore Party Battalion

CO LtCol Edward H. Jones	1Jan-17Sep67
Maj Jack E. Townsend	18-28Sep67
LtCol Nicholas Kavakich	29Sep-31Dec67

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO Maj Jack D. Rowley	1Jan-26Feb67
Maj Frederick N. Van Sant	27Feb-5Jun67
Maj James E. Swab	6-26Jun67
LtCol Robert L. Shuford	27Jun-31Dec67

1st Medical Battalion

CO Cdr Robert H. Mitchell (MC) USN	1-31Jan67
Cdr John C. Robins (MC) USN	1Feb-12Apr67
Cdr Paul D. Cooper, Jr. (MC) USN	13Apr-31Aug67
Cdr Clinton H. Lowery (MC) USN	1SSep-31Dec67

1st Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol Paul J. Stavridis	1Jan-21May67
LtCol Twyman R. Hill	22May-31Dec67

7th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Sydney H. Batchelder, Jr	1Jan-10Sep67
Maj Lance D. Thomas	11Sep-31Dec67

7th Communication Battalion

CO LtCol William M. Clelland	1Jan-18Nov67
LtCol Harry O. Cowing, Jr.	19Nov-31Dec67

11th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Lee V. Barkley	1Jan-11Feb67
Maj Robert C. Tashjian	12Feb-6Jul67
LtCol Joseph B. Brown, Jr.	7Jul-31Dec67

1st Field Artillery Group

CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling	1Jan-12Mar67
LtCol Robert B. Metcalfe	4May-17Nov67
LtCol Spencer F. Thomas	18Nov-31Dec67

7th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Frank W. Harris, III	1Jan-29Jul67
LtCol Ray Funderburk	30Jul-31Dec67

9th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Richard W. Crispen	1Jan-6Feb67
LtCol George A. Babe	7Feb-6Aug67
Maj Edward W. Lifset	7-30Aug67
LtCol Horacio E. Perea	31Aug-31Dec67

3d Marine Division Headquarters

CG MajGen Wood B. Kyle	1Jan-17Mar67
MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth	18Mar-14Nov67
BGen Louis Metzger	15-27Nov67
MajGen Rathvon M. Tompkins	28Nov-31Dec67
ADC BGen Lowell E. English	1-6Jan67
BGen Michael P. Ryan	7Jan-19May67
BGen Louis Metzger	20May-14Nov67
BGen Louis Metzger	28Nov-31Dec67
C/S Col John B. Sweeney	1Jan-2Mar67
Col Alexander D. Cereghino	3Mar-31Jul67
Col Walter H. Cuenin	1Aug-31Dec67
G-1 Col Robert M. Jenkins	1Jan-20Mar67
LtCol Charles S. Kirchmann	21Mar-14Sep67
LtCol James W. Marsh	15Sep-31Dec67
G-2 LtCol Jack L. Miles	1Jan-9Feb67
LtCol Lemuel C. Shepherd, III	10Feb-1Jun67
Col Philip A. Davis	2Jun-22Sep67
Col Edward J. Miller	23Sep-31Dec67
G-3 Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	1Jan-17May67
LtCol Harvey E. Spielman	18-27May67
Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	28May-15Jun67
Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr.	16Jun-10Jul67
Col Roy H. Thompson	11Jul-3Sep67
Col James R. Stockman	5Sep-31Dec67
G-4 Col John F. Mentzer	1Jan-28May67
Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr.	29May-31Dec67
G-5 Col Edward R. McCarthy	1Jan-31Jul67
Col Milton A. Hull	1Aug-31Dec67

Headquarters Battalion

CO LtCol Thomas J. Johnston, Jr.	1Jan-13Mar67
LtCol Charles R. Figard	14Mar-10Apr67
Col James R. Stockman	11Apr-17May67
Col John P. Lanigan	18May-3Jul67
Maj Homer L. Welch	4Jul-23Sep67
Col George E. Jerue	24Sep-31Dec67

3d Marines

CO John P. Lanigan	1Jan-17May67
Col James R. Stockman	18May-25Aug67
Col Joseph E. Lo Prete	26Aug-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 3d Marines*

**The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines joined the SLF on 8Feb67 and remained under its control for the rest of the year.*

CO LtCol Peter A. Wickwire	1Jan-7Feb67
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2d Battalion, 3d Marines*

**The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines served as a SLF BLT from 13Apr67 until 30Nov67.*

CO LtCol Victor Ohanesian	1Jan-28Feb67
LtCol Earl R. Delong	1Mar-12Apr67
LtCol Henry English	1-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong	1Jan-21Feb67
LtCol Gary Wilder	22Feb-30Jun67
LtCol Robert C. Needham	1Jul-31Dec67

4th Marines

CO Col Alexander D. Cereghino	1Jan-14Feb67
Col Roy H. Thompson	15Feb-9Jul67
Col William L. Dick	10Jul-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines served with the SLF during the period 1Jan-1Apr67.*

CO LtCol Theodore J. Willis	2Apr-12May67*
Maj Rheaford C. Bell	13May-29Jul67
LtCol Edwin A. Deptula	30Jul-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived in Vietnam on 6Jan67.*

CO LtCol Arnold E. Bench	6Jan-15Jul67
Maj Wells L. Field, III	16-18Jul67
LtCol James W. Hammond, Jr.	19Jul-27Oct67
LtCol William Weise	28Oct-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

CO LtCol William J. Masterpool	1Jan-3Mar67
LtCol Wendell N. Vest	4Mar-21Jul67
LtCol Lee R. Bendell	22Jul-31Dec67

9th Marines

CO Col Robert M. Richards	1Jan-20Mar67
Col Robert M. Jenkins	21Mar-17May67

Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	18-28May67
LtCol Joseph J. Kelly	29May-3Jun67
Col George E. Jerue	4Jun-12Sep67
Col Richard B. Smith	13Sep-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 9th Marines*

**The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines served with the SLF during the period 1Jan-4Feb67.*

CO Maj James L. Day	5Feb-17Mar67
Maj Donald J. Fulham	18Mar-21Jun67
LtCol Richard J. Schening	22Jun-9Sep67
Maj Darrell C. Danielson	10-24Sep67
LtCol John F. Mitchell	25Sep-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol John J. Peeler	1Jan-4Jul67
LtCol William D. Kent	5Jul-12Sep67
LtCol John J. Peeler	13Sep-28Oct67
LtCol William M. Cryan	29Oct-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

**The battalion departed for Okinawa on 11Jan67 and returned to RVN on 28Feb67.*

CO LtCol Sherwood A. Brunnenmeyer	1-10Jan67
	1-4Mar67
Maj Samuel G. Faulk	5-8Mar67
LtCol James S. Wilson	9Mar-28May67
Maj Willard J. Woodring, Jr.	29May-8Sep67
Maj Gorton C. Cook	9Sep-31Dec67

12th Marines

CO Col Benjamin S. Read	1-22Jan67
Col William R. Morrison	23Jan-20Jul67
Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr.	21Jul-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Lavern W. Larson	1Jan-15Feb67
LtCol Wayne H. Rice	16Feb-6Sep67
LtCol Charles H. Opfar	7Sep-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Willis L. Gore	1Jan-27Apr67
LtCol Jack L. Norman	28Apr-8Sep67
Maj George C. Harris, Jr.	9-10Sep67
LtCol Robert Schueler	11Sep-2Dec67
LtCol Ronald P. Dunwell	3-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Charles J. Kirchmann	1Jan-28Feb67
LtCol Jack L. Miles	1Mar-12Jul67
LtCol David B. Barker	13Jul-8Nov67
Maj Robert W. Green	9Nov-31Dec67

4th Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol David G. Jones	1Jan-6Apr67
Maj Louis G. Snyder	7Apr-23Jul67
LtCol Joseph K. Gastrock, III	24Jul-31Oct67
Maj Rudolph W. Bolves	1Nov-31Dec67

3d Reconnaissance Battalion

CO LtCol Gary Wilder	1Jan-15Feb67
Maj Charles N. Dezer, III	16Feb-13Apr67
Maj James R.A. Rehfus	14Apr-2Aug67
Maj Rheafor C. Bell	3Aug-9Nov67
LtCol William D. Kent	11Nov-31Dec67

3d Antitank Battalion

CO LtCol Charles R. Casey	1Jan-29Aug67
LtCol Gene M. McCain	30Aug-20Nov67
Maj Robert M. Jordan	21Nov-31Dec67

3d Tank Battalion

CO LtCol William R. Corson	1Jan-14Feb67
LtCol Robert J. Norton	15Feb-23Mar67
Maj Eddis R. Larson	24-26Mar67
Maj Vernon L. Sylvester	27Mar-28Jun67
LtCol Duncan D. Chaplin, III	29Jun-31Dec67

3d Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Richard F. Armstrong	1Jan-6Sep67
Maj William O. Day	7Sep-6Oct67
Maj William H. Stewart, Jr.	7Oct-31Dec67

3d Engineer Battalion

CO Maj Joseph A. Shearman, Jr.	1-31Jan67
LtCol Garry M. Pearce, Jr.	1-17Feb67
LtCol James H. Reid, Jr.	18Feb-20Oct67
LtCol Robert C. McCutchan	21Oct-6Nov67
LtCol Jack W. Perrin	7Nov-31Dec67

3d Shore Party Battalion

CO LtCol Donald E. Marchette	1Jan-9May67
Maj Willard T. Layton, III	10May-31Jul67
LtCol James W. Quinn	1Aug-31Dec67

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Albert R. Bowman, II	1Jan-15Jul67
Maj Austin C. Rishel	16-25Jul67
LtCol Edward R. Toner	26Jul-31Dec67

3d Medical Battalion

CO Cdr John T. Vincent (MC) USN	1Jan-22Aug67
Cdr Robert A. Brown (MC) USN	23Aug-31Dec67

9th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Donald R. Tyrer	1Jan-20Jun67
Maj David J. Maysilles	21Jun-3Sep67
Maj John R. Stanley	4Sep-31Dec67

11th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Ross L. Mulford	1Jan-10Jul67
LtCol Willard N. Christopher	11Jul-4Nov67
LtCol Victor A. Perry	5Nov-31Dec67

5th Marine Division Units in Vietnam**26th Marines***

**The regimental headquarters arrived 26Apr67.*

CO Col John J. Padley	26Apr-12Aug67
Col David E. Lownds	13Aug-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol Donald E. Newton	1Jan-3Jul67
LtCol James B. Wilkinson	4Jul-31Dec67

2d Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol John M. Cummings	1Jan-10Apr67
LtCol Charles R. Figard	11Apr-18May67
LtCol William J. Masterpool	19May-26May67
LtCol Duncan D. Chaplin, III	27May-3Dec67
LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr.	4-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol Garland T. Beyerle	1-17Jan67
LtCol Kurt L. Hoch	18Jan-20Aug67
LtCol Harry L. Alderman	21Aug-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 13th Marines*

**The battalion arrived in Vietnam on 23Jul67.*

CO Maj Thomas J. Coyle	23Jul-9Dec67
LtCol John A. Hennelly	10-31Dec67

Headquarters, Force Logistic Command*

**(Redesignated Headquarters, 1st Force Service Regiment/Force Logistic Command on 16Feb67. The staff for both units was the same.)*

CG BGen James E. Herbold, Jr.	1Jan-5Oct67
BGen Harry C. Olson	6Oct-31Dec67
C/S Col William H. Cowper	1Jan-23May67
Col Lyle S. Stephenson	24May-1Aug67
Col Roy I. Wood, Jr.	2Aug-31Dec67
G-1 Maj Joe B. Noble	1-2Jan67
Maj Leonard E. Fuchs	3Jan-4May67
LtCol Stanley H. Rauh	5May-30Jun67
Capt Harold B. Jensen, Jr.	1-29Jul67
LtCol Minard P. Newton, Jr.	30Jul-31Dec67
G-2 LtCol Richard M. Taylor	1-30Jan67
LtCol Arthur R. Mooney	31Jan-11Jun67
Capt Joseph G. Vindich	12-28Jun67
Maj Clarence E. Watson, Jr.	29Jun-31Dec67
G-3 Col Lyle S. Stephenson	1Jan-23May67
LtCol Nolan J. Beat	24May-21Dec67
Col George K. Reid	22-31Dec67

G-4 Maj Gilbert C. Hazard	1Jan-30Jun67
Maj Richard D. Taber, Sr.	1-11Jul67
Maj William E. Snyder	12-19Jul67
LtCol Robert W. Howland	20Jul-31Dec67
G-5 Maj Leonard E. Fuchs	1Jan-6Oct67
Maj Thomas J. Smyth	7Oct-31Dec67

Force Logistic Command Subordinate Units*

**When the FLC changed its designation to FSR/FLC on 16Feb67, the orders also redesignated and restructured its subordinate units. For clarity, the command list shows, first, the integral FLC units through 15Feb67. The subsequent listing presents the new alignment and, where applicable, the previous unit designation.*

Force Logistic Support Group Alpha

CO Col Robert R. Weir	1Jan-6Feb67
Col George C. Schmidt, Jr.	7Feb-15Feb67

Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

CO Col Kermit H. Shelly	1Jan-15Feb67
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Force Logistic Support Unit 2

CO LtCol Rollin F. Van Cantfort	1Jan-15Feb67
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Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment*

**Formed 16Feb67 with the arrival of 1st FSR at Da Nang.*

CO LtCol Kenneth D. Seibert	16Feb-27Jul67
LtCol William F. Koehnlein	28Jul-31Dec67

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

(Ex-Force Logistic Support Group Alpha)

CO Col George C. Schmidt, Jr.	16Feb-2Aug67
LtCol Jack O. Arford	3-13Aug67
Col Julian G. Bass, Jr.	14Aug-31Dec67

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment*

**Established in Vietnam 16Feb67.*

CO LtCol Abie Gordon	16Feb-31Jul67
LtCol Jack M. Hermes	1Aug-31Dec67

3d Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Alpha

(ex-Force Logistic Support Group 2)

CO LtCol Rollin F. Van Cantfort	16Feb-28Apr67
Col Stanley D. Low	29Apr-2Sep67
Col James R. Jones	3Sep-31Dec67

1st Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

(ex-Force Logistic Support Group Bravo)

CO Col Kermit H. Shelly	16Feb-14Mar67
LtCol Esten C. Carper, Jr.	15-21Mar67
Col Stanley D. Low	22Mar-27Apr67
LtCol Esten C. Carper, Jr.	28Apr-24May67
LtCol Lynn A. Hall	25May-4Aug67
LtCol Richard J. Smith	5-30Aug67
LtCol John H. Maloney	31Aug-31Dec67

United Attached to Force Logistic Command*

**The 5th Communications Battalion was the only battalion-size unit attached to FLC for the entire year.*

5th Communications Battalion

CO Col Phillip K. Leesburg	1Jan-12Apr67
Maj William A. Read	13-20Apr67
LtCol Arnold G. Ziegler	1May-3Nov67
LtCol Donald L. Linderemuth	4Nov-31Dec67

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters

CG MajGen Louis B. Robertshaw	1Jan-2Jun67
MajGen Norman J. Anderson	3Jun-31Dec67
AWC BGen Robert G. Owens, Jr.	1Jan-1Apr67
BGen Robert P. Keller	2Apr-31Dec67
C/S Col Edward J. Doyle	1Jan-31Mar67
Col Herbert H. Long	1Apr-3Sep67
Col John S. Payne	4Sep-7Oct67
Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.	8Oct-31Dec67
G-1 Col Dan H. Johnson	1Jan-4Feb67
Col Jay W. Hubbard	5Feb-3May67
LtCol Harry D. Stott	4May-30Aug67
Col Robert Baird	31Aug-31Dec67
G-2 Col George H. Dodenhoff	1Jan-5Jul67
Col Robert D. Limberg	6Jul-31Dec67
G-3 Col Guy M. Cloud	1Jan-5Feb67
Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	6Feb-1Aug67
Col Joel E. Bonner, Jr.	2Aug-31Dec67
G-4 Col Herbert H. Long	1Jan-3Feb67
Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.	4Feb-6Jun67
Col Joel E. Bonner, Jr.	7Jun-1Aug67
Col Charles A. Armstrong, Jr.	2Aug-31Dec67
G-5 LtCol Ernest J. Berger	1Jan-9Jun67
LtCol Edward R. Rogal	10Jun-31Jul67*

**The G-5 Section came under Wing G-4 cognizance on 1Aug67.*

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1)

CO Col William L. Atwater	1Jan-5Apr67
Col Kenneth T. Dykes	6Apr-14Aug67
LtCol Wesley H. Rodenberger	15Aug-17Oct67
Col Tolbert T. Gentry	18Oct-31Dec67

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1)

CO Maj Carl C. Foster	1Jan-21Feb67
LtCol Stanley A. Herman	22Feb-9Jun67
Maj Thomas R. Maddock	10Jun-6Aug67
LtCol Merton R. Ives	7Aug-20Oct67
LtCol Albert W. Keller	21Oct-31Dec67

Marine Air Support Squadron 2 (MASS-2)*

**MASS-2 transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol Harry Hunter, Jr.	1Jan-15Jun67
LtCol Ben C. Rowe	16Jun-8Dec67
LtCol John M. Johnson, Jr.	9-31Dec67

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)***MASS-3 transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol Donald L. Fenton	1Jan-29Mar67
LtCol Gordon D. McPherson	30Mar-14Sep67
LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr.	15Sep-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4)***MACS-4 arrived in Vietnam from CONUS on 4Jun67 and transferred to MACG-18 on 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol Conrad P. Buschmann	4Jun-20Dec67
LtCol William A. Cohn	21-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7)***The squadron returned to CONUS on 15Jul67.*

CO Maj Thomas K. Burk, Jr.	1Jan-15Jul67
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1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (1st LAAM Bn)***The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol Merton P. Ives	1Jan-4Aug67
LtCol Marshall J. Treado	5Aug-31Dec67

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (2d LAAM Bn)***The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol Thomas I. Gunning	1Jan-12Jun67
LtCol Stanley A. Herman	13Jun-31Dec67

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS-1)***The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization of MWHG-1.*

CO Maj David H. Tinius	1Sep-31Dec67
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Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1)***The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization of MWHG-1.*

CO Maj Edward A. Laning	1Sep-31Dec67
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Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17)

CO Col Orlando S. Tosdal	1Jan-28Mar67
Col Victor A. Armstrong	29Mar-30Jun67
Col John E. Hansen	1Jul-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17)

CO LtCol John J. Leogue	1Jan-9Aug67
LtCol Eugene V. Goldston	10Aug-31Dec67

Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)

CO LtCol Lawrence P. Hart	1Jan-11Apr67
LtCol John R. Hansford	12Apr-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18)***MACG-18 activated at Da Nang on 1Sep67. For other units assigned to MACG-18, see the command list for MASS-2,**MASS-3, MACS-4, 1st LAAM Bn, and 2d LAAM Bn under MWHG-1.*

CO Col Lyle V. Tope	1Sep-31Dec67
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Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18 (H&HS-18)***H&HS-18 activated with the formation of MACG-18 on 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol John M. Johnson, Jr.	1Sep-5Nov67
LtCol Paul B. Montague	6Nov-31Dec67

Marine Aircraft Group 11

CO Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.	1Jan-3Feb67
Col William F. Guss	4Feb-30Jun67
Col Arthur O. Schmagel	1Jul-29Dec67
Col LeRoy T. Frey	30-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11)

CO LtCol Raymond A. Cameron	1Jan-30Apr67
LtCol Charles E. Dove	1May-31Aug67
LtCol Earl E. Jacobson	1Sep-3Nov67
LtCol Anthony L. Blair	4Nov-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11)

CO Maj Guy R. Campo	1-23Jan67
Maj Edgar J. Love	24Jan-30Apr67
LtCol Lonnie P. Baites	1May-11Jun67
Maj Stanley D. Cox	12Jun-9Oct67
LtCol John W. Irion, Jr.	13Oct-31Dec67

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)

CO LtCol William B. Fleming	1Jan-30Apr67
Maj Edgar J. Love	1May-15Oct67
LtCol Robert W. Lewis	16Oct-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)***The squadron left Vietnam for Iwakuni, Japan on 15Feb67.*

CO Maj Larry Vandeusen	1-23Jan67
Maj Guy R. Campo	24-15Feb67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122)***The squadron joined MAG-11 from CONUS on 1Sep67.*

CO LtCol John M. Verdi	1Sep-31Dec67
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Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA (AW)-242)

CO LtCol Howard Wolf	1Jan-30Apr67
LtCol Earl E. Jacobson, Jr.	1May-17Aug67
LtCol Lewis H. Abrams	18Aug-26Nov67
Maj Arthur W. D. Lavigne	27Nov-31Dec67

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 232 (VMF (AW)-232)**The squadron departed for CONUS 31Aug67.*

CO LtCol Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr.	1Jan-22Mar67
Maj Melvin H. Sautter	23Mar-31Aug67

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 (VMF (AW)-235)*

**The squadron arrived in Vietnam on 15Feb67.*

CO LtCol Edward R. Rogal	15Feb-31May67
LtCol Wallace Wessel	1Jun-15Oct67
LtCol Lee E. Blanchard	16Oct-28Dec67
LtCol Carl R. Lundquist	29-31Dec67

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)

CO Col Jay W. Hubbard	1Jan-15Feb67
Col Baylor P. Gibson, Jr.	16Feb-31Aug67
Col Dean Wilker	1Sep-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS-12)

CO LtCol Paul G. McMahon	1Jan-31Mar67
Maj Eugene Lichtenwalter	1Apr-28May67
LtCol Robert E. Miller	29May-9Nov67
LtCol Dan C. Alexander	10Nov-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)

CO LtCol Ralph D. Wallace	1Jan-2May67
Maj Forest G. Dawson	3May-2Sep67
LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr.	3Sep-31Dec67

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)*

**During the period 3Jun-5Sep67, the squadron was at Iwakuni, Japan undergoing rehabilitation.*

CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver	1Jan-16Mar67
Maj Forest G. Dawson	17-30Mar67
LtCol James H. McGee	31Mar-24Sep67
Maj Richard J. Kern	25Sep-31Dec67

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)*

**The squadron departed from Vietnam on 3Sep67 for rehabilitation at MCAF Iwakuni, Japan and returned to Vietnam on 1Dec67.*

CO LtCol William G. McCool	1Jan-25Feb67
LtCol Knowlton P. Rice	26Feb-30Jun67
Maj Gerit L. Fenenga	1Jul-25Aug67
LtCol Francis H. Thurston	26Aug-31Dec67

Marine Attack Squadron 214 (VMA-214)*

**The squadron departed for CONUS 3Apr67.*

CO Maj Richard E. Hemingway	1Jan-3Apr67
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Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223)*

**The squadron arrived from Iwakuni, Japan on 2Mar67 and returned to Iwakuni for rehabilitation on 3Dec67.*

CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft	2-25Mar67
LtCol Claude E. Deering, Jr.	26Mar-26Sep67
LtCol Arthur W. Anthony	27Sep-31Dec67

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)*

**During the period 1Mar-3Jun67 the squadron was at MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation.*

CO LtCol Roger A. Morris	1Jan-17Jun67
LtCol Eugene Lichtenwalter	8Jun-25Aug67
LtCol Edgar K. Jacks	26Aug-21Sep67
LtCol Richard B. Taber	22Sep-31Dec67

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA [AW]-533)

**VMA (AW)-533 arrived from CONUS on 1Apr67.*

CO LtCol William P. Brown	1Apr-1Oct67
LtCol William H. Fitch	2Oct-31Dec67

Marine Air Group 13 (MAG-13)

CO Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	1Jan-5Feb67
Col Dan H. Johnson	6Feb-7Aug67
Col Edward F. LeFaivre	8Aug-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS-13)

CO LtCol Walter E. Domina	1Jan-30Mar67
LtCol Lynn F. Williams	1Apr-19Jul67
LtCol James E. Miller	20Jul-22Sep67
LtCol Paul Sigmund	23Sep-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13)

CO LtCol Owen L. Owens	1-25Jan67
LtCol David W. Morrill	26Jan-23Mar67
LtCol Kenny C. Palmer	24Mar-27Jul67
LtCol Richard E. Carey	28Jul-5Oct67
LtCol Leroy A. Madera	6Oct-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)*

**The squadron arrived in Vietnam from MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan on 15May67.*

CO LtCol Guy R. Campo	15May-27Jul67
LtCol Kenny C. Palmer	28Jul-5Oct67
LtCol Richard E. Carey	6Oct-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)*

**During the period 16Aug-16Nov67 the squadron was at MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation.*

CO Maj William H. Heintz	1Jan-31May67
LtCol Frank D. Topley	1Jun-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323)*

**The squadron departed from Vietnam on 15May67 for MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for a rehabilitation period; it returned to Vietnam on 15Aug67.*

CO LtCol Aubrey W. Talbert	1-29Jan67
LtCol Gordon H. Keller, Jr.	30Jun-14Jul67
LtCol Edison W. Miller	15Jul-13Oct67
LtCol Harry T. Hagaman	14Oct-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)

CO LtCol Donald L. May	1Jan-2Feb67
LtCol Frederick L. Farrell, Jr.	3Feb-18Jul67
LtCol John Hubner	19Jul-14Sep67
LtCol Richard C. Marsh	15Sep-31Dec67

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16)

CO Col Frank M. Hepler	1Jan-21Apr67
Col Samuel F. Martin	22Apr-4Sep67
Col Edwin O. Reed	5Sep-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS 16)

CO LtCol Lucius O. Davis	1-31Jan67
LtCol Walter C. Kelly	1Feb-21Apr67
LtCol William E. Deeds	22Apr-20Jul67
Maj Glenn A. Stephens	21Jul-30Sep67
LtCol Lawrence J. Flanagan	1Oct-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16)

CO LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick	1-4Jan67
LtCol Charles E. Wydner, Jr.	5Jan-30Sep67
LtCol Frederick M. Kleppsattel, Jr.	1-25Oct67
LtCol Samuel J. Fulton	26Oct-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)*

**The squadron transferred to the SLF on 9Sep67.*

CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	1Jan-26Apr67
LtCol Walter C. Kelly	27Apr-8Sep67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)*

**During the period 3Apr-13Jul67 the squadron served with the SLF; it transferred to MAG-36 effective 16Oct67.*

CO LTCol Warren C. Watson	1Jan-14Feb67
LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick	15Feb-24Jul67
LtCol Manning T. Jannell	25Jul-16Sep67
LtCol Robert F. Rick	17Sep-15Oct67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)*

**On 15Feb67 the squadron returned to MCAS, Futenma, Okinawa to assist in the CH-46 repair program.*

CO LtCol Leslie L. Darbyshire	1Jan-15Feb67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)*

**During the period 12Jul-23Aug67 the squadron served with the SLF; on 23Aug67 it returned to MAG-36 and on 16Oct67 transferred back to MAG-16.*

CO Maj Frank B. Ellis	1-31Jan67
LtCol Clifford D. Corn	1Feb-2Apr67
LtCol Robert L. Gover, Jr.	3Apr-18Jun67
LtCol William R. Beeler	29Jun-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361)*

**The squadron arrived from Okinawa on 16Feb67; on 16Nov67 it transferred to the SLF.*

CO LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	16-28Feb67
LtCol Earl W. Traut	1Mar-23May67
Maj Homer A. Bruce	24May-17Oct67
LtCol Daniel M. Wilson	18Oct-15Nov67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)*

**The squadron joined MAG-16 from the SLF on 8Sep67 and on 15Oct67 it transferred to MAG-36.*

CO LtCol Nick J. Kapetan	8-13Sep67
LtCol Richard W. Cline	14Sep-15Oct67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)*

**The squadron joined MAG-13 from the SLF on 4Apr67.*

CO Maj Marvin E. Day	4Apr-10Jul67
LtCol Robert Lewis, Jr.	11Jul-2Dec67
LtCol Frankie E. Allgood	3-31Dec67

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)*

**The major portion of the squadron arrived in Vietnam from CONUS on 23May67, but a detachment had served with MAG-16 since 26Dec66.*

CO LtCol Samuel G. Beal	23May-5Oct67
LtCol Joseph L. Sadowski	6Oct-31Dec67

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)

CO LtCol William F. Harrell	1Jan-14Jul67
Maj Morris G. Robbins	14-23Jul67
LtCol Philip M. Crosswait	24Jul-10Dec67
LtCol Morris G. Robbins	11-31Dec67

Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3)*

**The squadron transferred effective 16Oct67.*

CO Maj Kyle W. Townsend	1Jan-17Aug67
LtCol Glenn R. Hunter	18Aug-15Oct67

Marine Air Group 36 (MAG-36)

CO Col Victor A. Armstrong	1Jan-28Mar67
Col Orlando S. Tosdal	29Mar-1Jul67
Col Frank E. Wilson	2Jul-31Dec67

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 36 (H&HS-36)

CO LtCol William C. Carlson	1Jan-14Aug67
Maj Harold E. Roth	15Aug-13Oct67
LtCol Richard G. Courtney	14Oct-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (MABS-36)

CO LtCol Joseph A. Nelson	1Jan-26Mar67
LtCol Thomas E. Fish	27Mar67-30Apr67
LtCol William L. Walker	1May-3Sep67
Maj Claude E. Hendrix	4Sep-5Oct67
LtCol Melvin J. Sternberg	6Oct-15Dec67
Maj James C. Robinson	16-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)*

**The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 30Oct67.*

CO Maj Frederick A. Rueckel	30Oct-19Nov67
LtCol Louis W. Schwindt	20Nov-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)*

**The squadron transferred from MAG-16 to MAG-36 on 16Oct67.*

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick	16Oct-31Dec67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165)

CO LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr.	1Jan-30Apr67
LtCol John A. Reames	1May-31Oct67
LtCol Richard E. Romine	1Nov-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)*

**The squadron transferred to the SLF on 23Aug67.*

CO LtCol Ural W. Shadrack	1Jan-15Jun67
Maj Gregory A. Corliss	16Jun-23Aug67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)*

**The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 13Jun67 and departed from Vietnam for CONUS on 31Oct67.*

CO LtCol Edward K. Kirby	13Jun-9Jul67
Maj James C. Robinson	10Jul-31Oct67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)*

**The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 23Aug67 and transferred to MAG-16 on 16Oct67.*

CO LtCol William R. Beeler	23Aug-16Oct67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)*

**The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 19Jan67. On 8Sep67 it transferred to MAG-16, but on 16Oct67 it rejoined MAG-36.*

CO LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	19Jan-15Mar67
LtCol Nick J. Kapetan	16Mar-13Sep67
LtCol Richard W. Cline	14Sep-23Dec67
Maj Walter H. Shaver	24-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)*

**The squadron transferred to the SLF on 19Jan67 as a replacement for HMM-362.*

CO LtCol Kenneth E. Huntington	1-19Jan67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364)*

**The advance party of HMM-364 arrived in Vietnam on 29Oct67; the rest of the squadron arrived during November.*

CO LtCol Louis A. Gulling	29Oct-31Dec67
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Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3)*

**The squadron joined MAG-36 from MAG-16 on 16Oct67.*

CO LtCol Glenn R. Hunter	16Oct-31Dec67
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Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

CO LtCol William R. Maloney	1Jan-27Mar67
LtCol Joseph A. Nelson	28Mar-16Sep67
LtCol William J. White	17Sep-31Dec67

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade/Task Force 79*

**The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB) activated on 1 March 1966 and assumed responsibility for Task Force 79 (TF 79) duties on that date. On 15Apr66, 9th MAB assumed responsibility for tactical Marine aviation and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not in Vietnam.*

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters

CG BGen Michael P. Ryan	1-4Jan67
BGen Louis G. Metzger	4Jan-18May67
BGen Jacob E. Glick	19May-31Dec67
C/S Col Richard R. Amerine	1Jan-16Sep67
Col Elton Mueller	17-27Sep67
Col James A. Etheridge	28Sep-31Dec67
G-1 LtCol Edward V. Easter	1Jan-10Sep67
Maj Patrick E. Duffy	11-24Sep67
LtCol George H. Benskin, Jr.	25Sep-31Dec67
G-2 Maj James C. Hitz	1Jan-21Feb67
Capt Eugene B. Burleson, Jr.	22-27Feb67
Maj Clark G. Henry	28Feb-25Jul67
Capt Eugene B. Burleson, Jr.	26Jul-28Aug67
Capt Hugh S. Jolley	29Aug67
Maj James V. Knapp	30Aug-31Dec67
G-3 LtCol James G. Dionisopoulos	1Jan-25Jun67
LtCol William L. Smith	26Jun-12Jul67
Col David E. Lownds	13-24Jul67
LtCol Bruce F. Meyers	25Jul-31Dec67
G-4 Col Elton Mueller	1Jan-8Sep67
Col Warren A. Butcher	9Sep-31Dec67

Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT-26)/Task Force 79.2*

**On 26Apr67, RLT-26 Headquarters became RLT-26 (Forward) when it deployed to Vietnam, leaving RLT-26 (Rear) on Okinawa.*

CO Col John J. Padley	1Jan-11Aug67
Col David E. Lownds	12Aug-31Dec67

Regimental Landing Team 26 (Rear) (RLT-26 [Rear])*

**During the year 1967, RLT-26 and later RLT-26 (Rear) acted as the command headquarters for battalion and battalion landing teams as they arrived in Vietnam for training, rehabilitation, and deployment. All of the regiment's integral battalions had deployed in Vietnam, consequently the listing of battalions which*

follows presents only the periods when the individual battalions came under 26th Marines' control. They appear in the sequence of their arrival during the year, rather than in any numerical sequence.

CO LtCol Joseph K. Gastrock, III	26Apr-15Jul67
LtCol Richard D. Alexander	16Jul-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 13th Marines*

**The battalion arrived on Okinawa on 20Aug66.*

CO Maj Robert L. Christian, Jr.	1Jan-12May67
Maj Alva F. Thompson, Jr.	13May-15Jun67
Maj Thomas J. Coyle	16Jun-14Dec67
LtCol John A. Hennelly	15-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The battalion became BLT 1/4 for planning on 13Jan67, transferred to the SLF on 27Jan67 and departed from Okinawa on 28Jan67.*

CO LtCol Jack Westerman	1-26Jan67
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Battalion Landing Team 3/9 (BLT 3/9)*

**The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 14Jan67, deactivated as a BLT on 18Jan67, but rejoined the SLF on 22Feb67, and sailed from Okinawa on 24Feb67.*

CO LtCol Sherwood A. Brunnenmeyer	14Jan-22Feb67
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Battalion Landing Team 1/9 (BLT 1/9)*

**The battalion arrived from Vietnam on 24Jan67 and departed for Vietnam on 31Jan67.*

CO Maj James L. Day	24-31Jan67
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Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (BLT 1/3)*

**The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 13Feb67 and departed as part of the SLF on 4Apr67.*

CO LtCol Peter A. Wickwire	13Feb-4Apr67
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Battalion Landing Team 2/3 (BLT 2/3)*

**The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 13Mar67 and departed as part of the SLF on 14Apr67.*

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong	13Mar-14Apr67
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Battalion Landing Team 3/4 (BLT 3/4)*

**The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 11Apr67 and, upon receipt of orders recalling it to Vietnam, departed Okinawa on 16May67.*

CO LtCol Wendell N. Vest	11Apr-16May67
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Marine Air Group 15 (MAG-15)/Task Group 79.3*

**Marine Air Group 15, stationed at MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan served as a command and control headquarters for Marine aviation units requiring repair, rehabilitation, and training between Vietnam deployments. The following listing of squadrons both resi-*

dent and transient, appears in order of arrival during the year 1967.

CO Col Charles Kimak	1Jan-31Aug67
LtCol David O. Takala	1-27Sep67
Col Wilbur C. Kellogg, Jr.	28-30Sep67
LtCol David O. Takala	1-31Oct67
Col Wilbur C. Kellogg	1Nov-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 (H&MS-15)

CO LtCol James McDaniel	1Jan-22Aug67
LtCol Herman L. Mixon	23Aug-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 15 (MABS-15)

CO LtCol George H. Albers	1Jan-6Sep67
LtCol Clement C. J. Chamberlain	7Sep-31Dec67

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)

CO LtCol John Urell	1Jan-15May67
LtCol Royce M. Williams	16May-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Squadron 6 (MACS-6)

CO Maj William K. Hutchings	1Jan-30Mar67
Maj Rollin E. Hippler	31Mar-31Dec67

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 (VMF[AW]-235)*

**The squadron transferred to MAG-11 on 14Feb67.*

CO LtCol Edward R. Rogal	1Jan-14Feb67
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Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223)*

**VMA-223 transferred to MAG-12, effective 1Mar67 and returned to MAG-15 after relief by VMA-221 on 1Dec67.*

CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft	1Jan-28Feb67
LtCol Arthur W. Anthony, Jr	1-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361)*

**The squadron transferred to MAG-16 on 17Feb67.*

CO LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	1Jan-17Feb67
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Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)*

**The squadron departed MAG-11 in Vietnam on 15Feb67 and transferred to MAG-13 on 14May67.*

CO Maj Guy R. Campo	15Feb-13May67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)*

**The squadron arrived from MAG-16 on 20Feb67 and departed to the SLF on 3Apr67.*

CO LtCol Edward K. Kirby	20Feb-3Apr67
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Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)*

**The squadron arrived from MAG-12 on 1Mar67 and returned to MAG-12 on 1Jun67.*

CO LtCol Roger A. Morris	1Mar-1Jun67
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Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323)*

**The squadron arrived from MAG-13 on 16May67 and returned to MAG-13 on 17Aug67.*

CO LtCol Gordon H. Keller, Jr	16May-15Jul67
LtCol Edison W. Miller	16Jul-17Aug67

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)*

**The squadron was joined from MAG-12 on 1Jun67 and returned to MAG-12 on 5Sep67.*

CO LtCol James H. McGee	1Jun-5Sep67
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Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)*

**The squadron arrived from MAG-13 on 18Aug67 and returned to MAG-13 on 15Nov67.*

CO LtCol Frank D. Topley	18Aug-15Nov67
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Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)*

**The squadron joined from MAG-12 on 6Sep67 and was returned to MAG-12 on 1Dec67.*

CO LtCol Francis H. Thurston	6Sep-1Dec67
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Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)*

**The squadron joined from MAG-13 on 15Nov67.*

CO LtCol Richard C. Marsh	15Nov-31Dec67
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Special Landing Force Alpha (SLF Alpha)/TG 79.4)

Activated 1Mar67, SLF Alpha was in fact junior to its companion SLF, Bravo, which as Task Group 79.5, formed in 1966.

CO Col James A. Gallo	1Mar-11Jun67
Col John A. Conway	12Jun-31Dec67

Special Landing Force Alpha Battalion Landing Team**Battalion Landing Team (BLT 1/3)***

**BLT 1/3 joined SLF Alpha on 3Apr67. During the period 11-27Aug67, BLT 1/3 served under the operational control of Task Force X-Ray in Vietnam.*

CO LtCol Peter A. Wickwire	3Apr-15Jul67
LtCol Alfred I. Thomas	16Jul-17Nov
LtCol Richard W. Goodale	10Nov-31Dec67

Special Landing Force Alpha Helicopter Squadron ***Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)**

**HMM-263 joined SLF Alpha on 3Apr67, the same date as BLT 1/3. During the periods 13-27Jun67 and 31Oct-14Nov67, no squadron served with SLF Alpha, and during the period 16-27Aug67 HMM-362 reverted to the operational control of 1st MAW.*

CO LtCol Edward K. Kirby	3Apr-12Jun67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)

CO LtCol Nick J. Kapetan	28Jul-7Sep67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163)

CO LtCol Walter C. Kelly	8-22Sep67
Maj Fredrick A. Rueckel	23Sep-30Oct67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361)

CO LtCol Daniel M. Wilson	15Nov-31Dec67
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Special Landing Force Bravo (SLF Bravo)/TG 79.5*

**The first special landing force, Task Group 79.5 became Special Landing Force Bravo on 1Mar67.*

CO Col Harry D. Wortman	1Jan-6Jul67
Col James G. Dionisopoulos	7Jul-5Nov67
Col Maynard W. Schmidt	6Nov-31Dec67

Special Landing Force Bravo Battalion Landing Team**Battalion Landing Team 1/9 (BLT 1/9)**

CO Maj James L. Day	1-25Jan67
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Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (BLT 1/4)

CO LtCol Jack Westerman	26Jan-28Mar67
LtCol Theodore J. Willis	29Mar-1Apr67

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 (BLT 2/3)*

**Effective 2Apr67, BLT 1/4 transferred to the 3d Marine Division. Its replacement BLT 2/3, activated on Okinawa on 3Apr67 but did not embark until the 13th.*

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong	3Apr-21May67
Maj Wendell O. Beard	22May-12Jul67
Maj John R. Broujos	13-16Jul67
LtCol Emil W. Herich	17Jul-22Aug67
Maj Wendell O. Beard	23Aug-9Oct67
LtCol Henry Englisch	10Oct-31Dec67

Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (BLT 3/1)

CO LtCol Max McQuown	1-31Dec67
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Special Landing Force Bravo Helicopter Squadrons**Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)**

CO LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	1-18Jan67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)

CO LtCol Kenneth E. Huntington	19Jan-3Mar67
Maj Marvin E. Day	4Mar-3Apr67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164)

CO LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick	4Apr-12Jul67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265)

CO LtCol William R. Beeler	12Jul-22Aug67
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Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)
CO Maj Gregory A. Corliss 23Aug-11Oct67

CO Maj John W. Alber 12Oct-23Nov67
Maj David L. Althoff 24Nov-31Dec67

Detachment Alpha, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262*

**Detachment Alpha, HMM-262 formed when the 1st MAW grounded the CH-46s. Used only for emergency operations, the detachment remained with the ARG shipping until correction of the CH-46 structural problems.*

Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Group
SMA Col Nels E. Anderson 1Jan-23Jul67
Col Richard L. Michael, Jr. 24Jul-31Dec67

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After action report.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- ADC—Assistant division commander.
- AdminO—Administrative officer.
- Adv—Advanced.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is LCC.
- AK-47—Russian-made Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
- ANGLICO—Air and naval gunfire liaison company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
- AOA—Amphibious objective area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.
- APC—Armored personnel carrier.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious ready group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASRT—Air support radar team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.
- B-3 Front—North Vietnamese military command established in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operations in Kontum, Dar Loc, and Pleiku Provinces.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BGen—Brigadier general.
- BLT—Battalion landing team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Brig—Brigade.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CAAR—Combat after action report.
- Capt—Captain.
- CAS—Close air support.
- Cdr—Commander.
- CG—Commanding general.
- CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, heavy transport helicopter which carries three crew members and 20 passengers.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-turbine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class III, POL; Class V, Ammunition.
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
- CO—Commanding officer.
- Col—Colonel.
- CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S. and Vietnamese pacification efforts.
- Combined action program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon in a Vietnamese village.
- ComdC—Command chronology.
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.

County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.

CP—Command post.

CRC—Control and reporting center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.

CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.

DASC—Direct air support center—A subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.

D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.

DD—Navy Destroyer.

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

Dtd—Dated.

Div—Division.

DOD—Department of Defense.

Duster—The nickname for the U.S. Army's tracked vehicle, the M-42, which mounted dual 40-mm automatic weapons.

EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.

ECM—Electronic countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.

EF-10B—An ECM modified version of the Navy F-3D Skynight, a twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage.

ELINT—Electronic intelligence, the intelligence information gained by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.

Engr—Engineer.

F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.

FAC (A)—Forward air controller (Airborne).

FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.

FLC—Force Logistic Command.

FLSG—Force logistic support group.

FLSU—Force logistic support unit.

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

FO—Forward observer.

FSCC—Fire support coordination center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.

FSR—Force service regiment.

Fwd—Forward.

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e. g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2 intelligence; G-3 operations; G-4 logistics, and G-5 civil affairs.

Gen—General.

Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.

Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sus-

tained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.

Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.

Gun, 155mm, M53—U.S.-built, medium, self-propelled gun, with a 23,300 meter range, and weighing 96,000 pounds. It has a sustained rate of fire of one round every two minutes.

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

H&I fires—Harassing and interdiction fires.

H&S Co—Headquarters and service company.

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short range missiles.

HE—High explosive.

H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.

HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor of the History and Museums Division.

HLZ—Helicopter landing zone.

HMM—Marine medium helicopter squadron.

Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U.S.-Built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire of one round every two minutes.

Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.

Howitzer, 155mm, M-114A towed and M-109 self-propelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.

Howtar—A 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pack howitzer frame.

"Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.

ICC—International Control Commission, established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.

ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilian assistance program in I Corps.

I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which includes the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.

J—The designations for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e. g., J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; J-2 intelligence; J-3 operations; J-4 logistic and J-5 civil affairs.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).

JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).

JTD—Joint table of distribution.

- KANZUS**—A proposed international brigade to man defenses along the DMZ; the acronym stands for Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and United States.
- KC-130**—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- KIA**—Killed-in-action.
- Kit Carson Scout**—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
- L-Hour**—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.
- LAAM Bn**—Light antiaircraft missile battalion.
- LCM**—Landing craft mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.
- LCVP**—Landing craft, vehicle, personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.
- LOI**—Letter of Instruction.
- LPD**—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It has both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.
- LPH**—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.
- LSA**—Logistic support area.
- LSD**—Landing ship, dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.
- LST**—Landing ship, tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.
- Lt**—Lieutenant.
- LtCol**—Lieutenant colonel.
- LtGen**—Lieutenant general.
- Ltr**—letter.
- LVTE**—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, engineer; a lightly armored amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.
- LVTH**—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, howitzer; a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer. It resembles an LVTP with a turret for the howitzer.
- LVTP**—Landing vehicle, tracked, personnel; an amphibian vehicle used to land and or transport personnel.
- LZ**—Landing zone.
- MAB**—Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- Machine gun, .50 caliber**—U.S. built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
- Machine gun, M60**—U.S. built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.
- MACS**—Marine air control squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.
- MACV**—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF**—Marine amphibious force.
- MAG**—Marine aircraft group.
- Main Force**—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups.
- Maj**—Major.
- MajGen**—Major general.
- MarDiv**—Marine division.
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g. 3d Marines.
- MASS**—Marine air support squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.
- MAW**—Marine aircraft wing.
- MCAF**—Marine Corps air facility.
- MCAS**—Marine Corps air station.
- MCCC**—Marine Corps Command Center.
- MCOAG**—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.
- MedCap**—Medical civilian assistance program.
- MIA**—Missing-in-action.
- MilHistBr**—Military History Branch.
- Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30**—U.S. built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has a maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
- Mortar, 60mm, M19**—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
- Mortar, 81mm, M29**—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.
- Mortar, 82mm, Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon** which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
- Mortar, 120mm**—Soviet or Chinese Communist built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.
- MR-5**—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in MR-5 did not report to COSVN.
- MS**—Manuscript.
- Msg**—Message.
- NAG**—Naval Advisory Group.
- NCC**—Naval component commander.
- NCO**—Non-commissioned officer.
- NLF**—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.
- NMCB**—Naval mobile construction battalion (Seabees).
- NMCC**—National Military Command Center.
- NPA**—National priority area, designated targeted area for

pacification in South Vietnam.

Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.

Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin.

NVA—North Vietnamese Army; often used colloquially to refer to a North Vietnamese soldier.

O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.

Ontos—U.S. built, lightly-armored, tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.

OpCon—Operational control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.

OpO—Operation order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.

OPlan—Operation plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

OpSum—Operational summary.

OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).

PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This acronym dropped in favor of NVA.

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.

POL—Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfiltration barrier across the DMZ.

Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.

Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S. built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.

RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.

RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vought Crusader.

Regt—Regiment.

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.

Revolutionary Development Teams—Especially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level. (See rural reconstruction.)

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3.1 pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

RLT—Regimental landing team.

ROK—Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.

Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.

Route Package—Code name used with a number to designate areas of North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign.

Route Package I was the area immediately north of the DMZ.

RRU—Radio Research Unit.

Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor pacification campaign to Revolutionary Development.

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels.

S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel;

S-2 intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4 logistics; and S-5 civil affairs.

SAR—Search and rescue.

SATS—Short airfield for tactical support, an expeditionary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation that included a portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force.

SecDef—Secretary of Defense.

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Flt—Seventh Fleet, the U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.

SitRep—Situation Report.

SLF—Special landing force.

Song—Vietnamese for "river".

SOP—Standing operating procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.

Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.

SPOS—Strong point obstacle system, often called the "McNamara Line," which had the intended purpose of controlling movement of NVA units from North Vietnam into I Corps.

Strike Company—an elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.

TAC(A)—Tactical air coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an

- airplane, who coordinates close air support.
- TACC—Tactical air control center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.
- TADC—Tactical air direction center, an air operations installation under the tactical air control center, which direct aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.
- TAOC—Tactical air operations center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.
- TAFDS—Tactical airfield fuel dispensing system, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000 gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.
- Tally Ho—Bombing campaign under ComUSMACV begun in July 1966 of Route Package I in North Vietnam.
- Tank, M48—U.S. built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one .50 caliber machine gun. Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.
- TAOR—Tactical area of responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.
- TE—Task element.
- TG—Task Group.
- Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles in southeastern Laos.
- TU—Task unit.
- UH-1E-Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.
- UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries 8-12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.
- USA—United States Army.
- USAF—United States Air Force.
- USAID—United States Agency for International Development.
- USMC—United States Marine Corps.
- U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and included ComUSMACV, which developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.
- USN—United States Navy.
- USOM—United States Operations Mission, the United States civilian organization in RVN including the U.S. Embassy, AID, etc.
- VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrilla in South Vietnam; a derogatory contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists."
- Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.
- VMA—Marine attack squadron. In naval aviation, the "V" designates "heavier than air" as opposed to craft that were "lighter than air."
- VMF (AW)—Marine fighter squadron (all-weather).
- VMFA—Marine fighter attack squadron.
- VMCJ—Marine composite reconnaissance squadron.
- VMGR—Marine refueller transport squadron.
- VMO—Marine observation squadron.
- VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.
- VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.
- VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.
- VNN—Vietnamese Navy.
- VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.
- WestPac—Western Pacific.
- WIA—Wounded-in-action.
- WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

- 1 January III MAF strength totaled 65,789.
- 6 January Operation Deckhouse V, the first major offensive by U.S. forces into the Mekong Delta, began with helicopter and waterborne landings by the SLF and Vietnamese Marines. The Viet Cong knew of the operation in advance and departed before the Marines landed.
- 26 January MACV headquarters completed its Practice Nine Requirement Plan for constructing a strong point obstacle system (SPOS) south of the DMZ.
- 26 January Operation Desoto began. Task Force X-Ray controlled this operation which involved elements of the 4th and 5th Marines in a search and destroy mission in Quang Nam Province. The operation lasted 73 days.
- 31 January Operation Prairie, the 3d Marine Division's multi-battalion operation, which began in August 1966, ended in Quang Tri Province. The operation opposed elements of two North Vietnamese divisions.
- 1 February The 3d Marine Division began Operation Prairie II, a continuation of Prairie I.
- 8-12 February These dates marked the ceasefire for Tet, a major Vietnamese holiday. Thereafter, North Vietnamese units, for the first time, defended key terrain from well-constructed, fortified lines and employed artillery weapons ranging from 82mm to 130mm in size.
- 12-22 February The 1st Marines conducted Operation Stone in Quang Nam Province. In this operation, Marines destroyed a vast network of caves, tunnels, and bunkers. In the operation's second phase, Marines surrounded elements of the *R-20 Battalion* and then swept back and forth over the cordoned area.
- 21 February Dr. Bernard Fall, noted historian of the French combat experience in Indochina, died in a explosion of an enemy mine. Dr. Fall was accompanying the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on Operation Chinook II.
- 26 February The 1st Marines began Operation Lafayette, a multi-battalion effort in Quang Nam Province.
- 10 March III MAF completed the introduction of the M-16 to Marines in Vietnam.
- 18 March The first woman Marine to serve in Vietnam, MSgt Barbara J. Dulin-sky, arrived in Saigon, for assignment to the MACV combat operations center.
- 18 March The 3d Marine Division ended Prairie II and began Prairie III the following day. The latter continued until 20 April.
- 26 March COMUSMACV ordered III MAF to prepare a plan for locating, constructing, and occupying a strongpoint obstacle system south of the DMZ.
- 5 April The 4th Marines began a multi-battalion operation named Big Horn in Thua Thien Province.

- 6-10 April The 1st Marines conducted Operation Canyon with South Vietnamese ranger battalions participating.
- 20 April Operation Prairie IV began in Quang Tri Province. It ended on 17 May.
- 20 April Task Force Oregon arrived at Chu Lai.
- 24 April The First Battle of Khe Sanh began. Units of the 3d Marine Division subsequently fought bitter battles with regular NVA forces for control of Hills 881S, 881N, and 861. This battle continued into May.
- 2 May 11th Engineer Battalion completed clearing a 200-meter wide trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh and began clearing a 500-meter perimeter around each position.
- 13 May The 26th Marines began Operation Crockett in the Khe Sanh area.
- 18 May Units of the 3d Marine Division, augmented by the SLF and ARVN forces, began Operation Hickory by moving into the southern portion of the DMZ in a three-pronged attack against North Vietnamese units using the area as a sanctuary.
- 26 May The 5th Marines began Operation Union II, which continued until 5 June.
- 31 May LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., succeeded LtGen Lewis W. Walt as CG, III MAF.
- 7 June A company-size force from the 26th Marines engaged an NVA force on Hill 881 during Operation Crockett and reported killing 59 NVA soldiers.
- 14-22 June The 7th Marines conducted Operation Arizona with a multi-battalion force. The operation moved 1,650 refugees to camps at Duc Duc, the headquarters of the An Hoa industrial complex 15 miles south of Da Nang.
- 18 June III MAF published its OpPlan 11-67 outlining the SPOS concept.
- 25 June LtGen Cushman and MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the Vietnamese Army I Corps commander, opened the new 1,680 foot prefabricated bridge across the Da Nang River.
- 3 July North Vietnamese artillery fired supply dumps at the Marines' base at Dong Ha.
- 14 July The name "Dye Marker" became effective as the title of the efforts to construct an SPOS south of the DMZ.
- 15 July An early morning enemy rocket attack heavily damaged aircraft and the southern end of the Da Nang Air Base.
- 28-29 July The 3d Marine Division sent the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced with armored vehicles, into the DMZ north of Con Thien on a search and destroy mission. The battalion had to fight its way out on the DMZ on the second day.
- 7-11 August BLT 1/3 of the SLF conducted Operation Beacon Gate southeast of Hoi An.
- 10-28 August The 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-Ray conducted Operation Cochise in Quang Tin Province in conjunction with the ARVN Operation Lien Ket-122.
- 27 August The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began Operation Yazoo in Happy Valley near Da Nang. There was little contact and the operation ended on 5 September.

- 3 September North Vietnamese artillery fire destroyed the large ammunition dump at Dong Ha.
- 4 September Navy Chaplain Vincent R. Capodanno died earning the Medal of Honor while serving with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.
- 4-15 September Task Force X-Ray's Operation Swift pitted elements of two Marine battalions against a large and well-equipped force of NVA soldiers northwest of Tam Ky. ARVN forces and elements of Task Force Oregon fought simultaneous operations in conjunction with Swift.
- 6 October BGen Harry C. Olson relieved BGen James E. Herbold, Jr., as commander of the Force Logistics Command.
- 11-20 October The 1st Marines conducted Operation Medina near Quang Tri.
- 20 October The 1st Marines began Operation Osceola.
- 24 October The 7th Marines began Operation Knox, which ended 4 November, in the Phu Loc-Hai Van area.
- 31 October Operation Ardmore, Fremont, and Kingfisher, which began in mid-July, ended in northern I Corps.
- 1 November Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, on a visit to South Vietnam, presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3d Marine Division and the 7th ARVN Airborne.
- 14 November MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth died in a helicopter crash near Hue. BGen Metzger assumed command of the 3d Marine Division pending the arrival of MajGen Tompkins.
- 6-17 November The 5th Marines conducted Operation Essex in Quang Nam Province.
- 13-30 November The 7th Marines conducted Operation Foster northwest of An Hoa.
- 1-31 December The 3d Marine Division continued Operation Scotland, Lancaster, Kentucky, Napoleon, Neosho, and Osceola.
- 23 December The 7th Marines terminated Operation Citrus.
- 31 December As of this date, III MAF units had expended 757,520 man days and 114,519 equipment hours on the construction of the strong point obstacle system, which many Marines referred to as the "McNamara Line." Enemy action had destroyed \$1,622,348 worth of Marine equipment being used on the project.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations, 1967

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JAMES ANDERSON, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a rifleman, Second Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in Vietnam on 28 February 1967. Company F was advancing in dense jungle northwest of Cam Lo in an effort to extract a heavily besieged reconnaissance patrol. Private First Class Anderson's platoon was the lead element and had advanced only about 200 meters when they were brought under extremely intense enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The platoon reacted swiftly, getting on line as best they could in the thick terrain, and began returning fire. Private First Class Anderson found himself tightly bunched together with the other members of the platoon only 20 meters from the enemy positions. As the fire fight continued several of the men were wounded by the deadly enemy assault. Suddenly, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the Marines and rolled along side Private First Class Anderson's head. Unhesitatingly and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, he reached out, grasped the grenade, pulled it to his chest and curled around it as it went off. Although several Marines received shrapnel from the grenade, his body absorbed the major force of the explosion. In this singularly heroic act, Private First Class Anderson saved his comrades from serious injury and possible death. His personal heroism, extraordinary valor, and inspirational supreme self-sacrifice reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JEDH COLBY BARKER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Company F, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 21 September 1967. During a reconnaissance operation near Con Thien, Corporal Barker's squad was suddenly hit by enemy sniper fire. The squad immediately deployed to a combat formation and advanced to a strongly fortified enemy position, when it was again struck by small arms and automatic weapons fire, sustaining numerous casualties. Although wounded by the initial burst of fire, Corporal Barker boldly remained in the open, delivering a devastating volume of accurate fire on the numerically superior force. The enemy was intent upon annihilating the small Marine force and, realizing that Corporal Barker was a threat to their position directed the preponderance of their fire on his position. He was again wounded, this time in the right hand, which prevented him from operating his vitally needed machine gun. Suddenly, and without warning, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the few surviving Marines. Unhesitatingly and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Corporal Barker threw himself upon the deadly grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and tremendous force of the explosion. In a final act of bravery, he crawled to the side of a wounded comrade and administered first aid before succumbing to his grievous wounds. His bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death undoubtedly saved his comrades from further injury or possible death and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN PAUL BOBO
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Weapons Platoon Commander, Company I, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 30 March 1967. Company I was establishing night ambush sites when the command group was attacked by a reinforced North Vietnamese company supported by heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire. Lieutenant Bobo immediately organized a hasty defense and moved from position to position encouraging the outnumbered Marines despite the murderous enemy fire. Recovering a rocket launcher from among the friendly casualties, he organized a new launcher team and directed its fire into the enemy machine gun positions. When an exploding enemy mortar round severed Lieutenant Bobo's right leg below the knee, he refused to be evacuated and insisted upon being placed in a firing position to cover the movement of the command group to better location. With a web belt around his leg serving as a tourniquet and with his leg jammed into the dirt to curtail the bleeding, he remained in this position and delivered devastating fire into the ranks of the enemy attempting to overrun the Marines. Lieutenant Bobo was mortally wounded while firing his weapon into the mainpoint of the enemy attack but his valiant spirit inspired his men to heroic efforts, and his tenacious stand enabled the command group to gain a protective position where it repulsed the enemy onslaught. Lieutenant Bobo's superb leadership, dauntless courage, and bold initiative reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LIEUTENANT VINCENT R. CAPODANNO
CHAPLAIN CORPS, UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Chaplain of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF, in connection with operations against enemy forces in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 4 September 1967. In response to reports that the 2d Platoon of M Company was in danger of being overrun by a massed enemy assaulting force, Lieutenant Capodanno left the relative safety of the Company Command Post and ran through an open area raked with fire, directly to the beleaguered platoon. Disregarding the intense enemy small-arms, automatic-weapons, and mortar fire, he moved about the battlefield administering last rites to the dying and giving medical aid to the wounded. When an exploding mortar round inflicted painful multiple wounds to his arms and legs, and severed a portion of his right hand, he steadfastly refused all medical aid. Instead, he directed the corpsmen to help their wounded comrades and, with calm vigor, continued to move about the battlefield as he provided encouragement by voice and example to the valiant Marines. Upon encountering a wounded corpsman in the direct line of fire of an enemy machine gunner positioned approximately fifteen yards away, Lieutenant Capodanno rushed forward in a daring attempt to aid and assist the mortally wounded corpsman. At that instant, only inches from his goal, he was struck down by a burst of machine gun fire. By his heroic conduct on the battlefield, and his inspiring example, Lieutenant Capodanno upheld the finest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT RODNEY MAXWELL DAVIS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as the right guide of the Second Platoon, Company B, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in action against enemy forces in Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 6 September 1967. Elements of the Second Platoon were pinned down by a numerically superior force of attacking North Vietnamese Army Regulars. Remnants of the platoon were located in a trench line where Sergeant Davis was directing the fire of his men in an attempt to repel the enemy attack. Disregarding the enemy hand grenades and high volume of small arms and mortar fire, Sergeant Davis moved from man to man shouting words of encouragement to each of them while firing and throwing grenades at the onrushing enemy. When an enemy grenade landed in the trench in the midst of his men, Sergeant Davis, realizing the gravity of the situation, and in a final valiant act of complete self-sacrifice, instantly threw himself upon the grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and terrific force of the explosion. Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of almost certain death, Sergeant Davis saved his comrades from injury and possible loss of life, enabled his platoon to hold its vital position, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantry gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DOUGLAS EUGENE DICKEY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the Second Platoon, Company C, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam on 26 March 1967. While participating in Operation Beacon Hill 1, the Second Platoon was engaged in a fierce battle with the Viet Cong at close range in dense jungle foliage Private First Class Dickey had come forward to replace a radio operator who had been wounded in this intense action and was being treated by a medical corpsman. Suddenly an enemy grenade landed in the midst of a group of Marines, which included the wounded radio operator who was immobilized. Fully realizing the inevitable result of his actions, Private First Class Dickey, in a final valiant act, quickly and unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and complete force of the explosion. Private First Class Dickey's personal heroism, extraordinary valor and selfless courage saved a number of his comrades from certain injury and possible death at the cost of his own life. His actions reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT PAUL HELLSTROM FOSTER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as an Artillery Liaison Operations Chief with the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, near Con Thien in the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 14 October 1967, the Second Battalion was occupying a defensive position which protected a bridge on the road leading from Con Thien to Cam Lo. Suddenly, the Marines' position came under a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire, followed by an aggressive enemy ground assault. In the ensuing engagement, the hostile force penetrated the perimeter and brought a heavy concentration of small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire to bear on the Battalion Command Post. Although his position in the Fire Support Coordination Center was dangerously exposed to enemy fire and he was wounded when an enemy hand grenade exploded near his position, Sergeant Foster resolutely continued to direct accurate mortar and artillery fire on the advancing North Vietnamese troops. As the attack continued, a hand grenade landed in the midst of Sergeant Foster and his five companions. Realizing the danger, he shouted a warning, threw his armored vest over the grenade, and unhesitatingly placed his own body over the armored vest. When the grenade exploded, Sergeant Foster absorbed the entire blast with his own body and was mortally wounded. His heroic actions undoubtedly saved his comrades from further injury or possible death. Sergeant Foster's courage, extraordinary heroism, and unfaltering devotion to duty reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CAPTAIN JAMES ALBERT GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 2 June 1967. During Operation Union II, the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, consisting of Companies A and D, with Captain Graham's company attached, launched an attack against an enemy occupied position, with two companies assaulting and one in reserve. Company F, a leading company, was proceeding across a clear paddy area one thousand meters wide, attacking toward the assigned objective, when it came under heavy fire from mortars and small arms which immediately inflicted a large number of casualties. Hardest hit by fire was the second platoon of Company F, which was pinned down in the open paddy area by intense fire from two concealed machine guns. Forming an assault unit from members of his small company headquarters, Captain Graham boldly led a fierce assault through the second platoon's position, forcing the enemy to abandon the first machine gun position, thereby relieving some of the pressure on his second platoon, and enabling evacuation of the wounded to a more secure area. Resolute to silence the second machine gun, which continued its devastating fire, Captain Graham's small force stood steadfast in its hard won enclave. Subsequently, during the afternoon's fierce fighting, he suffered two minor wounds while personally accounting for a estimated fifteen enemy killed. With the enemy position remaining invincible upon each attempt to withdraw to friendly lines, and although knowing that he had no chance of survival, he chose to remain with one man who could not be moved due to the seriousness of his wounds. The last radio transmission from Captain Graham reported that he was being assaulted by a force of twenty-five enemy; he died while protecting himself and the wounded man he chose not to abandon. Captain Graham's actions throughout the day were a series of heroic achievements. He outstanding courage, superb leadership and indomitable fighting spirit undoubtedly saved the second platoon from annihilation and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS GARY WAYNE MARTINI
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. On April 21, 1967, during Operation Union, elements of Company F, conducting offensive operations at Binh Son, encountered a firmly entrenched enemy force and immediately deployed to engage them. The Marines in Private Martini's platoon assaulted across an open rice paddy to within twenty meters of the enemy trench line where they were suddenly struck by hand grenades, intense small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. The enemy onslaught killed 14 and wounded 18 Marines, pinning the remainder of the platoon down behind a low paddy dike. In the face of imminent danger, Private Martini immediately crawled over the dike to a forward open area within 15 meters of the enemy position where, continuously exposed to the hostile fire, he hurled hand grenades, killing several of the enemy. Crawling back through the intense fire, he rejoined his platoon which had moved to the relative safety of a trench line. From this position he observed several of his wounded comrades laying helpless in the fire-swept paddy. Although he knew that one man had been killed attempting to assist the wounded, Private Martini raced through the open area and dragged a comrade back to a friendly position. In spite of a serious wound received during this first daring rescue, he again braved the unrelenting fury of the enemy fire to aid another companion lying wounded only 20 meters in front of the enemy trench line. As he reached the fallen Marine, he received a mortal wound, but disregarding his own condition, he began to drag the Marine toward his platoon's position. Observing men from his unit attempting to leave the security of their position to aid him, concerned only for their safety, he called to them to remain under cover, and through a final supreme effort, moved his injured comrade to where he could be pulled to safety, before he fell, succumbing to his wounds. Stouthearted and indomitable, Private Martini unhesitatingly yielded his life to save two of his comrades and insure the safety of the remainder of his platoon. His outstanding courage, valiant fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty reflected the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS MELVIN EARL NEWLIN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner attached to the First Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 3 and 4 July 1967. Private Newlin, with four other Marines, was manning a key position on the perimeter of the Nong Son outpost when the enemy launched a savage and well coordinated mortar and infantry assault, seriously wounding him and killing his four comrades. Propping himself against his machine gun, he poured a deadly accurate stream of fire into the charging ranks of Viet Cong. Though repeatedly hit by small arms fire, he twice repelled enemy attempts to overrun his position. During the third attempt, a grenade explosion wounded him again and knocked him to the ground unconscious. The Viet Cong guerrillas, believing him dead, bypassed him and continued their assault on the main force. Meanwhile, Private Newlin regained consciousness, crawled back to his weapon, and brought it to bear on the rear of the enemy causing havoc and confusion among them. Spotting the enemy attempting to bring a captured 106 recoilless weapon to bear on other marine positions, he shifted his fire, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and preventing them from firing the captured weapon. He then shifted his fire back the primary enemy force, causing the enemy to stop their assaults on the marine bunkers and to once again attack his machine gun position. Valiantly fighting off two more enemy assaults, he firmly held his ground until mortally wounded. Private Newlin had singlehandedly broken up and disorganized the entire enemy assault force, causing them to lose momentum and delaying them long enough for his fellow marines to organize a defense and beat off their secondary attack. His indomitable courage, fortitude, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL WILLIAM THOMAS PERKINS, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a combat photographer attached to Company C, First Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 12 October 1967. During Operation Medina, a major reconnaissance in force southwest of Quang Tri, Company C made heavy combat contact with a numerically superior North Vietnamese Army Force estimated at from two to three companies. The focal point of the intense fighting was a helicopter landing zone which also serving as the Command Post of Company C. In the course of strong hostile attack, an enemy grenade landed in the immediate area occupied by Corporal Perkins and three other Marines. Realizing the inherent danger, he shouted the warning, "Incoming Grenade" to his fellow Marines, and in a valiant act of heroism, hurled himself upon the grenade absorbing the impact of the explosion with his own body, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the cost of his own. Through his exceptional courage and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, Corporal Perkins reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT LAWRENCE DAVID PETERS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a squad leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division in the Republic of Vietnam on 4 September 1967. During Operation Swift, in the province of Quang Tin, the Marines of the second platoon of Company M were struck by intense mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from an entrenched enemy force. As the company rallied its forces, Sergeant Peters maneuvered his squad in an assault on an enemy defended knoll. Disregarding his own safety, as enemy rounds hit all about him, he stood in the open, pointing out enemy positions until he was painfully wounded in the leg. Disregarding his wound he moved forward and continued to lead his men. As the enemy fire increased in accuracy and volume, his squad lost its momentum and was temporarily pinned down. Exposing himself to devastating enemy fire, he consolidated his position to render more effective fire. While directing the base of fire, he was wounded a second time in the face and neck from an exploding mortar round. As the enemy attempted to infiltrate the position of an adjacent platoon, Sergeant Peters stood erect in the full view of the enemy firing burst after burst forcing them to disclose their camouflaged positions. Sergeant Peters continued firing until he was critically wounded by a gunshot wound in his chest. Although unable to walk or stand, Sergeant Peters steadfastly continued to direct his squad in spite of two additional wounds, persisted in his efforts to encourage and supervise his men until he lost consciousness and succumbed. Inspired by his selfless actions, the squad regained fire superiority and once again carried the assault to the enemy. By his outstanding valor, indomitable fighting spirit and tenacious determination in the face of overwhelming odds, Sergeant Peters upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR STEPHEN WESLEY PLESS
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a helicopter gunship pilot attached to Marine Observation Squadron Six in action against enemy forces near Quang Ngai, Republic of Vietnam, on 19 August 1967. During an escort mission Major (then Captain) Pless monitored an emergency call that four American soldiers, stranded on a nearby beach, were being overwhelmed by a large Viet Cong force. Major Pless flew to the scene and found 30 to 50 enemy soldiers in the open. Some of the enemy were bayoneting and beating the downed Americans. Major Pless displayed exceptional airmanship as he launched a devastating attack against the enemy force, killing or wounding many of the enemy and driving the remainder back into a treeline. His rocket and machine gun attacks were made at such low levels that the aircraft flew through debris created by explosions from its rockets. Seeing one of the wounded soldiers gesture for assistance, he maneuvered his helicopter into a position between the wounded men and the enemy, providing a shield which permitted his crew to retrieve the wounded. During the rescue the enemy directed intense fire at the helicopter and rushed the aircraft again and again, closing to within a few feet before being beaten back. When the wounded men were aboard, Major Pless maneuvered the helicopter out to sea. Before it became safely airborne, the overloaded aircraft settled four times into the water. Displaying superb airmanship, he finally got the helicopter aloft. Major Pless' extraordinary heroism coupled with his outstanding flying skill prevented the annihilation of the tiny force. His courageous actions reflect great credit upon himself and uphold the greatest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT WALTER K. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Supply Sergeant, Company A, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, on 24 March 1967. Sergeant Singleton's company was conducting combat operations in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, when the lead platoon received intense small arms, automatic weapons, rocket, and mortar fire from a well entrenched enemy force. As the company fought its way forward, the extremely heavy enemy fire caused numerous friendly casualties. Sensing the need for early treatment of the wounded, Sergeant Singleton quickly moved from his relatively safe position in the rear to the foremost point of the advance and made numerous trips through the enemy killing zone to move the injured men out of the danger area. Noting that a large part of the enemy fire was coming from a hedgerow, he seized a machine gun and assaulted the key enemy location, delivering devastating fire as he advanced. He forced his way through the hedgerow directly into the enemy strong point. Although he was mortally wounded, his fearless attack killed eight of the enemy and drove the remainder from the hedgerow. Sergeant Singleton's bold actions completely disorganized the enemy defense and saved the lives of many of his comrades. His daring initiative, selfless devotion to duty and indomitable fighting spirit reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps, and his performance upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL LARRY EUGENE SMEDLEY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a squad leader with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in connection with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On the evening of 20-21 December 1967, Corporal Smedley led his six-man squad to an ambush site at the mouth of Happy Valley, near Phouc Ninh (2) in Quang Nam Province. Later that night, an estimated 100 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Regulars, carrying 122mm rocket launchers and mortars, were observed moving toward Hill 41. Realizing this was a significant enemy move to launch an attack on the vital Da Nang complex, Corporal Smedley immediately took sound and courageous action to stop the enemy threat. After he radioed for a reaction force, he skillfully maneuvered his men to a more advantageous position and led an attack on the numerically superior enemy force. A heavy volume of fire from an enemy machine gun positioned on the left flank of the squad inflicted several casualties on Corporal Smedley's unit. Simultaneously, an enemy rifle grenade exploded nearby, wounding him in the right foot and knocking him to the ground. Corporal Smedley disregarded this serious injury and valiantly struggled to his feet, shouting words of encouragement to his men. He fearlessly led a charge against the enemy machine gun emplacement, firing his rifle and throwing grenades, until he was again struck by enemy fire and knocked to the ground. Gravely wounded and weak from loss of blood, he rose and commenced a one-man assault against the enemy position. Although his aggressive and singlehanded attack resulted in the destruction of the machine gun, he was struck in the chest by enemy fire and fell mortally wounded. Corporal Smedley's inspiring and courageous actions, bold initiative, and selfless devotion to duty in the face of certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL ROY MITCHELL WHEAT
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, while serving as a fire team leader with the First Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam. On 11 August 1967, Corporal Wheat and two other Marines were assigned the mission of providing security for a Navy construction battalion crane and crew operating along Liberty Road in the vicinity of the Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province. After the Marines had set up security positions in a tree line adjacent to the work site, Corporal Wheat reconnoitered the area to the rear of their location for the possible presence of guerrillas. He then returned to within ten feet of the friendly position, and here unintentionally triggered a well concealed, bounding type, antipersonnel mine. Immediately, a hissing sound was heard which was identified by the three Marines as that of a burning time fuse. Shouting a warning to his comrades, Corporal Wheat in a valiant act of heroism hurled himself upon the mine, absorbing the tremendous impact of the explosion with his own body. The inspirational personal heroism and extraordinary valor of his unselfish action saved his fellow Marines from certain injury and possible death, reflected great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr. (Ret)
Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. (Ret)
Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret)

LtGen Hugh M. Elwood (Ret)
LtGen Joseph C. Fegan, Jr. (Ret)
LtGen Louis Metzger (Ret)
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. (Ret)
LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw (Ret)
LtGen Donn J. Robertson (Ret)

MajGen Norman J. Anderson (Ret)
MajGen Lowell E. English (Ret)
MajGen William B. Fleming (Ret)
MajGen Kenneth J. Houghton (Ret)
MajGen Wood B. Kyle (Ret)
MajGen Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (Ret)
MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins (Ret)

BGen Edward J. Doyle (Ret)
BGen Jacob E. Glick (Ret)
BGen Harvey E. Spielman (Ret)
BGen William A. Stiles (Ret)

Col Harry L. Alderman (Ret)
Col Nels E. Anderson (Ret)
Col Marshall B. Armstrong (Ret)
Col Robert Baird (Ret)
Col Arnold W. Barden (Ret)
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. (Ret)
Col George F. Bauman (Ret)
Col Julian G. Bass, Jr. (Ret)
Col Lee R. Bendell (Ret)
Col James L. Black, Jr. (Ret)

Col Louis A. Bonin (Ret)

Col Billy D. Bouldin (Ret)
Col Edward H. Boyd
Col Henry K. Bruce (Ret)
Col Alexander D. Cereghino (Ret)
Col Duncan D. Chaplin III (Ret)
Col John A. Conway (Ret)
Col John D. Counselman (Ret)
Col Charles C. Crossfield II (Ret)
Col William H. Dabney

Col Philip A. Davis (Ret)
Col William J. Davis (Ret)
Col William L. Dick (Ret)
Col Rex O. Dillow (Ret)
Col Dale D. Dorman
Col Kenneth T. Dykes (Ret)
Col William R. Earney (Ret)
Col Arnold L. Emils (Ret)
Col Dean E. Esslinger (Ret)
Col Charles R. Figard (Ret)

Col Leroy T. Frey (Ret)
Col James A. Gallo, Jr. (Ret)
Col Tolbert T. Gentry (Ret)
Col Baylor P. Gibson, Jr. (Ret)
Col Vincent J. Gottschalk (Ret)
Col William F. Guss (Ret)
Col Edward E. Hammerbeck (Ret)
Col James W. Hammond, Jr. (Ret)
Col Frank W. Harris III (Ret)
Col William H. Heintz (Ret)

Col Clayton V. Hendricks (Ret)
Col Frank M. Hepler (Ret)
Col Peter L. Hilgartner (Ret)
Col Milton A. Hull (Ret)
Col Kenneth E. Huntington (Ret)
Col Mallett C. Jackson, Jr. (Ret)
Col Robert M. Jenkins (Ret)
Col George E. Jerue (Ret)
Col Wilbur C. Kellogg, Jr. (Ret)
Col Joseph J. Kelly (Ret)

Col William D. Kent, Jr.
 Col Charles Kimak (Ret)
 Col Edward N. Le Faivre (Ret)
 Col Robert W. Lewis (Ret)
 Col Robert D. Limberg (Ret)
 Col Herbert H. Long (Ret)
 Col Joseph E. Lo Prete (Ret)
 Col Edgar J. Love (Ret)
 Col Stanley D. Low (Ret)
 Col David E. Lownds (Ret)

Col John L. Mahon (Ret)
 Col Donald L. Mallory (Ret)
 Col Samuel F. Martin (Ret)
 Col Glenn K. Maxwell (Ret)
 Col George C. McNaughton (Ret)
 Col Max McQuown (Ret)
 Col Ross L. Mulford (Ret)
 Col Robert C. Needham (Ret)
 Col Ernest W. Payne (Ret)
 Col John S. Payne (Ret)

Col Poul F. Pederson (Ret)
 Col Richard F. Peterson (Ret)
 Col Emil J. Radics (Ret)
 Col Robert L. Rathbun (Ret)
 Col Stanley Rauh (Ret)
 Col Edwin O. Reed (Ret)
 Col Robert C. Rice (Ret)
 Col David D. Rickabaugh (Ret)
 Col William K. Rockey
 Col Joseph L. Sadowski (Ret)

Col Richard J. Schening (Ret)
 Col Edwin S. Schick, Jr. (Ret)
 Col George C. Schmidt, Jr. (Ret)
 Col Maynard W. Schmidt (Ret)
 Col James C. Short (Ret)
 Col Richard B. Smith (Ret)
 Col James C. Stanfield (Ret)
 Col James R. Stockman (Ret)
 Col John C. Studt
 Col Richard D. Taber, Sr. (Ret)

Col David O. Takala (Ret)
 Col Orlando S. Tosdal (Ret)
 Col George M. Van Sant (Ret)
 Col Wendell N. Vest (Ret)
 Col Kirby B. Vick (Ret)
 Col Marvin D. Volkert (Ret)

Col Francis V. White, Jr.
 Col Gary Wilder (Ret)
 Col Dean Wilker (Ret)
 Col Theodore J. Willis (Ret)

Col Donald E. Wood
 Col Roy I. Wood, Jr. (Ret)
 Col Robert J. Zitnik (Ret)

LtCol Rheaford C. Bell (Ret)
 LtCol Gene W. Bowers
 LtCol Albert R. Bowman, II (Ret)
 LtCol Harold F. Brown (Ret)
 LtCol Horace A. Bruce (Ret)
 LtCol Willard N. Christopher (Ret)
 LtCol Philip M. Crosswait (Ret)
 LtCol James R. Davis
 LtCol Edwin A. Deptula (Ret)
 LtCol Henry Englisch (Ret)

LtCol Frederick L. Farrell, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Wells L. Field, III (Ret)
 LtCol Abie Gordon (Ret)
 LtCol John C. Hergert, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Jack M. Hermes (Ret)
 LtCol Earl E. Jacobson, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Roland L. McDaniel (Ret)
 LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick (Ret)
 LtCol John J. Mullen, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol James E. Murphy (Ret)

LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary (Ret)
 LtCol Charles E. Parker (Ret)
 LtCol Wesley H. Rodenberger (Ret)
 LtCol Richard E. Romine (Ret)
 LtCol Robert F. Sheridan (Ret)
 LtCol E. Bruce Sigmon, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Albert C. Slater
 LtCol Joseph T. Smith (Ret)
 LtCol Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.
 LtCol Philip E. Tucker

LtCol Charles B. Webster (Ret)
 LtCol James B. Wilkinson (Ret)
 LtCol James S. Wilson (Ret)

Maj Walter E. Deese
 Maj Leonard E. Fuchs (Ret)

Maj Michael W. Sayers (Ret)
 Maj William E. Snyder (Ret)
 Maj Raymond A. Thomas

Navy

Adm U.S. Grant Sharp (Ret)

VAdm Thomas R. Weschler (Ret)

RAdm Norvell G. Ward (Ret)
 RAdm Edwin B. Hooper (Ret)

Capt P.D. Cooper
 Capt John T. Vincent (Ret)
 Capt John D. Westervelt (Ret)

Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Center of Military History, Department of the Army
 Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force
 Naval History Division, Department of the Navy

BGen James L. Collins, USA (Ret)
 Dr. Robert J. Watson
 Mrs. Janet D. Beard
 Mrs. John H. Maloney
 Mrs. Glenn E. Norris
 Mrs. Harry D. Wortman

Appendix F

Distribution of Aircraft

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

December 1967

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER*
<i>MAG-11</i>								
H&MS-11	3/TA-4F 1/C-117D							
VMCJ-1	8/EF-10B 9/RF-4B 4/EA-6A							
VMFA-122	14/F-4B							
VMF (AW)-235	16/F-8E							
VMA (AW)-242	11/A-6A							
<i>MAG-12</i>								
H&MS-12		1/C-117 3/TA-4F						
VMA-121		16/A-4E						
VMA-211		21/A-4E						
VMA-311		15/A-4E						
(AW)-533		12/A-6A						
<i>MAG-13</i>								
H&MS-13		3/TF-9J 1/C-117D						
VMFA-115		14/F-4B						
VMFA-323		12/F-4B						
VMFA-314		10/F-4B						
<i>MAG-15</i>								
H&MS-15				5/UH-34D	3/C-54 4/TF-9J 1/C-117D			
VMGR-152				12/KC-130F				
VMA-223					19/A-4C			
VMFA-542					6/F-4B			
HMM-262				12/CH-46A				9/CH-46A
HMM-361								23/UH-34D*
<i>MAG-16</i>								
H&MS-16	1/C-117D 14/O-1C 4/UH-34D							
VMO-2	29/UH-1E							
HMM-265	6/CH-46A				15/CH-46A**			
HMM-363	29/UH-34D							
HMM-463	36/CH-53A							

*Aircraft indicated in "other" column with SLF, Seventh Fleet

**CH-46A Rehab Program.

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<i>MW/SG-17</i> H&MS-17			5/UH-34D 3/C-117D 2/US-2B					
<i>MAG-36</i> H&MS-36			3/UH-34D 1/C-117D					
VMO-3			20/UH-E					
VMO-6			21/UH-1E					
HMM-163			26/UH-34D					
HMM-164			3/CH-46A	12/CH-46A**				
HMM-165			3/CH-46A	16/CH-46A**				
HMM-362			25/UH-34D					
HMM-364			6/UH-34D					
<i>MAG-33</i> H&MS-33 VMCJ-3							2/T-1A 11/RF-4B 7/EF-10B	
VMF-214							17/A-4C	
VMFA-232							17/A-4C	
VMFA-334							15/F-4J	
<i>MW/SG-37</i> H&MS-37							4/T-1A 4/C-117D 3/C-54Q	
VMGR-352				4/KC-130F			11/KC-130F	
<i>MHTG-30</i> H&MS-30 HMMT-301 HMMT-302							3/UH-34D 24/UH-34D 23/UH-1E	
<i>1ST MAR</i> <i>BRIG</i> H&MS							3/UH-34D 1/VH-34D 3/T-1A	
VMF (AW)-212							16/F-8D/B	
<i>MAG-56</i> H&MS-56 VMO-5 HMM-263 HMH-462							6/CH-46D 23/UH-1E 24/CH-46A 19/CH-53A	
<i>TOTAL PAC</i> <i>AIRCRAFT</i> Fixed Wing (338)	72	129		16	34	15	72	
Helicopters (364)	108	94	24	23		5	68	42

Appendix G

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 31 December 1967

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		DONG HA		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
HEADQUARTERS																						
HQ, FMF, PAC																						
FMF, PAC (FWD)		75		24AUG									75									
H&S BN, FMF, PAC		1065	30	23NOV													1065	30				
CAMP S. M. BUTLER		1241	109	6NOV									1241	109								
CASUAL/TRANSIENT		1287		6NOV									1287									
HQ, V MEF		82	2	23NOV															82	2		
1ST CIV AFF GRP		80	7	23NOV															80	7		
HQ, 5TH MAR DIV																						
HQBN, 5TH MAR DIV		1407	43	23NOV															1407	43		
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF, PAC																						
HQ CO, FORTRPS		321	18	23NOV															321	18		
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																						
HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG		214	17	23NOV													214	17				
HQ, 9TH MAB																						
HQ CO, 9TH MAB		422	12	23NOV									422	12								
HQ, III MAF																						
H&S CO, III MAF																						
1ST & 2D CAG	4	768	62	2NOV	768	62																
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV																						
HQBN, 1ST MAR DIV		1588	32	16NOV	1588	32																
HQ, 3D MAR DIV																						
HQBN, 3D MAR DIV		1897	32	16NOV					1897	32												
INFANTRY																						
1ST MARINES																						
HQ CO		255	6	16NOV							255	6										
1ST BATTALION		1132	49	16NOV							1132	49										
2D BATTALION		1081	54	16NOV							1081	54										
3D BATTALION	1	1498	94	16NOV																	1498	94
3D MARINES																						
HQ CO		218	5	16NOV							218	5										
1ST BATTALION	1	1533	83	17NOV																	1533	83
2D BATTALION		1123	54	12OCT	1123	54																
3D BATTALION		1081	50	16NOV							1081	50										
4TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		218	3	16NOV					218	3												
1ST BATTALION		1082	48	16NOV					1082	48												
2D BATTALION		1051	49	16NOV							1051	49										
3D BATTALION		1062	53	16NOV							1062	53										
5TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		234	4	16NOV	234	4																
1ST BATTALION		985	53	16NOV	985	53																
2D BATTALION		1081	45	16NOV	1081	45																
3D BATTALION		982	51	16NOV	982	51																
7TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		223	7	16NOV	223	7																
1ST BATTALION		1050	54	16NOV	1050	54																
2D BATTALION		1030	53	16NOV	1030	53																
3D BATTALION		1039	51	16NOV	1039	51																
9TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		219	3	16NOV					219	3												
1ST BATTALION		1052	52	16NOV					1052	52												
2D BATTALION		1079	51	16NOV					1079	51												
3D BATTALION		1040	49	16NOV					1040	49												
26TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		503	17	23NOV							220	2	283	15								
1ST BATTALION		1012	50	16NOV							1012	50										
2D BATTALION		1058	49	16NOV					1058	49												
3D BATTALION		1079	49	16NOV					1079	49												
27TH MARINES																						
HQ CO		216	3	23NOV															216	3		
1ST BATTALION	3	1491	65	23NOV													1491	65				
2D BATTALION		1017	33	23NOV															1017	33		
3D BATTALION		1012	32	23NOV															1012	32		

28TH MARINES														
HQ CO		313	5	23NOV									313	5
1ST BATTALION		942	33	23NOV									942	33
2D BATTALION		945	35	23NOV									945	35
3D BATTALION		916	33	23NOV									916	33
ARTILLERY														
11TH MARINES														
HQ BTRY		262	7	16NOV	262	7								
1ST BATTALION		431	14	16NOV					431	14				
2D BATTALION		638	11	16NOV	638	11								
3D BATTALION		577	15	16NOV	577	15								
4TH BATTALION		427	11	16NOV	427	11								
12TH MARINES														
HQ BTRY		296	12	16NOV					296	12				
1ST BATTALION		703	13	16NOV					703	13				
2D BATTALION		541	8	16NOV					541	8				
3D BATTALION		516	9	16NOV				516	9					
4TH BATTALION		646	12	16NOV				646	12					

* UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		DONG HA		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
13TH MARINES																						
HQ BTRY		255	5	23NOV															255	5		
1ST BATTALION		388	8	16NOV																		
2D BATTALION		401	8	23NOV							388	8							401	8		
3D BATTALION		627	14	23NOV															627	14		
4TH BATTALION		366	8	23NOV															366	8		
HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG		91	2	16NOV					91	2												
HQ BTRY, 5TH FAG		156	5	23NOV															156	5		
1ST 155MM GUN BTRY		118	3	16NOV					118	3												
3D 155MM GUN BTRY		140	3	16NOV	140	3																
5TH 155MM GUN BTRY		150	3	16NOV	150	3																
7TH 155MM GUN BTRY		162	3	23NOV																		
1ST 8" HOW BTRY		189	3	16NOV					189	3									162	3		
3D 8" HOW BTRY		197	3	16NOV	197	3																
5TH 8" HOW BTRY		203	2	23NOV															203	2		
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY		111	2	16NOV							111	2										
RECONNAISSANCE																						
1ST RECON BN		441	24	16NOV	441	24																
3D RECON BN		500	34	16NOV					500	34												
5TH RECON BN		334	15	23NOV									31	1					303	14		
1ST FORCE RECON CO		146	4	16NOV	146	4																
3D FORCE RECON CO		161	7	16NOV					161	7												
5TH FORCE RECON CO		116	3	23NOV															116	3		
ANTI-TANK																						
1ST AT BN		303	7	16NOV	303	7																
3D AT BN		348	7	16NOV					348	7												
5TH AT BN		269	7	23NOV									20	1					249	6		
TANK																						
1ST TANK BN		593	15	16NOV	593	15																
3D TANK BN		611	8	16NOV					611	8												
5TH TANK BN		604	12	23NOV									77	1					527	11		
AMTRAC																						
1ST AMTRAC BN		631	15	16NOV					631	15												
3D AMTRAC BN		656	15	16NOV	656	15																
5TH AMTRAC BN		705	17	23NOV									110	1					595	16		
1ST ARM AMPHIB CO		244	3	16NOV	244	3																
ENGINEER																						
1ST ENGR BN		668	14	16NOV	668	14																
3D ENGR BN		672	11	16NOV					672	11												
5TH ENGR BN		493	12	23NOV									37	1					456	11		
7TH ENGR BN		947	22	16NOV	947	22																
9TH ENGR BN		946	14	16NOV			946	14														
11TH ENGR BN		1165	21	16NOV							1165	21										
13TH ENGR BN		869	17	23NOV															869	17		
1ST BRIDGE CO		140		16NOV	140																	
3D BRIDGE CO		156		16NOV	156																	
5TH BRIDGE CO		118	2	23NOV															118	2		
MOTOR TRANSPORT																						
1ST MT BN		246	5	16NOV	246	5																
3D MT BN		395	8	16NOV					395	8												
5TH MT BN		193	8	23NOV									12	1					181	7		
7TH MT BN		387	3	16NOV	387	3																
9TH MT BN		366	9	16NOV							366	9										
11TH MT BN		381	9	16NOV	381	9																
13TH MT BN		358	9	23NOV															358	9		
COMMUNICATION																						
1ST RADIO BN		475	2	23NOV	247												228	2				
5TH COMM BN		212	7	16NOV	212	7																
7TH COMM BN		669	13	16NOV	669	13																
9TH COMM BN		670	4	24NOV									190	3					480	1		
1ST ANGLICO	2	330	10	23NOV													133	2			197	8
SHORE PARTY																						
1ST SP BN		373	15	16NOV	373	15																
3D SP BN		496	35	16NOV					496	35												
5TH SP BN		298	21	23NOV									21	4					277	17		

MAG-16														
H&MS-16	496	1	16NOV	496										
MABS-16	689	30	16NOV	689	30									
MATCU-62	82		16NOV											
MATCU-68	73		16NOV											
VMO-2	163	1	16NOV	163	1									
HMH-463	306	1	16NOV	306	1									
HMM-265	179	4	16NOV	179	4									
HMM-363	187	1	16NOV	187	1									
MAG-36														
H&MS-36	474		16NOV											
MABS-36	701	35	16NOV											
MATCU-70	23		16NOV											
VMO-3	192	1	16NOV											
VMO-6	202	1	16NOV											
HMM-163	225	4	16NOV											
HMM-164	176	1	16NOV											
HMM-165	185	1	16NOV											
HMM-362	212	1	16NOV											
HMM-364	399	2	16NOV											
9TH MAB														
MAG-15														
H&MS-15	568		23NOV											
MABS-15	383	29	23NOV											
H&HS IWAKUNI	394	293	15JUN											
H&HS FUTEMA	244	61	9MAR											
MACS-6	208	2	23NOV											
MATCU-60	69	1	23NOV											
MATCU-66	38		22NOV											
VMGR-152	485	6	23NOV											
VMA-223	209	1	16NOV											
VMA-542	303	2	16NOV											
HMM-262	163	1	16NOV											
HMM-361	1	192	4	16NOV										

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		DONG HA		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
1ST BRIG		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
H&MS 1ST BRIGADE		93		23NOV													93					
MACS-2		235		9NOV													235					
VMF(AW)-212		233	1	9NOV													233	1				

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	DONG HA	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	85,790	25,463	1,737	12,186	15,134	8,133		3,131	16,778	3,228
	USN	3,855	1,154	100	668	575	222		125	826	185
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	27,280	7,664	4,705	2,534	225	1,141	1,829	635	8,355	192
	USN	717	143	85	41	4	70	326	1	43	4
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	113,070	33,127	6,442	14,720	15,359	9,274	1,829	3,766	25,133	3,420
	USN	4,572	1,297	185	209	579	292	326	126	869	189

- NOTES:**
1. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF's AND ARE BLT STRENGTHS.
 2. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS.
 3. STRENGTH INDICATED IS FOR BLT 1/27.
 4. AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS.

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